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" I do not say that we can here and now give definite answers to all 
these ancient questions, but I do say that a method has been discovered 
by which, as in science, we can make successive approximations to the 
truth, in which each new stage results from an improvement, not a 
rejection , of what has gone before" 
Bertrand Russell "History of Western Philosophy". London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1961, p. 789. 
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Abstract 
In the present study, a total of two experiments constitute a follow 
up study of the development of communication: referring expressions and 
other aspects of discourse in pre-school urban Algerian children. 
In the first experiment, the focus is on the differences between the 
use of definite and indefinite noun-phrase, in two conditions (free-
play/structured play), and differences between the use of person 
pronouns (I, You) which are essentially deictic and the ones which are 
essentially intralinguistic or cohesive (3rd p: he, she, it) within the two 
conditions. The demonstrative pronouns and adverbs which are added in 
the grouping are less important with regard to the main factors of interest 
(definite vs. indefinite NP, and 1st and 2nd p. vs. 3rd p.), but in the global 
analysis they are of some interest as to the continuity from the more 
indexical function to the more intralinguistic or cohesive use of referring 
expressions. 
The categories which are of interest in the second experiment, are 
those which, strictly speaking, are used anaphorically. The person 
pronouns (I,You) and the demonstrative adverbs (or locatives: here, 
there) which were under scrutiny in the first experiment, are dropped in 
the second experiment. These categories of discourse are hardly found, 
because of the nature of the experiment, the purpose of which being the 
evaluation of the more intralinguistic uses of referring expressions. 
Unlike the first experiment which was designed to tackle both the deictic 
4 
and intralinguistic uses of referring expressions by pre-school children, 
the second experiment was, thus, designed to measure the extent to 
which pre-schoolers engaged in some specific tasks (tasks which might 
prompt the use of some aspects of discourse), use referring expressions 
in their anaphoric sense, and track down these uses to their significance. 
Overall, the results of the present study, together with examples 
from other experimental data, indicate that the function of the definite 
article may initially be predominantly exophoric or deictic, in as much as 
this function signals a particular object or the actions of one salient object 
singled out from a group of others, in the extralinguistic context. The 
results of the first experiment showed a predominant presence of a 
developmental function (the nominative use of the definite reference) and 
a consistency in the appearance of such a function across categories (the 
deictic uses) developmentally associated with this function. The person 
pronouns '1"you' are typically 'exophoric' since they refer to aspects of 
the non-linguistic context and, by contrast 3rd p. pronouns (he, she, it, 
they) are essentially intralinguistic or cohesive. Similarly in the second 
experiment the results concerning the definite NP do agree with some 
recent findings about the deictic function of the definite article (which 
sometimes is used correctly when the object is alone, and at some other 
time it is used incorrectly in the instance of a non-specific reference). 
This, in fact, is quite different from an anaphoric or intralinguistic function: 
it grew out from the present data, that the apparently correct use of the 
definite NP is tied to situationally introduced referent and it is not truly 
anaphoric. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
The present research is an attempt to study experimentally 
referring expressions and some other aspects of discourse in Algerian 
pre-school children. It is firmly grounded in the ever increasing and 
multidisciplinary field of the development of communication. The 
development of communication subsumes both the development of 
communicative competence and the development of discourse as an 
aspect of 'communicative competence', or the ability to use language not 
just correctly but also effectively. 
Children acquire language in order to communicate. This simple 
fact goes along with the increasing recognition, (among contemporary 
child language researchers and developmental psychologists) that 
language is intrinsically communicative and that its acquisition is viewed 
as occurring within and being dependent upon a social-communicative 
context (Waterson and Snow, 1978). The consequences of this emphasis 
on the social-communicative role of language by developmental 
psycholinguists in the late 70s, have been that more attention is paid to 
the child's intentions and to the acquisition of conversational skills, 
together with other components of linguistic ability. Other consequences 
include the recognition that non-verbal communication is a step towards 
the early use of language, and that what and how the child communicates 
must be the true object of research in language acquisition. 
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To get a general idea of the approach, the analysis and the 
procedure adopted in the present research, an attempt is made to review 
the literature on the subject of language development, from the notion of 
'communicative competence' and its acquisition, and the pragmatics of 
the development of communication through to the development of 
reference in discourse. The pragmatics of the acquisition of 
communicative competence being intended to provide depth and scope 
to the present research topic. 
Learning to communicate is, in one important sense, learning to 
use language appropriately in social contexts, and this involves what Dell 
Hymes (1971) calls 'communicative competence'. 'Communicative 
competence' includes the ability to express one's pragmatic intents (to 
express one's intentions and at the same time to get things accomplished 
in the world) and the knowledge of how to speak appropriately in various 
social situations. This shift, in recent developmental psycholinguistic 
studies, towards communicative competence put forward the issue that 
"An approach to language acquisition that recognizes the centrality of 
communicative competence to development enables us to understand 
language as a culturally situated social behaviour" (R.L. Schiefelbusch, 
1984, p. 3). 
In the second chapter of the present study, an attempt will be made 
to present the above view together with other dimensions of 
communicative competence. In doing so, I will concentrate on some 
characterisations of communicative competence, the ones which are 
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hypothesized to enable a speaker to understand the speech of others as 
a function of both the structural characteristics of speech and the social 
context. I will touch upon the need, already felt in the late 70s within that 
broad multidisciplinary area of child development, to develop somehow 
more comprehensive models of the development of communicative 
competence. Research within that period, and especially in the area of 
developmental pragmatics (Bates, 1976; Bates et al, 1979, Ochs and 
Schieffelin, 1979) has moved significantly beyond a deterministic 
cognitive explanation of language which originated in the developmental 
psychology of Jean Piaget. For J. Bruner (1978) a more comprehensive 
view of language development would require the student of child 
language to take into consideration a set of "generative skills", namely the 
conceptual, social and linguistic. One way to handle these skills is, 
according to J. Dore (1979), to build up a conversational model. 
In the early 70s, a morphemic index of development, or the M.L.U. 
(Mean Length of Utterance unit), was used intensively to measure the 
child's grammatical capacity. However this index does not actually reflect 
the function of an utterance, nor the semantic relations expressed by such 
a morphemic unit. It appears that, in Dore's view (1979), MLU count 
correlated with the conversational status of the utterance will provide both 
a structural and functional index that will in some way offer an integrated 
measure of the development of communicative competence. Dore (1977; 
1978; 1979) proposed what he called "conversational acts" or 
"conversational units", or units of language behaviour that reflect both the 
functions and the structures of children's utterances. 
	 Dore's 
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'conversational acts' are assumed to be based on some pragmatic 
considerations, i.e., they are acts which convey both a proposition and the 
speaker's attitude towards that proposition. These also appear to be the 
essential components of a communicative act or speech act: the 
propositions and illocutionary force. The 'proposition' is said, in Speech 
Act theory (Austin 1962; Searle, 1969), to involve the conceptual content 
of the utterance organised in terms of a predicate taking one or more 
arguments, and the 'illocutionary force', or what the speaker intends his 
utterance to be taken. Another condition in taking conversational acts as 
central elements of communicative competence has to do with the 
identification of particular acts based partly on their relation to others in 
the conversation. There may be some methodological advantages of 
conversational acts or C- acts, among these is particularly the attribution 
of intentions to infants' early vocalisation. Some work (J. Ryan, 1974) has 
already been done in that direction, which is a classification of cues used 
by mothers and caretakers, on the basis of a pragmatic analysis of 
performative aspects of speech developed by Austin (1962). This was 
done in terms of the 'aspects' the 'accompaniments' and the 
'circumstances' of the utterance. However in attributing intention to 
infants' early vocalisation there appears to be a difficulty in trying to 
establish whether something was 'really' or consciously intended. 
In any case, it appears that the progress towards the use of 
conventional means to communicate an intent depends, from the 
beginning, upon the child learning the appropriate pragmatic of 
indicating, requesting, or whatever before he learns grammatical forms. 
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The pragmatic perspective on the development of communication 
helped students of child language to redefine speech act theory as a 
theory of 'communication' or 'communicative competence' (Bates, 1976; 
Dore, 1975; Garvey, 1975); this is because speech act theory focussed on 
the use of expressions in speech event situations. Besides the works of 
Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) other philosophers of language 
considered the circumstances surrounding an utterance, and 
consequently the discourse in which it occurred. They attempted to 
identify rules that govern the way discourse is conducted. Among these, 
H. Grice (1975) formulated a set of conversational postulates that are 
perhaps susceptible to developmental influences and empirical research. 
Grice's principles involve assumptions or presuppositions that 
participants in a conversation share about the contents of their exchange 
of talk and the way the conversation must be conducted. Very few studies 
have directly investigated children's awareness of Gricean maxims or 
principles. The apparent reason for this seems to be that they are too 
general to be easily subjected to research. It is possible to relate, 
indirectly, some specific presuppositional constructions (informativeness 
and relevance, for example) to Gricean principles which are partially 
instantiated in those specific presuppositional constructions. The 
"cooperative principle", one of Grice's most general principles, subsumes 
these presuppositional constructions under the assumption of 'quantity' 
and 'relation'. For De Hart and Maratsos (1984), informativeness and 
relevance partly concern correct usage of determiners ('a' and 'the'), 
proper names and pronouns, and that all these particular linguistic forms 
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partly involve the speaker's understanding of what the listener knows. 
These particular linguistic forms that carry presuppositions (definite and 
indefinite articles, proper names, pronouns) are directly related to the 
referring expressions, as elements of presuppositions, investigated in the 
present research. 
In the third chapter, the most closely related studies to the present 
research are discussed in some detail within the development of 
reference in discourse. One of the most important accomplishments in 
pragmatic development, when talking about presuppositional usages, 
involves when not to take information for granted; more precisely it 
requires that the developing child learns when not to presuppose so that 
the listener will understand what is being said, since the latter does not 
hold the same assumptions as the speaker does (Bates, 1976a). 
'Presupposition' which involves "the use of an utterance to comment upon 
information assumed to be shared by speaker and listener" (Bates, 
1976a, p. 97), is a feature of communication that extends throughout 
one's life. From a Piagetian position, while pre-school children are still 
prone to egocentric speech they are in some way very much 
presupposing, and the gradual decline of egocentric speech parallels the 
development of presupposition. If, in such a view, pre-school children's 
speech appears to be predominantly non-social or egocentric in that it 
fails to take into consideration other interlocutors, from a Vygotskyan 
position (Vygotsky, 1962; 1978) this so-called 'cognitive inadequacy' 
appears to be very different. Vygotsky's view is that young children 
respond to and initiate dialogues with adult partners when engaging in 
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joint activities. Adult's utterances will guide children's attention and 
actions, and progressively adult dialogue forms will come to be used as 
overt private speech. Private speech takes its origins in social dialogues 
between adult and child. These dialogic strategies are internalized later 
on, by children, in the forms of covert private speech, or 'inner' speech. 
An important assumption in child's language research in the 
Piagetian tradition is that the waning of the developmental processes of 
presupposition and egocentric speech is closely tied to the development 
of discourse. One recurring idea in the developmental literature on 
language development in the pre-school years, is that progress in the 
development of discourse depends on the child's increasing ability to 
understand the needs and resources of the listener (Bloom and Lahey, 
1978). 
Studies by Brown (1973), Maratsos (1974) and Warden (1976), on 
the acquisition and use of articles, uncovered an inappropriate egocentric 
use of the definite article in young children. Such findings attribute to 
young children a failure to take account of their audience's knowledge of 
the referent, when they use a definite reference or when they construct a 
referring expression. It appears that young children fail to recognize the 
need for an indefinite expression (use of an indefinite article) when they 
introduce a referent for the first time in discourse. 
Children's referring expressions in discourse (definite and 
indefinite reference, pronouns, noun-substitutes and deictic indexical 
functions, proper nouns, etc.) have been studied longitudinally and cross- 
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sectionally from a variety of points of view, within the broad field of the 
development of communication. Most research on children's use of 
pronouns, for example, has concentrated on the indexical function of 1st 
and 2nd person usage. A contemporary psycholinguistic hypothesis (J. 
Lyons, 1977; 1975) states that deictic terms are logically prior to 
anaphoric ones, and that the former appear earlier than the latter. The 
young child appears first to use pronouns to refer to things and persons 
that are physically present in the situation in which he/she is involved, 
rather than those that linguistically refer to objects and persons known 
only through prior mention in an utterance. It can be said that basically a 
deictic pronoun does not need in its use some form of an internal 
representation (since it can refer to the world of objects directly), while an 
anaphoric pronoun will require some form of internal representation (to 
retrieve information about the antecedent which justifies the use of an 
anaphoric pronoun). Part of one of the hypotheses of the present study is 
that this function of deictic terms at a certain age is an example of a 
'developmental function', whereby deictic terms are acquired earlier than 
sentential expressions belonging to the extended discourse. (c.f. works of 
Warden, 1976; Maratsos, 1976; Emslie and Stevenson, 1981). These 
terms appear to continue to function developmentally (the pronouns are 
deictically referential) for some time before the effective use of cohesive 
devices (all aspects of anaphora). 
The basic findings about the acquisition of pronouns (Charney, 
1980; Deutsch & Pechman, 1978) appear to agree that young children 
acquire the personal pronoun 'I' before 'you', and that these two are 
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acquired before 'he' or 'she'. This will be discussed in some detail in the 
third chapter of the present research. A problem, however, about all 
these observations, is pointed out in conjunction with the discussion of 
their results. 
Are the tasks given to 2-year-olds suitable for reflecting their actual 
abilities? Could one obtain reliable responses, which are not 
experimental artefacts, from young children at the crucial stages of 
development? (S. Chiat, 1986). Do these results reflect young children's 
actual processing of particular linguistic forms or do they reflect more of 
the experimental situation and perhaps the strategies used by children in 
that situation? Some related questions will also be posed in connection 
with the sorts of experimental manipulation of either cognitive (pragmatic) 
or linguistic (lexical) sources of information. The intent in these studies 
concerned with the interpretation of pronouns by young children, is to 
disambiguate the relative contributions of these sources of information in 
the acquisition and use of pronouns (Tyler, 1983; Wykes, 981). 
Other experimental studies of referring expressions have looked 
particularly at the functions that pronouns and articles can serve. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1979; 1981; 1985) Warden (1976) and Emslie and 
Stevenson (1981) have focussed on the notions of definiteness and 
indefiniteness in the use of articles, and the parallel notions of specificity 
vs. non-specificity and novel vs. familiar distinction coded by the articles. 
The indefinite article 'a' can serve many functions. It can be used to 
introduce a new entity (e.g. "I visited a new school yesterday") but it can 
also have a non-specific function (i.e. no specific entity in the mind of the 
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speaker, e.g.:"the old man wanted to buy a book", where any book on any 
subject will do). 
In Karmiloff-Smith's view, developmental changes in the 
psycholinguistic behaviour of children reflect underlying representational 
changes that allow the above-mentioned functions to be coordinated. On 
the other hand, for Karmiloff-Smith (1979; 1981) the early deictic use of 
the definite referring expressions is deictic rather than anaphoric, and the 
reason for such use "could be that the child has one procedure for 
naming: 'that's + N', juxtaposed with quite a separate procedure for 
making reference, i.e. the use of the definite article or the pronoun 
deictically" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1981, p. 128). 
In the same context of research, pre-school children in Warden's 
study (1976) fail to take account of the social context of their reference or 
of their audience's knowledge of the referent, when they construct a 
referring expression. For Warden children under 5 years fail to recognize 
the need for an indefinite expression when introducing a referent and, at 
the same time, the constraints on the use of the definite article, i.e., to 
indicate an already identified referent. The same conclusion about the 
egocentric use of the definite article is also found in Maratsos (1976) with 
3 to 4 year olds but to a lesser degree (Maratsos' results do not agree 
with Warden's as to the extent to which this egocentric use is found in pre-
school children). This will be discussed in more detail in the chapters 
dealing with the experiments of the present study, together with the 
existing, and sometimes conflicting, evidence as to the age at which the 
articles are acquired. 
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Problems concerning some aspects of the methodologies used by 
contemporary experimental studies of the article by pre-school children 
must be pointed out. The most common of such problems concerns the 
pictures used in the experimental tasks (the pictures often being difficult to 
integrate into a single story, and this may be masking, in a way, children's 
true abillity in using such and such linguistic form). Another problem often 
pointed out has to do with the situation in which the tasks are being 
performed. Concerning this latter problem, one essential argument in 
Emslie & Stevenson (1981) (talking about the appropriate/inappropriate 
use of the definite article) is that when children are telling stories to a 
listener who is familiar to the individual depicted in the pictures shown to 
them (the listener can actually see the pictures), the use of the definite 
article is appropriate. But in the situation where the listener can not see 
the pictures, even three-year-old children, can use the definite and 
indefinite articles appropriately (Emslie & Stevenson (1981). A problem, 
however, might emerge here. This use of definite and indefinite articles 
seems to be appropriate from the adult's, as addressee's, point of view, 
but it may not necesssarily be the case for the pre-school child. As was 
suggested earlier by Karmiloff-Smith (1981), children might just be 
'juxtaposing' a series of sentences containing pronouns, but not 
necessarily linking them up. In the examples: 
"That's a dog. The dog is barking." 	 and 
"That's a dog. It's barking" 
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is the pre-school child's use of the definite article "the" and the neutral 
pronoun "it" really anaphoric? In the situation where both the young child 
and the adult are looking at the same picture or watching the same scene 
involving a dog engaged in an action, the 'a' in "That's a dog" appears to 
function deictically (the child's 'pointing' to and 'naming' the individual in 
the picture), and not truly introducing a new entity. 'The' and 'it' may not 
be understood by young children as necessarily referring back to an 
already introduced individual, i.e. functioning anaphorically. In the 
situation where the listener (an adult or another child) can not see the 
picture, a young child as a speaker may refer to the content of the picture 
by "the dog's barking" or simply "dog's barking". A definite referring 
expression (e.g. 'the') might often function "exophorically" (referring to 
objects & things in the environment of the child, or reference outward) 
rather than anaphorically. An attempt will be made to show this in the 
discussion of the results of the present research in conjunction with other 
studies of referring expressions (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979; Warden, 1976; 
Hawkins, 1977). 
The situation in the present study plays an important role, but it is 
seen from a different angle than the one used by Emslie & Stevenson 
(1981). 
One hypothesis of the present study is that the cohesive uses of 
referring expressions, and their interpretations and recognition without 
difficulty by children, are relatively late developments (c.f. also works by 
Karmiloff-Smith 1977, 1979; Warden, 1976; Hickmann, 1980; 1985). To 
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be successful, a definite reference must refer to a definite individual. 
Moreover, the description we offer of that 'definite individual' will be 
sufficiently specific, in the given context, to identify uniquely for the 
hearer/participant (i.e. in the context of a conversation) the referent we 
have in mind. (see J. Lyons, 1977; 1981). Such specification of the 
uniqueness of the referent is cognitively more demanding than, for 
example, the semantic distinction involved in naming. In the former use 
(or 'identifying function') the speaker/participant is referring to a particular 
example(s) of a class of things (c.f. Emslie and Stevenson, 1981), and in 
the latter use (or 'nominative function') the speaker/participant is required 
to have only a grasp of the class membership, i.e., an individual class 
member. We can illustrate this with the example of the indefinite article 'a' 
as having a nominative and an identifying use. In a naming task the reply 
to the question 'what's that?' will be "a + noun", and in an 
identification/description task the reply to the question "tell me what's 
happening?" will be "a + noun is ...ing a + noun", e.g. "a dog is chasing a 
duck" (c.f. Warden, 1976). 
3rd person pronouns are continuous with this cohesive use of a 
definite reference. They "create" referents linguistically in such a way that 
the presuppositions about their existence and specificity are thus 
available, and in the subsequent discourse the use of more 
'presupposing' coreferential "definite forms" is to maintain reference to the 
entities introduced earlier in discourse, thus providing continuity in the 
context of speech. Thus 3rd person pronouns contribute to what Halliday 
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and Hasan (1976) called the "text-forming" function through cohesive 
intralinguistic relationships. 
In the sentence "I saw a little boy in front of the house, he was 
holding a big umbrella", 'he' refers to a specific non-linguistic entity which 
is identifiable only through its indexical relation to previous (coreferential) 
noun phrase ('a little boy'). In contrast to 3rd person pronoun use, 1st and 
2nd person pronouns refer to aspects of the non-linguistic context, though 
3rd person pronouns ('he', 'she', 'it') may also have a more context-
specific use, the referent being physically present. 1st and 2nd person 
pronouns are typically 'exophoric' (Halliday and Hasan, 1976), i.e., they 
refer to something in the environment of the speaker. 'Exophoric' 
reference is situational reference, and has been said to be a 
characteristic of children's speech (Bernstein, 1971; Halliday and Hasan, 
1976; Hawkins, 1977). 
The other hypothesis of the present study has to do with the play-
space, or the distance between the two partners of the dyad (the subjects 
participating in the experiments are always in a dyadic interactive 
situation). Such a play-space between the children is indeed a critical 
factor. For a more natural situation, the children must see each other 
completely. Proxemic relations in this case can be decisive not only in 
matters of talkativeness (a richer referential content in children's 
messages) but also in matters of mutual relations and reciprocal 
socialisation. An empirical study was done in that direction by two child 
language researchers (B. Bokus and G.S. Shugar, 1984). Their 
hypothesis is that young children in a dyadic interactive situation are 
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more likely to produce longer utterances with an expected richer 
referential content, when there is a short distance between the members 
of the dyad, and short utterances which are lacking in referential content 
when the distance between the children is greater. In the present study 
the distance between the members of the dyad was as short as possible, 
and it was built, in the overall design, in order to be tested as a condition 
which is hypothesized to influence the pattern of production and 
construction of utterances. This will be shown in the chapters dealing 
with the experiments. 
The situational opportunity just described and the nature of the 
stimulus materials (animate human beings in a series of pictures making 
up a unique story, a coherent whole) introduced in the second experiment 
(this being recognized as the factor of 'animacy') are hypothesized as 
triggering first, a richer referential content in children's speech, and 
second, as a potential influence on children's production of speech 
(longer utterances) and cohesive uses. 
The analysis of children's errors over the two experiments of the 
present study, across the six months interval, will help explain the 
significance of the children's developmental errors in relation to the use 
and function of the discourse categories under study. 
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Chapter 2 
Ways of characterizing the acquisition of 
communicative competence 
2.1.Introduction 
The study of the development of communication is one of the most 
exciting challenges to developmental psychologists and psycholinguists. 
Thus, within the broad field of child language, there has been increasing 
interest, if not an orientation, in developmental psycholinguists, in the last 
decade and in the current one, towards the acquisition of communicative 
competence. 
From a sociolinguistic point of view (D. Hymes, 1964) the term 
'communicative competence' covers a person's knowledge and ability to 
use all the semiotic systems available to him as a member of a given 
socio-cultural community; and linguistic competence, or knowledge of the 
language system is one part of communicative competence. 
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From a somewhat multidisciplinary viewpoint which emphasizes 
both the person and the context ('context' being taken in its widest sense 
to include the social and cultural factors), communicative competence is 
"the totality of experience-derived knowledge and skill that enables a 
speaker to communicate effectively and appropriately in social contexts". 
(R.L. Schiefelbusch, 1984, p. IX) 
This definition has the advantage of considering the social and 
cultural context and to shape it into a new dimension already introduced 
by Gumperz and Hymes (1964), beside the 'knowledge' of the rules 
which enable a speaker to select well-formed utterances. The term 
'linguistic competence' was introduced for the first time by N. Chomsky in 
the early 60s (N. Chomsky, 1964; 1965), to cover the two much discussed 
issues of the knowledge of a set of rules that underlie sentence 
construction, and the child's innate knowledge and capacity for linguistic 
universals, which are assumed to explain the structural principles 
common to all languages. But it happens that Chomsky's definition of 
'competence' overlooked the particular cultural context. The reactions of 
a certain number of investigators was almost immediate. Thus, Gumperz 
and Hymes (1964) and Slobin (1967) include in their definition of 
communicative competence not only that 'linguistic knowledge' which 
enables a speaker to produce structurally well-formed utterances, but 
also the knowledge of both semantic reference and pragmatic functions: 
the utterances should be referentially accurate and their use should be 
contextually appropriate. 	 In addition, this characterization of 
communicative competence enables a speaker to understand the speech 
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of others as a function of both the structural characteristics of speech and 
the social context. 
Thus, to resume, a developmental sociolinguistic theory of 
language acquisition was taking shape in the last decade, and it 
distinguished itself from the essentially linguistic theory developed by 
Chomsky and his co-workers in the early 60s, in the way it views the role 
of linguistic input to children. It differs also from the Chomskyan-based 
approach to language development in another essential way, in that the 
nature of the behaviour acquired, or competence, has been refined to 
include more than simply grammatical competence. 
For Gleason (1973), communicative competence involves knowing 
how to speak in different ways to different people. Baby-talk is one of the 
variants in the registers of an adult's "code-switching" repertoire. Baby-
talk or BT is, for C. Ferguson (1977), a set of simplified registers to use 
with people felt to be unable to understand normal adult's speech. And 
for Roger Brown (1977), there are two principal components for BT: 
1) communication-clarification (or the desire to be understood and 
to teach) 
2) expressive-affective (or the expression of affection with the 
capturing of the addressee's attention as a secondary goal). 
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On the other hand, C. Ferguson (1977) found the following 
processes in BT, which are 'simplifying' (or replacing difficult consonants 
with easy ones, and pronouns by proper names), 'clarifying' (or speaking 
slowly, clearly and with many repetitions), and the expressive process (or 
use of hypocoristic or pet names - affixes, 'cute' euphemism and nursery 
tones). 
Some researchers in the area of BT (Gleason, 1973; Anderson and 
Johnson, 1973) found that 5-year-olds, while they are not as adept at 
code-switching as for instance eight-year-olds, nevertheless show some 
baby-talk features when addressing two-year-olds or infants. 
Thus, it was detected that some, but not all of BT features are 
present in four-and-five-year-olds, and it was found well-established in 
eight-year-olds (Anderson and Johnson, 1973). In a larger study, Shatz 
and Gelman (1973) found that four-year-olds talk differently to adults, 
peers and two-year-olds. It appears, then, that the children as young as 
four or five years must learn the baby-talk register. 
This introduced a way of characterising communicative 
competence. But, in the meantime, other important developments were 
taking place in this ever expanding field of child language. In the late 
70s, investigators and theoreticians in the field of child language, in the 
light of other developments in the broad multidisciplinary area of child 
development, felt the need to somehow develop more comprehensive 
models of the developments of communicative competence. The 
development of such models ranges from the cognitive developmental 
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view of the early 70s, inspired by Piaget and his followers, to the 
cognitive-pragmatic view of the mid-70s (Bates, 1976; Bates et al, 1979). 
The developmental psychology of Jean Piaget was becoming 
increasingly popular in America and in Great Britain, and this approach 
began to exert influence on theories of language development. Piaget's 
descriptions and explanations of the origins of intelligence in children 
(Piaget, 1952), presented the child as an active organizer of experience 
from birth onwards. This 'active organization of experience' involves the 
perception and knowledge about things and objects in the child's 
environment. Knowing about things, according to Piaget, implies action 
at two levels. First, he believed, children structure their world through 
interactions with things, and through interactions they adapt and organize 
schemes to promote the development of the intellectual system. Second, 
through the assimilation of objects into schemes, children recognize or 
perceive the objects. The application of schemes (through visual 
scanning, haptic (or pertaining to the sense of touch) manipulations, and 
so on, gives meaning to our sensory experience. In addition to this, 
Piaget's careful description of the child's preverbal behaviour and his 
analysis of the cognitive structures which are hypothesized to underlie 
preverbal behaviour were very appealing to students of child language. 
Thus, for one of the most prominent Piagetians of the Genevan School, 
Sinclair de-Zwart (1969), children's first, single-word utterances, could be 
expressions of action patterns or schemas. 	 Prior sensori-motor 
development is for the Genevan School (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; 
Sinclair de-Zwart, 1969; 1971) an essential prerequisite for the 
emergence of language. To this position, and the followers of Piaget in 
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America and Europe (McNamara, 1972; Nelson, 1973;; Brown, 1973; 
Bloom, 1973 and papers in Lock (ed.), 1978; etc.,), "the young child's 
months of sensori-motor activity have provided him with a great deal of 
this kind of uncoded knowledge about how objects can be related to one 
another, and it now remains to map all this knowledge in a linguistic 
system, so that he can tell himself and others what he knows implicitly" (J. 
Flavell, 1977, p. 38) 
For Sinclair de-Zwart, the child begins to acquire language only at 
the conclusion of the sensori-motor period, because he/she is dependent 
on some intellectual accomplishments of that period, and language is 
only one aspect of a more general semiotic or symbolic function. 
Research, in the mid- and late 70s, on a wider multidisciplinary 
basis, especially in the area of developmental pragmatics (Bates, 1979; 
Bates et al, 1979; Ochs and Schieffelin, 1979) has moved beyond a 
deterministic cognitive explanation of language. For this latter view, the 
development of language must be considered not just in a cognitive 
context, but also in a context of social interactions. According to this 
approach, these three aspects of development are not truly separate 
entities. 	 In the same current of multidisciplinary research on the 
development of language, J. Bruner (1975a) advocated a more 
comprehensive approach than the previous ones , to language learning 
in the child. 
For Bruner (1975a) a more comprehensive view of language 
development would require the student of child language to take into 
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consideration a set of "generative skills" which are, at least, the 
conceptual, social and linguistic. These skills (conceptual, social and 
linguistic) could partly be handled according to Dore (1979) by a 
conversational model. One of the main reasons behind the need for such 
a model is that it is rather difficult to interpret early speech, the child's 
meaning being different from the adult's, and the intention behind the 
child's utterance being often a puzzle. To take an example, if a child says 
'Dat', pointing for instance to a stuffed dog in a truck, or, to take another 
example, if he says 'allgone' and is looking at his mother, this is not as 
easy to interpret as it might seem at first sight. In the first example, the 
child might mean only the object pointed at, he/she might mean "what is 
that object (stuffed dog) over there?" or "is that a dog?". The same thing 
could be said about the second utterance, "allgone". An adult might 
interpret it as meaning, that something - an object, a thing or a person or 
whatever - has disappeared. But is this the only intention in the child's 
mind? The nonverbal signals and the one-word utterances accompanied 
by pointing and looking are examples of the potentially imprecise and 
ambiguous quality of the young communicator's messages. Dore 
(1979a) emphasizes that the function of an utterance (in the early stages) 
relative to the ongoing conversation is to allow the adult to interpret the 
child's intentions. In the early 70s, there was an intensive use of MLU 
(Mean Length of Utterance) as a measure of the child's grammatical 
competence. But this morphemic index of development does not reflect 
the function of an utterance, nor the semantic relations this index 
expresses. MLU might be more useful when used with reference to what 
children can perform in actual conversation. 
	 MLUs, then, might 
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advantageously be correlated with functional acts, and it can be shown 
that the length of utterances varies with the purpose they serve. For 
example, experiments with children have revealed that responses to 
questions are shorter than the spontaneous descriptions and statements 
they produce in the situation where they themselves initiate the topic of 
conversation. 
Dore's suggestion is that MLU count correlated with the 
conversational status of the utterance will provide both a structural and 
functional index that will offer an integrated measure of the development 
of communicative competence. 
2.2. The development of communicative competence as 
'conversational acts' 
To counteract the old and heated debate of the primacy 'qua' 
importance of either language or thought as organizational processes, J. 
Dore (1979 b) proposes conversation as the immediate communicative 
context for language development, but remarked that conversational 
properties "cannot explain the abstract structure of the language the child 
acquires" (J. Dore, 1979 b, p. 339). Within the growing interdisciplinary 
field of the development of communication, the conception is that 
language evolves from a 'functional' pragmatic base (works by Bates and 
associates, 1976; 1977; 1979; Bruner and associates, 1978). The 
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orientation is, thus, towards Labovian sociolinguistics: the attempt is to 
demonstrate the sociological determinants of the use of speech. In 
"language in the Inner City" (1972), W. Labov pointed out that the various 
manifestations of linguistic competence are affected by variations in the 
settings, participants and topics of conversation (the empirical findings by 
Cole, Dore, Hall and Dowley, 1978, tend to support Labov's claims, for 
groups of nursery school children). 	 The critical link between these 
views and the functionalist view of Halliday (1975) is that both directly or 
indirectly emphasize that the structure of what is actually acquired by 
children is determined by the functions for which language is used. The 
problem for Dore (1979b), then, is to find out about the types of relations 
between the 'pragmatic of communicative interactions' and 'the cognitive 
representation of linguistic knowledge'. 
This third approach to this delicate and controversial study of 
knowledge and use of language (the 'know how to do' with the 'know 
about' language) proposed by Dore aims to separate the function of 
utterances (in other words, the pragmatic aspects of talk) from the 
structures which manifest them (or 'the abstract substance of linguistic 
representation'), and the possibility to identify, ontogenetically,the 
multiple relations between the two. To this end, Dore (1977; 1978; 1979) 
devised what he henceforth called 'conversational units', or units of 
language behaviour which reflect both the function and the structure of 
utterances children produce. 
There are, according to Dore (1979a) several advantages in taking 
conversational units as central elements of communicative competence; 
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and this is true if one assumes some pragmatic considerations, i.e. to 
build up an utterance as some sort of a functional act which conveys both 
a proposition and the speaker's attitude towards that proposition. These 
are what seem to be the two essential tenets of a communicative act or 
speech act: the proposition and the illocutionary force. In Speech Act 
theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), the "proposition" involves a 
conceptual content of the utterance organized in terms of predicate taking 
one or more arguments. 	 And "illocutionary force" is a kind of 
conventional 'force' associated with the "illocutionary act" (speech act), or 
the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc. This conventional force is 
based on certain conditions (or 'felicity conditions') which will be defined, 
in more detail, in the next section. This is one of the reasons why speech 
acts (which are the building blocks of a relatively well-defined theory of 
communicative acts) were taken by several investigators of child 
language as appropriate units for the analysis of the child's developing 
communicative competence. But more will be said about this later on. 
The second condition has to do with the identification of particular acts 
based partly on their relation to others in the conversation. 
J. Dore (1979a) defines a conversational act as "an utterance in a 
person's turn at speaking in conversation which conveys information and 
expresses an attitude (intention, expectation, belief, etc.,) relative to that 
information" (J. Dore, 1979a, p. 342). And to the extent that utterances 
function as acts in a conversation, these are conversational acts or C-
acts. These may present methodological advantages, and the central 
methodological value of a C-act as a unit of mutual display is that it is 
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always subject to 'immediate feedback'. Among the several levels of 
feedback, the most prominent of these is when, for example, a participant 
has not heard adequately, or understood, another participant in a 
conversational episode (in this case the first participant can obviously 
seek clarification). Another example of feedback is, for instance, when a 
participant in a conversation states a position, another participant may 
corroborate, or contest or evaluate or ignore, etc., the first participant's 
position. In this context of mutual display between participants in a social 
episode (i.e. conversation on situationally appropriate topics) Garfinkel 
and Sacks (1970) remarked that participants' formulations: 
"treat some parts of the conversation, to explain it, or characterize it, 
or explicate, or translate or summarize or furnish the gist of it, or to 
take notice of its accordance with rules, or remark on its departure 
from rules". (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 350) 
The few published articles and studies on repairs and formulations 
in children's speech indicate that both devices are pervasive in adult 
speech to children. 
The other methodological advantages of conversational episodes 
and acts, according to Dore (1979a), have to do with adult's attributions of 
intentions to infant's early vocalizations. This appears to be perhaps the 
most important aspect of conversational feedback for the initial acquisition 
of language. In this respect, Ryan (1974) pointed out that during verbal 
interchange between mothers and infants, "the mothers actively pick up, 
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extend, comment, repeat, interpret and misinterpret what the child has 
said". (Ryan, 1974, p. 199) Mothers, and in general adults, use, then, a 
variety of cues to possibly interpret infants' communicative intents. Ryan 
(1974) (on the basis of a pragmatic analysis of performative aspects of 
speech developed by Austin, 1962) has adapted a classification of the 
cues used by mothers and caretakers. This was done in terms of the 
'aspects', the 'accompaniments' and the 'circumstances' of the utterance, 
which include: 
- the intonation patterns variously interpreted as 'insistence, 
protest, pleasure, request, etc.' (aspects); 
- a set of cues for interpreting 'pointing, searching, playing with 
specific object, refusing' (accompaniments); 
and finally 
- another source of cues constituting the context of the child's 
communicative intention (circumstances). 
In Ryan's words this has to do with "the presence or absence of 
particular objects or people, the relation of these to the child, any 
immediately preceding events of speech". (J. Ryan, 1974, p. 201) 
But in attributing intentions to the infants' early vocalizations there 
appears a difficulty in trying to establish whether something was 'really' or 
consciously intended. Linguists and psychologists have come to speak of 
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the functions that communication or language serve and determine the 
way these functions work, in an attempt to overcome such difficulties. If 
these proposals do not answer to the questions of 'reality' and 
'consciousness', they, nevertheless, express the hope that these ultimate 
questions may one day be dealt with. Thus, the fact remains that adults, 
in general, attribute communicative intent to young children's utterances 
with respect to certain functions of language. In that context, Jakobson 
has attempted a descriptive list of functions (1960). Jakobson's list of 
functions of language includes the 'referential', the 'expressive', the 
'conative', the 'phatic', the 'metalingual' and the 'poetic' functions. The 
'referential' function is that which is more closely associated with the 
symbolizing or representational aspects of language. The 'expressive' 
function is that which reveals the speaker's feelings. The 'conative' 
function is the use of language to influence the behaviour of others. The 
'phatic' function, already introduced by Malinovski (1930), is described in 
Jakobson's writing, as that which contributes to the establishment and 
maintenance of social or communicative contact. The 'metalingual' 
function serves to explicate usually by reference to a code, or in J. Lyons 
(1977) words "any utterance whose primary function it is to verify that the 
interlocutors are using the same language or dialect, or using expression 
of the language in the same way, is said to be metalinguistic" (J. Lyons, 
1977, p. 53). The 'poetic' function involves the use of language to reveal 
its inherent artistic possibilities. But contemporary pragmatists (e.g. 
Levinson, 1983) find that the categories provided by such a traditional 
approach to the functions of speech are not inspired by "direct empirical 
motivation". (Levinson, 1983, p. 41) 
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To summarize what has been said so far about communicative 
intentions in the young child, it appears that the progress toward the use 
of conventional means to communicate an intent depends, from the 
beginning, upon the child's learning the appropriate pragmatic of 
indicating, requesting, or whatever, before he learns grammatical forms; it 
may be that the pragmatics is constitutive with respect to his grammar. 
From this perspective, which has been called the 'communicative' 
perspective, and based on speech act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 
1969), Dore (1974; 1975) has studied the emergence of communicative 
intents and showed not only that a systematic study of pragmatic 
development is possible, but that such studies can possibly yield valuable 
insight into the acquisition of the language code itself. 
Here as in many studies of child language, in the last and present 
decade (c.f. papers on dimensions of communicative competence in 
Shiefelbusch et al, 1984) the intention to approach the development of 
communication from a pragmatic perspective is introduced. Pragmatics 
involves how people use language in a variety of situations to achieve 
personal and societal social goals. The most pervasive ideas that 
contributed to the study of pragmatics came from the philosophical study 
of language developed by J.L. Austin (1962). 
The study of pragmatics involves a variety of orientations; these 
include the philosophy of language, linguistics, cognitive psychology and 
social anthropology. But the pragmatics of acquisition essentially seems 
to be derived from the linguistically oriented point of view (Dore, 1977; 
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1978; 1979; Bloom, 1975; Bloom et al, 1976; Halliday, 1975), and the 
cognitively oriented point of view (Bates, 1976, Bates et al, 1979; Parisi 
and Antinucci, 1978), though both of these views borrowed heavily for 
their taxonomies of children's discourse, from Speech Act theory (Austin, 
1962; Searle, 1969; Grice, 1975), and the socially oriented point of view 
of the pragmatics of language of Dell Hymes (1971; 1972; Schegloff, 
1971; 1972). Thus some of these students of child language often refer to 
Speech Act theory as a theory of 'communication' or 'communicative 
competence' in their studies of children's use of language (Bates, 1976; 
Dore, 1975; Garvey, 1975), essentially because Speech Act theory 
focussed on the use of expressions in speech events situations. To 
understand more about the foundations of communicative competence in 
pre-school children, in the following part are introduced, briefly, some of 
the concepts underlying Speech Act theory, and subsequently the 
development of communicative competence in the pre-school years. 
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2.3. Foundations of communicative competence and its early 
development 
a) Speech acts, an overview 
To begin with, we can say that to produce an utterance is to 
engage in a certain kind of social interaction. This fact, until the writings 
of J.L. Austin (1962), was not recognized as such by philosophers and 
logicians of language. Speech Act theory explicitly recognized the social 
or interpersonal dimension of language behaviour and subsequently 
oriented the discussion around such terms as 'mood' and 'modality' (but 
see the recent treatment of these terms by F.R. Palmer, 1986). The term 
'Speech Act' is potentially misleading; we often use it to refer to the act of 
speaking as such (the production of an actual spoken utterance) or to 
something more abstract, its usual sense in linguistic philosophy and the 
philosophy of language, to take J. Searle (1969) distinction between two 
usually confounded types of reflection on language ('linguistic 
philosophy' - name of a method - attempts to solve particular 
philosophical problems pertaining to particular words or other elements in 
a particular language, and 'philosophy of language' - name of a subject -
attempts to give "philosophically illuminated descriptions of certain 
general features of language ("reference, truth, meaning, and necessity"), 
J. Searle, 1969, p. 3-4). Moreover the non-linguistic communicative acts 
(e.g. a manual gesture) may be perfectly included in a 'speech act', in its 
Austinian sense, though Austin and his followers in building the theory of 
speech acts do particularly refer to language utterances. 
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Austin distinguished between constative (or content aspect of 
language) and performative utterances, or functional aspects of 
language. 
A constative utterance is a statement which is either true or false; it 
describes some event, process or state of affairs. A performative 
utterance can be successful or unsuccessful, without there being any 
question of truth or falsehood. It is used to do something rather than to 
say something is or is not the case. (e.g. "I name this ship Liberty" or "I 
advise you to stop smoking". These are uttered to perform particular 
kinds of acts which could hardly be performed in any other way.) 
In other words, a constative utterance involves saying something 
(asserting that something is or is not) and a performative utterance 
involves doing something, and these two aspects are possible by means 
of language. 
Austin later realized that these distinctions broke down, the criteria 
for performative utterances can be applied in the same way to constative 
utterances (these are assertions which can fail just like any other kind of 
speech acts); he came then to develop, starting from the VIII William 
James lectures, in 1955, a new theory, that of locutionary, illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts. 
Finding that the constative/performative distinction can no more 
characterize different sorts of utterance, but, instead, to reconstruct 
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different aspects of the same utterance, he further distinguished the 
following aspects of speech acts: (c.f. D. Wunderlich, 1979) 
1) a Vocutionary acf involves 
a) performing a 'phonetic act' i.e.. the utterance of certain 
sounds. 
b) performing a 'phatic act', i.e. the utterance of certain words 
(sounds of a certain type that belongs to a certain vocabulary) 
c) and, generally, performing a 'rhetic act', where the results of 
the phatic act and its constituents are used with more or less 
definite meaning, in other words this act contains a particular 
sense and reference. 
2) performing an 'illocutionary act' involves a certain force to be 
exercized on the hearer in a conventional way and with 
reference to special circumstances of the situation 
3.) and finally to say anything is often to perform a 'perlocutionary 
act', i.e. certain non-conventional effects - as a result of the 
illocutionary act - are achieved on the hearer, with respect to his 
feelings, thoughts and actions. 
The fact that questions, warnings, promises, condemnations, 
criticisms, identifications, etc., are regarded by Austin as 'illocutionary 
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forces' (of utterances), and not the meanings of the utterances, precludes 
him from using the concept of meaning for illocutionary act. 
The 'illocutionary force' is characterised by a set of 'felicity 
conditions' which according to Searle (1969) may be classified into: 
- 'preparatory conditions' (that concern real world prerequisites to 
each speech act), 
- 'propositional content conditions' (that specify restrictions on, for 
example, the content of the complement sentence(s): 'I hereby 
promise that 	 (s)' 
and 
- sincerity conditions (that state the requisite feelings and intentions 
of the speaker as appropriate to each action). 
On the other hand, certain effects of speaking may appear to be 
essentially outside conventional control (the distinction between 
illocutionary and locutionary acts was done from the point of view of 
conventionality). Thus, the following words: 'amazing', 'persuading', 
'encouraging', 'humiliating', 'offending', can not have explicit performative 
formulas, i.e. "I hereby amaze you ... etc.".* An explicit performative, e.g. "I 
ask you whether all the guests are French" has the grammatical form of a 
declarative sentence. 	 But in so far as effects of speaking are 
conventionally produced, they belong to the illocutionary act. Austin 
* unaccepted sentence 
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(1962, 115 ff.) developed further the distinction between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts; this is done in some points which are: 
1) that the speaker has to be secure that the utterance will be 
understood and accepted 
2) that the hearer's attitude with respect to the social situation as a 
whole is altered in some way, which could not have been the 
case if the utterance had not been made and 
3) that particular obligations are imposed with respect to following 
acts. 
Austin reviewed all these concepts (1970, posthumous publication), but 
the challenge was yet to come as to the identification and classification of 
all possible forces of utterances. John Searle was among those young 
philosophers who took up the challenge; he developed what is 
considered to be the most comprehensive theory of speech acts, in the 
post-Austinian developments of the philosophy of language (c.f. J. Searle, 
1969). 
For Searle "speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts 
such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making 
promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and 
predicating" (J. Searle, 1969, p. 16). Searle tried to be systematic by 
43 
providing a more precise analysis of the linguistic rules that regulate 
speech acts. He viewed the speech act as the basic unit of 
communication. For Searle, to perform communicative acts is not only: 
- to speak to someone else, but also it implies that: 
- the acts intend what they say, (i.e. the communicative intentions of 
the acts are successfully communicated) and finally 
- the acts have particular effects on listeners 
He proposed four components of speech acts, which are: 
- the utterance acts 
- the propositional acts 
- the illocutionary acts 
- the perlocutionary acts. 
All speech acts include an utterance act (utter something), a propositional 
act (refer or predicate), and an illocutionary act (assert, direct, deny, and 
so on). A speech act may or may not bring about the intended response 
from the listener (the intended perlocutionary force). 
A proposition is, for Searle, "what is asserted in the act of asserting, 
what is stated in the act of stating" (J. Searle, 1969, p. 29) To take an 
example, when an interlocutor says "I admit that I lost your book", "I lost 
your book" is the proposition, and the illocutionary act - the act of 
admitting - is indicated by "I admit". 
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In other words, the proposition is essentially the conceptual content 
of the utterance, and the illocutionary force indicates the speaker's 
attitude towards the proposition. For some critics (Wunderlich, 1979), 
Searle's analyses are still, in a number of ways, unsatisfactory (partly 
because they are incomplete, partly because they isolate the speech acts 
from their preconditions and above all from their 'expected' 
consequences, and finally because he did not pay much attention to the 
hearer's role). 
To resume this part, and in the words of a contemporary researcher 
in child language (P. Griffiths, 1979) 
"In performing illocutionary acts, speakers generally (...) convey 
messages with some content to their addressees. That is they 
may express a proposition about something (or some things) (...) 
the same content may be put to the addressees with any one of a 
variety of different illocutionary forces (commands, question, 
promise, etc." (p. Griffiths, 1979, p. 106. The words and the dots 
between brackets are added.) 
Other philosophers of language began to consider the circumstances 
surrounding an utterance, and consequently began to consider the 
discourse in which it occurred. Their attempt was to identify rules which 
are governing the way discourse is conducted. Among them, H. Grice 
(1975) formulated a set of conversational postulates that are perhaps 
susceptible to developmental influences and empirical research. 
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2.3. b) Grice's conversational maxims 
For Grice (1975), conversation is essentially a cooperative social 
enterprise, where the participants must accept the purpose or direction of 
the talk exchange in which they are engaged. By 'cooperative' is meant 
that: 
utterances share common features (content being true and related 
to a common topic). 
- there is some agreement about what is appropriate to say. 
And in the expression "purpose of the talk exchange" it is implied that 
participants must somehow arrange their utterances in order to 
accomplish some shared concern. The consequence of this is that 
participants in a conversation expect each other to observe certain basic 
principles. Among these principles or maxims, Grice proposes one most 
general, the 'cooperative principle' which subsumes several assumptions 
about: (c.f. Grice, 1975, p. 45) 
quantity: 
1- Make your contribution as informative as is required (for 
the current purpose of the exchange. 
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2- Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required. 
quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
1- Do not say that which you believe to be false. 
2- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
relation: Be relevant. 
manner: Be perspicuous 
1- Avoid obscurity of expression 
2- Avoid ambiguity 
3- Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) 
4- Be orderly. 
But these maxims, as Grice remarked, are sometimes 'violated' as, for 
instance, when a participant intends to mislead. In this context, it is quite 
possible for a participant in a conversation to intend something that is not 
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forthcoming from the primary or literal sense of his utterance. But the 
speaker's intention can be inferred by all the participants in a 
conversation only on the assumption that the speaker is saying 
something relevant (i.e. some information relevant to the message being 
conveyed) and conducive to cooperation. This is, in Gricean terms, a 
'conversational implicature', i.e. the conveyed information is not said by, 
for instance, speaker A, but is 'implicated' since speaker B is able to 
understand it on the basis of what A said, and the assumptions subsumed 
under the 'cooperative principle', the context, the background knowledge 
shared by the participants, etc., and also because speaker B assumes 
that all the above sources of information are available to both partners in 
the conversation (c.f. Dore et al, 1978, for a theoretical discussion of the 
notion of 'implicature', p. 353-55). 
Thus Grice's maxims or principles involve assumptions or 
presuppositions that participants in a conversation share about the 
contents of their talk exchange, and the way the conversation must be 
conducted. Grice's principles seem to be not well understood by children 
as much as they are by adults. Children apparently fail to observe, for 
instance, the maxims pertaining to informativeness and relevance of their 
contributions to a conversation. If a child says "Nadia is bigger than me, 
you know" to a pre-school teacher who does not know who "Nadia" is, this 
is an example of an imperfect understanding of what a listener knows 
about a person or a topic. The same child might give more information 
than necessary about a person or a topic to a listener who happens to 
know what the child is talking about (as in "Hakim is my brother; he is 
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bigger than me, and he goes to school..." said to a friend of the family of 
the child). This implies that the pre-school child might understand the 
need to be informative, but may not realize how informative he must be in 
a particular case. 
These last remarks bring us to the discussion of the development 
of the basic presuppositions which are underlying the use of language to 
communicate. In the field of child language, researchers who are 
interested in presuppositions very often cite Grice's conversational 
postulates, though very few studies actually directly investigated 
children's awareness of Gricean maxims (with perhaps the exception of 
Ackerman, 1978, who investigated kindergartners and school children's 
ability to recognize violations of these conversational principles, and also 
their ability to infer the pragmatic meanings of sentences on that basis). 
The reason behind this is perhaps because the principles are too 
general to be easily subjected to research, but the possibility remains to 
relate indirectly some specific presuppositional constructions 
(informativeness & relevance, for example) to Gricean conversational 
principles which are partially instantiated in those specific 
presuppositional constructions. In their detailed study of the acquisition of 
presuppositional usages, De Hart and Maratsos (1984) remarked that 
informativeness and relevance, which are embodied by these 
presuppositional constructions, partly concern correct usage of 
determiners ('a' and 'the'), proper names and pronouns, and that all these 
particular linguistic forms partly involve the speaker's understanding of 
what the listener knows. More will be said about these particular 
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linguistic forms that carry presuppositions (definite and indefinite articles, 
proper names, pronouns) in the next chapter, since they are directly 
related to the present research. Before that, the question is: what 
elements of presupposition in children's early language can be found, 
and what kind of empirical data are available on these early 
presuppositional usages and the development, on the other hand, of 
speech acts? 
2.3. c) Early presuppositional usages and the development of 
speech acts 
According to Austin (1962), it is the speakers who use sentences 
who have presuppositions rather than the sentences: thus when talking 
about presuppositions and presuppositional usage, it is generally more 
accurate to refer to them as "presuppositions of the speakers" than 
"presuppositions of sentences". 
Presupposition is a feature of communication that extends 
throughout one's life. For E. Bates (1976a), there are three possible 
definitions of presuppositions. The semantic or logical presupposition 
which refers to "information that must be true for a given sentence to be 
either true or false"; the pragmatic presupposition defined as "conditions 
necessary for a sentence to be used appropriately in a given context", 
and finally, the psychological presupposition which is "the use of an 
50 
utterance to comment upon information assumed to be shared by speaker 
and listener" (E. Bates, 1976a, p. 96-97). 
The semantic presuppositions or (P1) truth-conditions of 
presuppositions are subsumed under the much broader pragmatic (or P2) 
definition, for the important reason that the enactment of a speech act of 
declaring entails a commitment by the speaker to the truth of a proposition 
or a sentence. And both (P1) and (P2) are subsumed under the 
psychological presupposition (P3). Moreover, the psychological 
presupposition subsumes the operations of deixis and anaphora, which 
makes it a relatively important concept as to the present research (more 
will be said about deixis and anaphora and the words that carry 
presuppositional usages, in the next part). 
The psychological act of presupposing involves "a decision 
essential to every act of speaking - the choice of which elements to 
encode and which elements to take for granted" (E. Bates, 1976a, p. 97). 
According to Bates (1976a), pragmatic development involves learning 
when not to take the information for granted, or, in other words, it requires 
learning when not to presuppose, to help the listener to understand what 
is being said, since the listener does not hold the same assumptions as 
the speaker does. It also means that the child is gradually reaching the 
ability to talk about events that occurred in the past and to anticipate 
events in the future. 
Now, what could be the situation at the stage of early 
presuppositional usage? Some investigators (Greenfield and Smith, 
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1976; E. Bates, 1976) have attempted to show that some elements of 
presupposition in children's early language can be practically studied. 
In Greenfield and Smith (1976), it was pointed out that children, at 
the one-word stage, will encode whatever significant aspect of the 
situation is undergoing change, often omitting the given or unchanging 
aspect. The child at the one-word stage makes his production choices in 
order to avoid encoding information which one could take as 
presupposed, old, given and instead selects for encoding that which is 
new. To take an example, if a child is putting several objects into one big 
truck, he/she is more likely, in such a situation, to give the names of the 
changing objects rather than the unchanging truck which is a kind of 
background for the actions. In another situation, the child might be putting 
different objects in different locations, and if among these objects there is 
a truck, then he/she is more likely to utter the word "truck" among other 
words. 
For Greenfield and Smith (1976), in one-word responses to 
questions (like: what do you want?) the child- or the adult for that matter -
encodes only the new information and omits the information now 
presupposed on the basis of prior verbalization. One contemporary 
support for this view, came from the work of Weisenburger (1976) who 
noted in the one-word utterances of a two-year-old child that he tended to 
lexicalize those elements that were redundant because they were 
obvious or had just been mentioned. It appears, then, at least according 
to these writings, that children, at the stage of one-word utterance, show 
at least an early capacity for using the presupposition/assertion or the 
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given-new distinction for language production, comprehension and 
discourse. 
Given elements are viewed as presuppositions and new elements 
as assertions. Bates (1976b) advanced the idea that the tendency, in 
very young children, to choose or to focus on the new rather than the 
given information has probably deeper roots. Infants, only a few days old, 
have been shown (c.f. for that matter, T. Bower, 1974/82) to attend to the 
novel stimuli more than the old backgrounds information. 
It is probable that later, at the early stage of language use, children 
will focus more on the new elements of a situation than on those elements 
that are given; and so they are more likely to talk about the new elements. 
For Bates (1976b) at the two-word stage children tend to follow a 
new information-old-information sequence (an example from Greenfield & 
Smith, 1976): when a child says 'nut' when picking up the nut and 'drop' 
when dropping the nut, the two-word utterance would be: "drop nut"" 
'drop' being the new information is encoded first and 'nut', the old 
information, is encoded second in that particular event. 
Bates sees the rules of order in the two-word utterances as a 
logical extention of the "new only" rule that applies to the one-word stage. 
Accordingly, the development of control over presuppositions begins with 
the one-word stage since, always according to Bates (1976b) hypothesis, 
at each selection of a piece of information to be encoded, the child 
"automatically presupposes the contextual information from which his 
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comment was selected", consequently, presupposing is "an integral part 
of every act of speech" (E. Bates, 1976b, p. 445). 
According to Halliday (1975), if the child considered the 
information he was encoding as already known to the listener, he used a 
declarative structure; if he considered this information as new to the 
listener, as in the case where the listener has just arrived, he used an 
interrogative structure. 
Bates and Halliday attribute to the child some ability to make the 
distinction between what can be regarded as old information and the 
new, in so far as the child's perception of that distinction determines what 
he/she will choose to say and/or how he/she will encode it. 
But presupposition involves more than what has been suggested, 
in the literature on early presuppositional usage, as counterparts, i.e. new 
information/old information; comment/topic; figure/ground. These 
relations involve meanings that are, in fact, still organized at the 
perceptual-motor level with perhaps one or two verbal elements, later 
instantiations of presupposition involve a wider variety of constructions, 
which again involve a relevant syntactic and semantic development. We 
will see this, in more detail, when we will come to later presuppositional 
usage, i.e. words and referring expressions that carry specific 
presuppositions. In the meantime, let us turn our attention to the 
development of speech acts in the pre-school child. 
As has been suggested in the previous pages, a number of 
researchers, in the mid- and late 70s, have attempted to study the 
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ontogenesis of speech acts, tracing back the emergence of primitive 
speech acts to early vocalizations and gestures (Dore, 1975; 1978; Bates 
et al., 1975; 1979). In this context, Bruner (1983) noted that: 
"The learning of speech acts may be easier and less mysterious 
than the learning either of syntax or semantics (...) Such primitive 
"speech acts" patterns may serve as a kind of matrix in which 
lexico-grammatical achievements can be substituted for earlier 
gestural or vocal procedures" (J. Bruner, 1983, p. 38, parentheses 
added). 
Bates and her colleagues incorporated the speech act approach into their 
characterization of the child's transition from the pre-verbal to the verbal 
communication. 	 Bates et al., (1975) identified three stages of 
communication in the very early years which are the perlocutionary, the 
illocutionary and the locutionary functions.* In Bates, Camaioni and 
Voltera (1975) it is a question of a girl of one year, Carlotta, who in a 
typical communication episode looked at her mother and uttered the 
sound "ha", then looked towards the kitchen and twisted her body and 
upper shoulder. The mother carried her to the kitchen, and there Carlotta 
pointed towards the sink. the mother gave her a glass of water, and 
Carlotta drank eagerly. This intentional prelinguistic communicative 
signal was referred to by Bates et al, as "proto-imperative". This was 
defined as the child's use of means to cause the adult to do something, 
or, in other words, the intentional use of adults to achieve some goal, and 
This theoretical background of the development of speech acts in the prelinguistic 
period was discussed in an earlier study (H. SAADI, 1984). 
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it corresponds to the illocutionary stage, (roughly between 10 and 15 
months). In the perlocutionary stage, from birth to 10 months 
approximately, the child is said not to be aware of the communicative 
value of his signals. 
The use of objects as a means to direct the adult's attention 
(Carlotta, for instance, looked at an object of interest, pointed at an adult, 
then returned to look at the object and pointed again at adult, then 
pointed at object, etc.,) to some event or object in the child's environment, 
is termed "proto-declarative". This also corresponds to the illocutionary 
stage, whereby the infant could use an object to obtain another object. In 
Piagetian terms this expresses means-end relationships (two aspects, 
two forms of knowledge, being coordinated into a single concept of tool 
use), and it corresponds to the 5th sub-stage of the sensori-motor phase 
of cognitive development. The infant's behaviour is, at this stage of 
development, truly intentional. 
At the close of the illocutionary stage (15 up to 18 months) the child 
is already able to use linguistic symbols to obtain an adult's attention and 
eventually to draw it to desired objects and events. However, at this 
stage, communication is still tied to the here and now world of objects, 
people, actions and events; it relies on contextual clues to be clearly 
intentional, and it is ego-centred. 
The stage where meaningful recognizable words begin to be used 
in communication acts corresponds to the "locutionary" stage, whose 
onset, at least in Bates et al' subjects, varies between 12 and 16 months, 
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which shows that there is a real overlap between the illocutionary and 
locutionary stages of communication. This argues, in a way, for a working 
hypothesis advanced by Bates et al (1979), that there is continuity 
between the behavioural and organizational skills that an infant has 
acquired during an earlier period of development, and the construction of 
more complex behavioural and organizational skills later. For example, 
from ten months and onwards, progressively, the unintended or 
perlocutionary signals are replaced with intended or illocutionary words, 
etc. Thus, for Bates et al, (1979), it would be most useful to study the 
transition between stages as this might strengthen the case for continuity. 
The word 'stage' being understood in the sense of an organizer marking 
the attainment of new skills, and which in the Piagetian sense means that 
it incorporates behaviours which have gradually been acquired during 
the previous stage (c.f. Bates et al, 1979; Bretherton et al, 1979). 
At the locutionary stage, the child can ask for things by name and 
point to a thing, object or person, while saying its name. For Bates 
(1976b) the child is now beginning to learn "performative conventions", or 
the way his language encodes performative meanings which, according 
to her, are established by this time. 
In Dore (1976), the speech of seven three-year-olds was 
transcribed from videotaped sessions. The children were interacting with 
each other and with the teacher in a free-play situation. In this study, 
Dore identified six illocutionary act types: 
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1) Requests, which solicit information, actions or 
acknowledgements. 
2) Responses, which directly complement preceding utterances. 
3) Descriptions, which represent observable or verifiable aspects 
of context. 
4) Statements, which express analytical and institutional facts, 
beliefs, attitudes, emotions, reasons, etc., 
5) Conversational devices, which regulate contact and 
conversations. 
and 
6) Performatives, which accomplish acts by being said (this term 
was used more restrictively than Bates, 1975). 
The coding of the children's utterances as illocutionary acts was 
made by using a number of features both internal and external to each 
utterance token. These features include the utterance's literal meaning, 
the utterance's intentional characteristics, the old-and-new information 
distinction, the speaker's nonlinguistic behaviour, and his prior and/or 
subsequent utterances, the behaviour of utterances of the other person, 
and the situational context. These features were, therefore, utilized in the 
analysis of each utterance, in order to determine its best speech acts 
classification. From a much longer list of illocutionary act types, Dore 
deduced the above categories, which apparently accounted for his 
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sample of three-year-olds. A later more elaborated version scheme of 
these categories, was developed by Dore (1978) into what he calls 
"conversational acts", whose communicative intents and characteristic 
functions were discussed in the previous section of the present study. 
The interesting findings in these studies are that the most 
substantial changes which are noted in the 2 to 4-year-old children's 
speech are the increasingly differentiated discourse functions (c.f. for that 
matter, Keenan, 1977; and Dore, 1978) and the increasing ability to 
contribute new information on a topic in a child-adult conversation 
(Bloom, Rocissano and Hood, 1976). (The changes, here, are reflected in 
the degree to which a child of three continues the topic of the preceding 
utterances, which is that of an adult, and the way that the topic is 
continued). 
Other specific types of illocutionary acts were presented in 
Garvey's study (1975). C. Garvey looked at 'requests for actions' 
between 36 dyads from 3 1/2 to 5 1/2 years, divided into two groups: the 
three to four-year-olds, and the four-to-five-year-olds. The two groups 
engaged in a spontaneous dyadic interaction, were found to produce 
both direct (e.g. "roll this tape up for me") and indirect (e.g. "wanta get on 
my car?") requests. In Garvey's writings, direct requests "express the 
content, H will do A, directly, either imperatively, e.g. 'open the door', or 
with a performative marker, e.g. 'I request that you open the door (p. 47, 
1975), and indirect requests, which are of two types: 
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Type I indirect requests "embed the content, H will do A, into an 
utterance, whose matrix clause references one of the four sincerity 
conditions (outlined in Searle, 1969)" (p. 47, 1975). The four sincerity 
conditions which underlie a sincere request are sketched as follows, in 
Garvey (1975): 
a) S (speaker) wants H (hearer) to do A (I want you to open the 
door). 
b) S assumes H to do A (would you open the door?) 
c) S assumes H is willing to do A (would you be willing to open 
the door?) 
d) S assumes H will not do A in the absence of request (Will you 
open the door?) 
And Type II indirect requests "embed the content, H will do A, into 
an utterance whose matrix does not reference one of the four sincerity 
conditions, at least in any obvious way" (p. 47, 1975). 
On the whole there were indirect requests in her data, however 
these requests increased for the 5-year-olds. As to the direct requests, 
there were no instances of performative verbs (children, for instance, did 
not say things like "I request that you open the door"). 
Ervin-Tripp (1977) analysed the speech acts of children of various 
ages in various situations, with particular reference to directives (or the 
whole class of utterances which are used with the intention to get a 
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listener to do something). In Ervin-Tripp's data, children, after the age of 
two, were able to use a relatively complex vocabulary and syntax to 
perform the directive function which resulted in routines such as "where is 
the shoe?", and other questions with directive meanings, some goal-
oriented constructives such as "you have to call us", or many utterances 
like "we haven't had any candy for a long time" interpreted, with 
difficulty,as a directive, and possessives like "That's my truck" (meaning 
"Get away"). At the age of four, according to Ervin-Tripp, children are 
already able to use "verbal strategies which have several steps to 
success", and around the age of six, children "do not require reference to 
a desired goal" (p. 178) (e.g. "Can I have a penny?", a six-year-old can 
use this directive without specifying the goal). However, her conclusion is 
that the hardest forms for children to learn are those that "do not explicitly 
identify what is wanted - question directives of an indirect type, and 
affirmative hints" (e.g. "That's where the iron belongs"). The difficulty lies 
probably in the degrees of indirectness of form. Although pre-school 
children around the age of four both recognize and produce indirect form 
of requests, as the works of Garvey (1977), Dore (1977) and Ervin-Tripp 
(1977) have shown, it is however still hard for pre-schoolers to be aware 
of the whole range of rules (grammatical, illocutionary, and social-
interactional) in order to interpret an intent correctly. What children 
progressively learn or master is, in Ervin-Tripp's own words, to "conceal 
purposes". For Ervin-Tripp (1977), the major difference between adults 
and pre-school children, in terms of the use of conventional rules for 
interpretation of all sorts of intents, lies in the "systematic, regular, 
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unmarked requests which do not refer to what the speaker wants. Wide 
use of tactical deviousness is a late accomplishment" (p. 188, 1977). 
But various problems with the speech acts model arise as to the 
attribution of meaning to the child's utterance. One of the difficulties lies 
in the decision about which speech act is associated with a given 
utterance, so much so that very often a subjective interpretation on the 
part of the listener seems to be unavoidable. The attempt to attribute 
meanings to the child's utterance is, as one critic remarked, talking about 
Halliday's (1975) functional approach to child language (H. Francis, 
1979), largely based on intuitions rather than firmly based on an 
intersubjective interpretation of the functions of speech acts (which would 
make them more amenable to a systematic analysis). In this state of 
affairs, the child's utterance being affected by the listener's subjective 
interpretation, there must be some degree of confidence in the listener's 
ability to interpret the child's illocutionary acts and other aspects of the 
developing discourse (Bloom et al, 1976; Dore, 1977; Greenfield and 
Smith, 1976; etc.). On the other hand, when one comes to the question of 
defensible or non-defensible sample, the position one may adopt will 
perhaps depend on "personal predilections" as P. Griffiths (1980) 
pertinently remarked. 
We remarked earlier, when talking about presuppositional usages, 
that one of the most important accomplishment in pragmatic development, 
according to Bates (1976a), involves when not to take information for 
granted, or, more precisely, it requires from the developing child learning 
1.0 
when not to presuppose that the listener will understand what is being 
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said, since this latter does not hold the same assumptions as the speaker 
does. This accomplishment also means that the child is gradually 
acquiring the ability to talk about future events as well as past 
occurrences. Such an ability is in fact an expression of a developmental 
process in the late pre-school years, which is characterized as a move to 
distance one's self, in time and space. As a consequence, the 'pre-
operational' child (in Piaget's terms, the child from 2 to 7 years) is no 
longer tied to the immediate, palpable environment. 
For some researchers such as E. Bates (1976b) "the development 
of presupposition is tied to the decline of egocentrism" (p. 445), the 
development of presupposition being as was already suggested, a 
progressive negation of presupposition (egocentrism). On the other 
hand, for the Piagetians, there appears to be, around the same period of 
pre-operational thought, an inability to make the distinction between a 
personal perspective and a perspective of another person. This 
corresponds to the stage of egocentric thought. Piaget (1926/1959) put 
forward the hypothesis that pre-schoolers keep their thoughts for 
themselves. To the above position, while pre-schoolers are still prone to 
egocentric speech they are in some way presupposing, and the gradual 
decline of egocentric speech parallels the development of 
presupposition. The waning of these developmental processes is closely 
tied to the development of discourse. 
It has been stated in the developmental literature (Bloom and 
Lahey, 1978) that progress in the development of discourse depends on 
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the child's increasing ability to understand the needs and resources of the 
listener. 
In what follows, an attempt will be made to discuss some views of 
discourse development, but concentrating on what is of direct relevance 
to the present study, i.e. the development of reference, or more precisely, 
referring expressions in discourse. 
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Chapter 3 
Discourse development in the pre-school years 
3.1 The development of reference in discourse 
3.1.1 Egocentric reference 
It was briefly remarked at the end of the previous chapter that, 
progress in the development of discourse results from the child's 
increasing ability to understand the needs and resources of the listener. 
It was pointed out, in conjunction with this, that the gradual decline of two 
developmental processes (presuppositions and egocentric speech) seem 
to be closely tied to the development of discourse. In the last decade, 
detailed studies (Brown, 1973, Maratsos, 1974, Warden, 1976) of the 
acquisition and use of the definite and indefinite articles uncovered an 
inappropriate egocentric use of the definite article in young children. The 
findings were that young children fail to take account of their audience's 
knowledge of the referent, when they use a definite reference or when 
they construct a referring expression. Young children fail to recognize the 
need for an indefinite expression (the use of an indefinite article) when 
they introduce a referent for the first time in a discourse. In the adult 
model of discourse, the constraints on the use of the definite article are 
that it must indicate an already-identified referent, or the referent must be 
known by both parties. Thus, young children seem to be unable to adopt 
their audience's point of view. From the child's own egocentric viewpoint 
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a referent is specified as soon as he (as a speaker) is familiar with it; the 
young child fails to realize that his audience will only become familiar with 
his referent after he has identified it for them verbally. These arguments 
are based on Piaget's (1926) characterizations of preschoolers' private 
speech as egocentric. 
The developmental psycholinguistic view which consists of 
studying children's conversations from the perspective of their ability to 
convey information, originates in Piaget's theory on the origins and 
functions of private speech (1926), and alternatively in Vygotsky"s 
(1962;1978) challenging view on the functions of private speech. 
Young children are thus perceived as being less successful at 
conveying information to others than are older ones or adults. From this 
Piagetian perspective, the growth of the child's ability to take into account 
the perspective and knowledge of the listener has been investigated in a 
number of contemporary developmental studies. Piaget (1926) explored 
this by giving one child some information and asking the child to tell it to 
another child who was not present when this telling happened. He used 
three stories of one paragraph each and two explanations of how a 
simple object worked (e.g. a tap and a syringe). Ten pairs of six-year-olds 
and fifteen pairs of seven-year-olds were tested. In the six-year-old pairs, 
the speakers often failed to communicate a great deal of the essential 
details of the stories or explanations. This age-group communicated 
slightly more of the content of the stories than of the explanations; the only 
difference was that their explanations were understood slightly better by 
the listeners. The seven-year-olds were slightly better, in their 
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explanations, than the six-year-olds. The main problem noted by Piaget 
was that the speakers failed to specify the people and the objects which 
were referred to, and used pronouns and demonstrative adjectives ('this' 
and 'that') instead. This was recognized as being due to egocentrism; the 
speakers appear to be unable to distinguish what the listener knows 
compared with what they themselves know. 
If, for the Piagetian position pre-school children's speech is 
predominantly non-social or egocentric in that it fails to take into 
consideration other interlocutors, Vygotsky's position about this so-called 
'cognitive inadequacy' appears to be very different.(c.f. A.D. Pelligrini, 
1984, for an interesting review of the Piaget-Vygotsky debate, but also 
Hickmann, 1986, and the volume edited by J. Wertsch, 1985). For 
Vygotsky (1962;1978), private speech takes its origins in the social 
dialogue between children and adults. To this view, young children 
respond to and initiate dialogues with adult partners when engaging in 
joint activities (e.g. 'peekaboo' play and joint referring to objects in the 
environment). The references used by adults in such contexts typically 
guide children's attentions and actions. With development, children 
internalize these adult dialogue strategies to regulate their behaviour. In 
other words children will progressively come to use those adult dialogue 
forms as overt private speech which originate in social dialogues 
between adult and child. Later on, children will internalize these dialogic 
strategies in the forms of covert private speech, or inner speech. 
Research in the mid-70s (Bruner, 1975a, 1975b) and late 70s and 
early 80s (Rubin, 1979; Pellegrini 1981) seem to support Vygotsky's 
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position that children learn language by interacting with adults while both 
are engaged in dialogue. For Bruner (1974, 1975) pre-school children's 
acquisition of syntax may originate in dialogue; his hypothesis is that 
children acquire topic/comment structure (or, in the language of 
pragmatics, old/new information) by engaging in dialogue. And the works 
of Pellegrini (1981) and Rubin (1979) both support Vygotsky's view that 
private speech becomes more covert or otherwise internalized in the pre-
school years. Much more recently, M. Hickmann (1985) used Vygotskyan 
developmental theory (emphasizing the interdependence of language 
and thought in development, which ultimately become one, in inner 
speech, when children internalize adult dialogue strategies) in her 
discussion of children's use of various cohesive and metapragmatic 
devices - or speech referring to speech - in discourse. M. Hickmann's 
study is treated in full detail in the next section of the chapter because of 
its relevance to the present study. 
Other works on the development of communication and discourse, 
(Keenan (1976) Mueller (1972) Garvey & Hogan (1973)) and works in the 
referential communication paradigm (c.f. papers in Dickson, 1981, 
Schmidt & Paris, 1984) have attempted to show that the Piagetian 
position about pre-school children's speech is untenable, and that for 
their samples at least children produce discourse which is, for the most 
part, socially adapted. Bloom Rocissano and Hood (1976) found, 
however, that younger children (2 year-olds) did not sustain successive 
turns by adding their information to an adult's utterance. But in Garvey 
(1977), slightly older children could sustain more extensive sequences of 
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talk. Questions also have been posed about how children develop from 
an initial inability to sustain a topic or produce contingent talk, to a stage 
where they produce extended sequences of contingent talk (Mc Tear, 
1978). Directly related to this is the ability to produce utterances that are 
semantically related to prior utterances of another speaker. This ability 
appears to increase substantially from the age of two to three years (c.f. 
Bloom, Rocissano & Hood, 1976). Bloom et al (1976) argue that children 
learn to share information in previous messages in different ways, in 
some instances the exchange of information (the sharing of information 
about a topic) is possible because both speakers are talking about the 
same event in context. In the Bloom et al study (1976), children were said 
to be learning to share the topic of a prior utterance and adding new 
information related to the topic. 	 Another important part of the 
development of discourse which is developmentally and inextricably tied 
to learning to share information, is the learning of the conventions for 
shifting reference (or words in the language used that are not stable in 
reference, because their use depends on variations in the orientations of 
speakers and situations), deixis and ellipsis in the communication 
process. This ability to learn the conventions for shifting reference is, as 
Bloom and Lahey remarked (1978), one aspect of the more general 
process of alternation. The learning of the rules of language use, to 
decide which forms to use in which context, together with the ability to 
take into account the listener when formulating a message, are two major 
requirements for the development of language. The process of 
alternation is, in Bloom & Lahey's words: 
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"the use of one of several possible forms that share the same 
essential meaning or referential function, but differ according to 
relations between content events and speech events, or even 
between speech events." (Bloom & Lahey, 1978, p.224) 
To illustrate, if an object or a thing is near the speaker, 'this' is used 
instead of 'that' as in "Bring me 'this'one here (and not 'that'...over there)", 
and 'bring' is, for instance, used instead of 'take' because it is question of 
a speaker who is also a recipient e.g. "Can you bring the papers to me". 
Anaphoric reference, i.e. reference backwards to something already 
introduced in a prior message, is that other aspect of the process of 
alternation. For example, the pronoun 'it' instead of a noun already used 
in a prior message, as in the following sentences: "This book is mine. 
Give it to me". And the definite article 'the' is used instead of the indefinite 
article 'a' if the object has already been specified. This aspect of 
alternative forms of reference within the broad development of language 
use to meet different needs in different contexts, will be dealt with in more 
detail in the chapter entitled "Introduction to the units of analysis". 
Now, what could be the real capacity of pre-school children for 
tasks which consist of talking about events and participants in the world of 
objects and persons, and the relation between these? What could be 
their capacity for the task of talking about, or taking into account, not only 
the relations between the events and participants (in terms of the content 
or forms of a language) but also the relations between speech events 
(e.g. conversations) and participants in speech events? The current 
hypothesis, in the developmental literature, Brown (1973), is that single 
forms or words used to talk about events and participants are learned first, 
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while alternative forms (shifting reference) appear later in children's 
speech because their use, and the rules which underlie them, involve 
judgement about the situation, the social status of the listener and the 
needs of the listener. A recent hypothesis (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979) very 
close to that one, is that forms are initially unifunctional before they 
become plurifunctional, and that would help to understand why deictic 
use appears before the anaphoric one (Lyons, 1975); 'I' and 'you' appear 
first, and later on 'he' or 'she' are learnt appropriately (Charney, 1980; 
Deutsch & Pechmann, 1978). But this will be dealt with in more detail in 
the next sections. 
Shifting reference (pronouns - personal and demonstrative -
definite and indefinite articles) in children's language was the subject of 
several studies in the 70s and early 80s (Bloom, Lightbown and Hood, 
1975; Tanz, 1977; Deutsch-Pechmann, 1978; Solan, 1983; for the 
pronouns; Brown, 1973; Maratsos, 1974; Warden, 1976; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1979; Emslie & Stevenson, 1981, for the indefinite and definite articles). 
Children's referring expressions in discourse (these include 
definite & indefinite reference; pronouns - noun-substitute and deictic or 
indexical function, proper names, etc.) have been studied from a variety of 
points of view longitudinally and/or cross-sectionally, within the broad 
field of the development of communication. The present study is a follow-
up study of referring expressions (two experiments which took about two 
months each to complete and separated by an interval of six months, and 
with the same children). In the next part of the chapter, experimental 
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studies dealing with definite reference, and pronouns, and so directly 
relevant to the present research, will be reviewed. 
3.2. Experimental studies of referring expressions: The 
acquisition and use of pronouns 
It is by now generally admitted that the acquisition and use of 
pronouns involves the interplay of various knowledge sources; these are 
the social, the cognitive and the linguistic (c.f. the recent work of 
Stevenson, 1988). Social cognitive and linguistic knowledge sources are 
required for the understanding of speech roles [i.e. 'I' (speaker) 'you' 
(listener) and 'he' she"they' (non-participants)] 
One such important knowledge is, first, the realisation by the child, 
that when the mother, or the caretaker, uses the pronoun 'I' to identify 
herself and the pronoun 'you' to identify the child, she is referring to roles 
and not to particular individuals. With this knowledge in mind, the child 
must now realize that when he/she is speaking he/she must use 'I' to 
identify him/herself and not his/her mother, and 'you' to identify his/her 
mother and not him/herself. And if a third person, identified by 'he' she' is 
speaking, then either the child or the mother will be identified by the third 
person pronoun, though this last use seems to be more complex because 
of its associated anaphoric use (linguistic knowledge). 
Social knowledge and non-linguistic (pragmatic) knowledge, are 
two major requirements in the production and comprehension of 
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language. 	 Social knowledge involves judgement about shared 
knowledge (between speaker and listener). This shared knowledge is 
going to determine how things will be referred to. How a speaker will 
refer to an object or a thing will depend on what he/she assumes the 
listener knows. The use of determiners is a good example of this type of 
knowledge (for instance if I refer to an animal which lives in my house by 
"my cat" or "kitty" or "she's an Angora" will depend on what I assume the 
listener knows). On the other hand, pragmatic or non-linguistic 
knowledge involves inference from general knowledge about possible 
interpretations of a sentence or a speech act. In the example, 
"John was late for his appointment with Tom and he was in a hurry to get 
a taxi", 'he' is compatible with either of the two antecedents (John and 
Tom) and neither syntax nor semantics could rule out that possibility ('he', 
3rd p. sing. masculine is compatible with both John and Tom). 
If we are able to make an inference, derived from our general knowledge, 
about the possible consequence of someone being late for an 
appointment, and to infer that `he' refers to John in the example above, 
then we are able to infer a sense in which the pronoun is not indeed 
ambiguous. In this case we are making a pragmatic inference, and a 
linguistic interpretation alone can not help us disambiguate that sense. 
Cognitive information involves the above knowledge sources, the 
social and pragmatic. This is especially true for the acquisition and use 
of deictic and anaphoric pronouns. Deictic pronouns such as 'I' and 'you' 
involve respectively the concept of self and the concept of other but also 
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the knowledge of social roles. The anaphoric pronouns require, for their 
interpretation, cognitive, or non-linguistic, information, because, as we 
have just seen with the above example (John was late...etc.) a linguistic 
interpretation alone is not sufficient for all their possible uses. 
Thus the developing child is seen with the difficult task of learning 
these different concepts and skills as well as the learning of the ability to 
interpret the skills in order to produce and understand pronouns. 
Most research on pre-school children's use of pronouns has, on 
the whole, concentrated on the indexical function of 1st and 2nd person 
pronoun usage. As was remarked earlier, a current psycholinguistic 
hypothesis (J. Lyons, 1975) states that deictic terms are logically prior to 
anaphoric ones, and that the first mentioned appear earlier than the 
second. This is because the young child appears, in first instance, to use 
pronouns to refer to things and persons that are physically present in the 
situation in which he/she is involved rather than the ones that 
linguistically refer to objects and persons that happen to be known only 
through a prior mention in an utterance. 	 The description and 
characteristic use of pronouns is left for the next section; it is sufficient to 
know, here, that basically a deictic pronoun does not need in its use some 
form of an internal representation, (since it can refer to the world of 
objects directly), while anaphoric pronouns will need some form of 
internal representation to possibly retrieve information about the 
antecedent which conditions the use of an anaphoric pronoun. In 
connection with this point of view, this function of deictic terms at a certain 
age is an example of a 'developmental function', whereby deictic terms 
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are acquired earlier than sentential expressions belonging to the 
extended discourse. These deictic terms continue to function 
developmentally (the terms are deictically referential) for some time 
before the effective use of cohesive devices (all aspects of anaphora). 
Studies which focussed on the deictic forms of the pronouns 'I' and 
'you' and 'he' and 'she' (Charney, 1980; Bruner, 1983) maintain that 
young children from 18 months to 5 1/2 years acquire, appropriately, first 
the 'I', then the 'you' and later the 'he' or 'she'. Charney (1980) proposed 
that the earliest pronoun use is correct only when this use is referring to 
the child's own speech role, i.e., from the point of view of his/her own role 
as a speaker. The pronouns 'my' and 'you', for instance, are, apparently, 
used correctly earlier than the pronoun 'her'. S. Chiat (1981) proposed a 
psycholinguistic analysis of person distinctions to explain Charney's 
findings. In R. Charney's study (1980) which is an examination of both 
production and comprehension of person pronoun, every child whose 
production of 'my' passed the criterion of syntactic independence (which 
indicated that my functioned as an independent linguistic unit and not 
only in rote phrases) also passed the comprehension test. In Chiat's 
study (1981), which is an analysis of the errors made by young children in 
making distinctions of persons, possession and case in their spontaneous 
use of pronouns, three children who,presumably, used 'my' without 
comprehending it (a part of Chiat's own thesis (1978) is dealing with this) 
did not meet the criterion of syntactic independence. In this case they 
have only acquired my within rote phrases, i.e they produce an 
unanalysed whole containing 'my' which corresponds to a complex 
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concept including the notion of 'self'. But these children have not isolated 
the pronoun and determined its specific contribution to the expression of 
that complex concept. Consequently, they can not be said to have 
acquired the pronoun itself, and there is no basis for attributing a person-
in-speech-role-referring pronoun to them. In Charney's findings, 'her', 
unlike 'my' and 'your', was not easiest in the speech role in which it 
referred to the child. For Chiat (1981) if 'my' was easiest when it referred 
to the child it was because the child initially produced unanalysed 1st 
person phrases which necessarily referred to the child himself/herself. 
On the other hand, if unanalysed 3rd person phrases occurred they would 
not result in a person-in-speech-role-referring stage for 'her'. The other 
reason invoked by Chiat was that if 'your' was easier when it referred to 
the child it was because comprehension is generally in advance of 
production, and in comprehension 'your' always refers to the child 
(provided the child is the addressee). Moreover 'her' refers to any non-
participant, so that a child who understood 'her' even if he/she did not 
produce it, would not understand it as referring to himself/herself. Thus, 
the priority of comprehension over production does not result in what 
looks like a child referring bias for 'her' as much as it does for 'your'. In 
Deutsch & Pechman's (1978) study of the acquisition of pronouns by 
German children it is proposed that the relationship between speaker and 
hearer is particularly relevant for young children, and the consequence is 
that 'I' and 'you' are acquired before 3rd person references. (c.f. 
Cognition, 6, 1978, 155-168) 
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The basic findings about the acquisition of the pronouns which 
have been discussed so far seem to agree that young children acquire 
pronouns in the following order: I being acquired before you, and these 
two are acquired before 'he' or 'she'. However, one problem remains 
with all these observations. In some instances the tasks given to children 
of 2 years or less may not be suitable enough to reflect their actual 
linguistic abilities. It may be that it is more difficult to devise tasks which 
are intended to reflect 2-year-old linguistic abilities than the cognitive 
workload (i.e. demands) (M. Shatz, 1977) of the tasks itself. On the other 
hand, Chiat (1986) considers that it is difficult to obtain reliable responses 
which are not experimental artefacts from children at the crucial stages of 
development (in the case of pronouns around 2 years of age). The 
experimental ingenuity might yield interesting results. But do these 
results reflect young children's actual processing of particular linguistic 
forms (or more broadly, the socio-cognitive and socio-linguistic 
capacities) or do they reflect more of the experimental situation and 
perhaps the strategies used by children in that situation? 
The same problem of methodological adequacy arises, together 
with another not less important one (c.f. Stevenson, 1988), when we 
consider some studies of children's inferences to interpret pronouns. This 
latter problem concerns the contribution of two sources of information, the 
cognitive (pragmatic) and the linguistic (lexical) in the acquisition of 
pronouns. 
77 
In Wyke's (1981) experiments on children's inferential abilities to 
interpret pronouns, for instance, it was reported that 5-year-olds have 
some difficulty in assigning reference to pronouns. These children 
apparently have difficulty when there is more than one pronoun in a 
sentence, when the subject pronoun does not refer to the subject noun 
phrase of the previous sentence, and when it is necessary to draw an 
inference to define reference. The following pair of sentences is an 
illustration of the above difficulty in assigning referents to pronouns: 
Jane needed Susan's pencil. She gave it to her. 
In the second sentence there are two pronouns of the same gender 
which contains no linguistic information (i.e., number & gender) to 
distinguish between presumed referents. So the only possibility was to 
interpret pronouns on the basis of general knowledge about how to draw 
the relevant inferences. In this typical case, children in Wyke's study 
performed poorly. In Wyke's first study, intended as a control task in her 
design, children were asked to draw the relevant inferences explicitly and 
they were able to do so. Wykes' design varied the presence or absence 
of gender information in order to directly manipulate pragmatic inference, 
and there was an attempt to include in her second study another variation 
concerning the ease with which young children can interpret pronouns, 
(sentence requiring simple inferences vs. sentences requiring complex 
inferences). But a problem arises as to the complex inferences 5-year-
olds have to deal with, these inferences increasing the memory load and 
in many ways complicating the task for pre-schoolers. Are the sentences 
78 
used in Wyke (1981) suitable for 5-year-olds? The same question might 
be asked about Tyler's experiments (1983) with five-year-olds use of 
pragmatic inferences to interpret discourse (anaphoric expressions). In 
Tyler's study (1983), young children fail to use lexical information (gender 
information) in their interpretation of pronouns. Children from 5 to 9 years 
as well as adults were asked to press a key whenever they detected a 
mispronounciation of a word in sentences like: 
Mother saw the postman coming from a distance. The postman 
brought a letter from Uncle Charles who lives in Canada. 
In subsequent examples, the pronouns, as well as the head 
subject in the second sentence were varied. The time taken by the 
subjects to press the key when detecting a mispronounciation was 
measured. The results were that the 5-year-olds took a longer time to 
detect the mispronounciation in the sentences which contain pronouns. 
The basic argument in Tyler's study is that young children can make 
pragmatic inferences to interpret discourse, or to recognize the 
implausibility of the second sentence in the following pair: 
Mother saw the postman coming from a distance. Mother brought 
a letter from Uncle Charles who lives in Canada. 
But they fail to interpret pronouns as in the second sentence of the 
following pair: 
Every now and then, the princess goes to see the old shepherd. 
She takes good care of the sheep and.... 
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The consequence of this failure, is that they do not, also, recognize 
the implausibility of the second sentence. 
Tyler's (1983) position contrasts with Wykes (1981), in the sense 
that young children are not able to use gender information for the former 
sentence, and on the other hand, young children are able to use lexical or 
gender information before pragmatic inferences to interpret pronouns, for 
the latter sentence. But in both studies, the tasks appear to be very 
demanding, and thus not quite suitable for young children's use of 
inferences. This fact alone can not be overemphasized in that most 
studies concerning the interpretation of pronouns by young children, 
however fragmentary, do mention all sorts of experimental manipulation 
of either cognitive (pragmatic) or linguistic (lexical) sources of information. 
But these studies do not actually yield results which consistently 
disambiguate the relative contributions of the above-named sources of 
information in the acquisition, the understanding and use of pronouns. 
Other experimental studies of pronouns have looked particularly at 
the functions of articles. Studies by Karmiloff-Smith (1979; 1981; 1985) 
Warden (1976) Emslie & Stevenson (1981) and Maratsos (1976) have 
focussed on the notions of definiteness and indefiniteness in the use of 
articles, the parallel notions of specificity vs. non-specificity and novel vs. 
familiar distinction coded by the articles. 
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3.3. Experimental studies of referring expressions: 
definiteness and indefiniteness 
Directly relevant to the present investigation, the work of Warden 
(1976) was one of the first, among those cognitively oriented, to study 
experimentally definite reference in pre-school children. Warden pointed 
out that, although the nominative and identifying uses of 'a' are similar 
(both are concerned with the marking of unity rather than the marking of 
indefiniteness; c.f. Vendler, 1967, for the above remark), naming an item 
and identifying it remain distinctly different operations. As an example, in: 
'that's a hammer', the ind. NP does not identify anything - the referent 
being already identified and is now being referred to by the expression 
'that', whereas in the sentence 'there is a hammer in that drawer', the ind. 
NP identifies a particular item. 
The nominative sense of 'a' is not affected by the contextual factors 
which constrain the use of the identifying sense of the article. A speaker 
need not take into account the listener's previous knowledge of a referent 
when he is naming it; whereas this is precisely what he must do if he 
wishes to refer to it. 
In an earlier study (1974) Warden attempted to elicit referential 
speech from children between 3 and 5 years of age in a controlled 
experimental setting. According to his results, relatively few children 
below four years were capable of directing their use of language to such 
non-egocentric goals as describing events to an audience. 
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It will be made clear in the following pages, the 'a' in the use of 
identifying expression and 'the' in the definite reference, is a cognitively 
more demanding task than the one involved in naming (nominative 
function), which function involves only a grasp of the class membership -
an individual class member. 
The semantic distinction involved in identifying a definite reference 
requires from the child a specification of the uniqueness of the referent, 
i.e.; the speaker/participant is referring to a particular example (s) of a 
class of things (c.f. Emslie & Stevenson, 1981). Thus one can say that the 
indefinite article (in an ind. NP) serves an identifying function, and the 
definite article serves an anaphoric function. 
Warden (1976) poses some questions about what we have called 
above the semantic distinction between identifying something and simply 
naming it. Do young children identify specific referents with an indefinite 
NP, or is the process of "pointing" too intrinsically definite for them to 
realize the need for an indefinite expression? 
With a relatively small sample, Warden (1976) somehow 
established that adults make an appropriate use of identifying 
expressions and definite reference (c.f. table 3-1). On this question of 
appropriateness of use, some naturalistic studies, Bloom (1970), Brown 
(1973), predicted that children will master the nominative use of "a' before 
they use this morpheme appropriately in identifying expressions. As an 
illustration, in a naming task, e.g. "what's that?" the reply will be "a" + 
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noun. In a description task, e.g. "tell me what's happening?", the reply will 
be "a + noun is 	 ing a + noun" (e.g. "a cow is chasing a duck"). 
In Warden's study, it would appear that the act of naming created a 
set for the indefinite article, thereby increasing the likelihood of an 
identifying expression in subsequent discourse. 
In the 1st experiment in Warden's study (1976), there were 
assumptions from both adults and children that the experimenter, even 
blindfold, somehow shared their view of events (although the children 
may be hypothesized to be less sensitive to such contextual factors). 
Warden's second experiment was designed to obviate such weakness in 
the design of the first experiment. 
Are children's referring expressions sensitive to changes in the 
social context? In other words, did the first experiment reflect the 
children's assumption that, in that context, the referents were already 
identified, enabling them to use identifying expressions, regardless of 
context? The other hypothesis which was also examined, was whether a 
previously identified referent is more likely to be referred to if it is isolated 
rather than if it is a member of a group. 
The suggestion is that the group situation is more likely to 
emphasize the need for an identifying expression when talking about one 
member of that group. 
The adults (in Warden's second experiment) used fewer definite 
and more indefinite referring expressions than the children, in the two 
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experimental conditions (the 'isolated condition' and the 'social 
condition') 
It was then suggested that definite reference might be more likely 
to occur if the referent was isolated as the presence of the other group 
members might emphasize the need for an identifying expression. The 
statistical results 'disproved', as it was claimed, this hypothesis; neither 
the adults, nor the children discriminated reliably between isolated and 
non-isolated referents in their use of definite and indefinite referring 
expressions. But again, in this experiment, the adults seem to have made 
certain presuppositions regarding their audience's knowledge of 
referents, presuppositions which the experimental task was intended to 
eliminate. 
The researcher, then, designed a 3rd experiment, one similar to 
experiments within the referential communication paradigm (subjects in 
pairs, seated opposite each other, and being unaware of the contents of 
the cartoon stories the speaker is going to tell -- the roles were reversed 
afterwards -- to the listener who was instructed to try to remember the 
story, because he was going to repeat it afterwards). 
Children, in Warden's 3rd experiment, from 3 to 9 were divided into 
four age-groups: 3;0 - 3;11, 5;0 - 5;11, 7;0-7;11, 9;0 - 9;11. 
For Warden, young children fail to take into account the social 
context of their reference or of their audience's knowledge of the referent, 
when they construct a referring expression. They fail to recognize the 
need for an indefinite expression when introducing a referent for the first 
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time in a discourse; consequently, they also fail to recognize the 
constraints on the use of the definite article, namely that its use indicates 
an already identified referent. 
The explanation for that failure to identify a referent is that a pre-
school child is unable to adopt his audience's point of view. From his 
own egocentric viewpoint, a referent is specified as soon as he (the 
speaker) is familiar with it; he fails to realize that his audience will only 
become familiar with the referent after he has identified it for them 
verbally. The other argument is that five-year old children can be non-
egocentric in their uses of referring expressions, for example, when using 
demonstratives, but that they are still grappling with the implications of 
non-egocentricity for the dual function of the indefinite article. The ind. 
article either indicates an indefinite referent or a specific, but previously 
unidentified referent. In the former, a speaker need only consult his own 
knowledge of a referent; in the second, he must take account of his 
listener's knowledge. 
Children may be forced to rely on the definite article until they have 
mastered the identifying function of the indefinite article; and this mastery 
will depend on an awareness of their audience's point of view. 
This much discussed failure, in the pre-school child, to take 
account of someone else's point of view, or in other words 'egocentrism', 
which for Piaget and his followers is a serious barrier to communication, 
has also been dealt with in some experimental studies of semantic 
acquisition (use of definite and indefinite reference) by Maratsos (1976), 
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and the age at which different semantic distinctions conveyed by the 
articles in definite and indefinite referring expressions are acquired, by C. 
Emslie & R. J. Stevenson, (1981). 
We have seen, in the introductory chapters to this research, that 
Piaget (1926) proposed 'egocentrism' as an explanatory concept, and 
that he used the term 'to designate the initial inability to decenter, to shift 
the given cognitive perspective (manque de decentration)." (c.f. Piaget's 
comments on Vygotsky's 'Thought and Language', 1962/1986, A Kozulin 
editor, p. 262). 
The work of Maratsos (1976) was one of the late 70's experimental 
studies to question not the claim that the child sometimes fails 'to place 
himself at the point of view of his hearer', but the suggestion that he can 
not do this. A group of 4-year-olds in Maratsos' study (1976) seem to 
have mastered the non-egocentric use of the articles, though the existing 
experimental evidence is conflicting as to the age at which the uses of the 
articles are acquired. For Warden (1976), the egocentric use of both 
identifying and definite expressions is still occurring in children up to the 
age of 9; and for Emslie & Stevenson (1981) by the age of 3 years, 
children have mastered the uses of both identifying and definite 
expressions. 
The experiments in the present study were more supporting 
Warden's findings on the approximate age of egocentric use of definite 
reference, than the experiments realized by Emslie and Stevenson 
(1981). But we will have more to say about this later on. Maratsos (1976) 
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devised a number of procedures to test children's competence in 
comprehending articles. In one of these procedures, children saw a boy-
doll go up to three dogs in three cars and begin talking to one. The 
children were told either "suddenly the dog drove away", or "suddenly a 
dog drove away". They were then asked to indicate which dog drove 
away. If they were told "the dog drove away", they should have picked the 
dog being talked to, or the contextually specific dog. If told "a dog drove 
away", the choice is one of the two other dogs, or the contextually non-
specific dog. 
Maratsos found that approximately 85% of children answers were 
accurate (correctly choosing referents). 
In other tasks used by Maratsos -- tasks where there is a lack of 
contextual support from the toys -- children were asked questions which 
were intended to elicit either definite or indefinite articles based on short 
stories. 
In one of such stories, a man goes to the jungle to find a lion or a 
zebra. One version of the story ends: 
"He looked for a lion or a zebra everywhere. He looked and 
looked. Suddenly, who came running out at the man?" 
The correct answer (unless the child decides to introduce a new 
character) is 'a lion' or 'a zebra', since no particular lion or zebra was 
mentioned in the story. The other version ends: 
87 
"Then the man found a lion and a zebra together. Who came 
running out at the man?" 
Here one would expect the answer: 'the lion' or 'the zebra', because a 
particular lion and a particular zebra where referred to in the story. 
The results, in Maratsos' (1976) study, showed that 3-year-olds 
were very good at producing answers requiring the indefinite article (in 
the 1st version), but they frequently failed to use the definite article when 
a particular referent had been established for them (second version). 
Maratsos' conclusion is that memory load makes it difficult for these 
children to encode both class membership information and specification 
of the uniqueness of the referent (identifying function), and children in 
Maratsos' study and in the present study, responded on the basis of class 
membership alone (the nominative function). 
But if in Maratsos' study there exists a group of 4-year-olds (high 
4's group vs. low 4's group) who have apparently mastered both the 
definite and indefinite articles, by contrast, children under 5 years, in 
Warden's study, still fail to take into account the listener's knowledge of a 
referent, their referring expressions continue to be predominantly definite. 
Warden (1976) suggested that it is only at 9 years that children have a full 
grasp of the articles in referential speech. 
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The discrepancies between the results of Maratsos' (1976) and 
Warden (1976) as to the age at which children are supposed to show 
mastery of both identifying and definite expressions, may well be due to 
task difficulty (cognitive requirement of the task placing too great a 
demand on the pre-school child, e.g. in the cartoon pictures (line 
drawings) in Warden (1976), one of the pictures (picture 2) is described 
as "a cow stops the dog and the hen is behind the cow"), and the 
experimental procedure devised by the two researchers (the instructions 
to the child, and contextual variables such as 'shared perception' or 'prior 
knowledge' illustrate the task difficulty). 
It seems that in Maratsos (1976), the story completion (the lion and 
the zebra story) was difficult to interpret by 3 and 4-year-olds, and it might 
be that the children have been concentrating on the task itself rather than 
the need of the listener, the 4-year olds group considered to be 
egocentric may have assumed that the listener was already familiar with 
the referents. In Warden (1976), the procedure adopted is akin to the 
technique used by researchers using the referential communication 
paradigm, i.e. placing a screen between the subjects, but adjusted in 
such a way that subjects can see only the top of their partner's head, and 
instructing them to tell about the picture to the partners. But a problem 
remains, which is the extent to which pre-school children understand that 
they have to talk to each other and not to the experimenter. This problem 
was pointed out in the preliminary discussion of the 1st experiment of the 
present study. And, if one assumes that children understand the 
instructions (continual emphasis by the experimenter that the person who 
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tells the story will have to tell it well so that the other person can 
understand it), to what extent can we prove that children are using 
egocentric definite reference or not? 
A number of methodological criticisms were made by 
Warden (1977) and Emslie & Stevenson (1981). For Warden, (1977) 
Maratsos utilizes an experimental context in such a way that the 
children's audience was always an adult experimenter who introduced 
the tasks and provided the verbal and non-verbal context for their 
utterances. This weakness also pointed out by Emslie & Stevenson 
(1981), was that the rising 4-year-old children may have assumed that the 
experimenter was familiar with the referents of their referring expressions, 
and therefore may be inclined to use the definite article. The other 
weakness pointed out by Warden was that the experimenter controlled 
the verbal context and did not, in fact, allowed the children to initiate such 
a context for their referring expressions. In Warden, the emphasis should 
be on the word conversation (using articles in conversation with a variety 
of listeners, particularly with the same age partners so that there be no 
assumption of prior knowledge attributed to them) because asking 
subjects for a name in response to a question as in Maratsos' study 
(1976) may have biased their responses towards the nominative 
indefinite article. (e.g. "article + noun") 
Subsequent work on articles and their acquisition, but this time in 
terms of the functions these words fulfill, was carried out by Karmiloff-
Smith (1977; 1979) and Garton (1983; 1984). Instead of attempting to 
trace the emergence of the definite and indefinite article and their correct 
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and incorrect use in a grammatical sense, Karmiloff-Smith and Garton 
carried out experiments to elicit a range of different uses of the articles, 
and other determiners such as the demonstratives 'this' and 'that'. 
3.3.1. Karmiloff-Smith's study of postdeterminers and 
reference 
Karmiloff-Smith (1977; 1979) devised a number of experiments 
with French-speaking children between 3;0 and 12;0, designed to study 
the plurifunctionality of determiners. Much of her experimental work was 
concentrated on production tasks (1979), though in a previous paper 
(1977), an experiment in addition to a production task experiment, was 
focussing on a comprehension task, involving children between 2;10 and 
7;11. Karmiloff-Smith (1977) analysed young children's comprehension 
of the words 'other' and 'same' which are used anaphorically as post-
determiners, with the intention to give emphasis to the contrast between 
indefinite and definite articles 'a' and 'the'. . But, to put it in Roger Brown's 
(1973) terms, in devising comprehension tasks "one puts a somewhat 
unusual communication burden" (p. 406) on the indefinite article 'a'. 
Such criticism was already levelled at aspects of the Maratsos (1976) and 
Warden (1976) studies, in the previous discussion, which was, briefly 
speaking, that what the child can do in an experimental task is not 
necessarily equivalent to what the child does in language use and 
understanding. In other words, in placing unusual communicative 
burdens on certain morphemes in order to create a linguistic contrast 
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(the/a) (and narrowing down the situational context to one cognitive 
contrast, e.g. singletons/groups of identical objects) are we actually 
observing the child's normal language processing procedures or are we 
observing ad hoc experiment-generated procedures? 
In the view of Karmiloff-Smith, in the area of articles, the semantic 
distinctions of the type mentioned above (the/a) would not be made only 
on the article distinction in a natural language usage, but instead by 
adding relevant linguistic emphasizers such as 'the same X', 'another X', 
'the only X', 'one of the X', or by some other means, including intonational 
stress, pronominalization, etc. Her second experiment, which was a 
production task, was thus designed to look, on the one hand, at how 
children organize various linguistic means to make the above named 
contrast, and on the other hand, to whether children between 3 and 8 
years place the sematic burden on the article contrast alone. 
Her hypothesis, following Maratsos (1976) was that, if the pre-
school child is able to distinguish, in a comprehension task, specific from 
non-specific reference only on difference between two unstressed articles 
'the' and 'a', then, it will be probably easier for the children to make such 
a distinction if the meanings of articles are emphasized by the addition of 
postdeterminers 'same' and 'other'. 
In Karmiloff-Smith's study (1977), there were six basic situation 
types using familiar objects in four basic contexts. In context (A), children 
were presented with completely identical objects (e.g. blue plastic ducks, 
green toy-Volkswagen, etc.,); in context (B) objects of the same class 
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differing only in colour (e.g. blue or pink plastic lambs, red or blue toy-
Fords, etc.,); in context (C) objects of the same class differing by essential 
parameters (e.g. brown-wooden standing cow versus white-plastic 
saloon car, etc.,); and in context (D), objects which were the only 
members of their class (e.g. a horse, a truck, a toy-watch, etc.,). To these 
experimental contexts, it was added a girl-doll and a baby-doll. The 
experimenter asked the child to act out a series of sentences which have 
the following design, where, in sentence type (a) the key word is in object 
position: 
e.g. "La fille pousse un X et puis le garcon pousse (la meme/une 
autre) X" 
("The girl pushes an X and then the boy pushes (the same/another) 
X") and in the sentence type (b), the key word is in the subject position: 
e.g. "une X pousse la fille et puis (la meme/une autre) X pousse le 
garcon" ("An X pushes the girl and then (the same/another) X pushes the 
boy"). All through the experiments, sentences were repeated and 
children were encouraged to talk about familiar objects they possessed. 
A total of forty seven children between the ages 2;10 and 7;11 years 
participated in the experiment. 
The results of this experiment showed that overall the order of 
change of interpretation from 'same kind' to 'same one' is, quantitatively 
speaking, a function of age and the extralinguistic context (i.e. the objects 
used in the experimental procedure) within each age group. 
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The three-year-olds interpreted 'same' as meaning 'same kind', 
and 'other, according to her results, is often interpreted as meaning 'other 
kind'. It seems that these two expressions are interpreted in, what 
Karmiloff-Smith calls, their 'descriptor function', meaning 'same kind', i.e. 
members of the same class (e.g. X is wearing the same suit/dress as Y), 
or, in other words, as modifiers which tell the child about class attributes, 
and not in their 'determiner function', meaning 'same one', i.e. the same 
element (a singleton) within a class (e.g. X is wearing the same suit/dress 
as yesterday). 
The determiner function of these expressions thus understood, 
helps distinguish a subordinate class of possessed objects from a 
superordinate class of similar ones. 
The four-year-olds interpreted 'other' as meaning 'other one', i.e. in 
its function of postdeterminer, but 'same' was apparently still interpreted 
in its descriptor function, meaning 'same kind'. It was only in 'conflict' 
situations, i.e. situations in which the child was hesitating between the 
competing interpretations 'same one' and 'same kind', that there was 
significant increase in correct 'same one' interpretation. 
With the five-year-olds, there was a substantial increase (a very 
significant change) in success rate. This age group was interpreting 
'same' to mean 'same one', but in the first few experimental items, as 
reported by Karmiloff-Smith, many hesitations preceded correct 
responses in situations where Xs were identical or similar. But from 6 
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years onward, children interpreted more systematically, both 'same' and 
'other' as postdeterminers. 
It appears that, from this experiment (1977) and from other 
experiments in Karmiloff-Smith (1979), for children under five years the 
word 'same' is clearly a sort of modifier, with a descriptor function in the 
sense of 'same kind'. It is only after six years that 'same' was interpreted 
as referring anaphorically to the same referent as the antecedent refers 
to. 
Karmiloff-Smith's other experiments (1979) on determiners 
indicate that the function of the definite article may initially be 
predominantly exophoric or deictic, which means that it (the function) 
serves to signal a particular object or the actions of one salient object 
singled out from a group of others, in the extralinguistic context. 
Karmiloff-Smith's results are also consistent with Warden's (1976) and 
Hickmann's (1980; 1985) analyses of both definite and indefinite forms in 
children's narratives, whether or not these narratives are elicited in the 
presence of appropriate extralinguistic context. 
Following Karmiloff-Smith's approach, Garton's (1983; 1984) study 
of English-speaking children argued for an adoption of the child's 
perspective on his developing language and examined the context and 
use (and non-use) of article forms. She attempted to show that 3-year-old 
children were sensitive to adult language which was addressed to them, 
and that their article usage reflected the form of the question. 
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One essential result in Garton's experiment (1984) was that, to the 
question form "What did the farmer do?", the bulk of 3-year-olds 
responses involved a full sentence with the definite article (e.g. "the 
farmer knocked over the cow")., and to question form "what did the farmer 
knock over?" the responses consisted mainly of the indefinite article 
accompanied by a noun ("the farmer knocked over a cow"). Garton 
proposed that the tendency in the children to use a particular sentential 
form was influenced by the type of the question asked by the adult, this in 
turn led to the form and function produced. The main argument in Garton 
(1984) is that because children are not totally consistent in their article 
usage (at least in her study), their production of articles does not 
correspond to adult usages. In an earlier work (1983) Garton argued that 
a contrastive categorisation of the articles ('the' and 'a') and the 
demonstratives ('this' and 'that') does little to help the interpretation of the 
data, and that we should instead describe children's ability in terms of the 
determiners used, and those omitted, and in terms of the function noted in 
the different contexts. 
After the work of Warden (1976), discussed in an earlier section, 
Hickmann's studies (1980; 1985) of discourse cohesion in pre-school 
children are of particular interest to the present study, in so far as her work 
and that of Karmiloff-Smith (1977; 1979) show that intralinguistic uses of 
linguistic forms (definite article, pronouns and demonstratives) in the 
creation of referents (i.e. being used anaphorically and not just deictically) 
are a relatively late development. 
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3.3.2. Other experimental studies of anaphoric reference 
1) Hickmann's study of discourse cohesion 
Hickmann (1985), in her discussion of children's uses of various 
text-forming (cohesive) and metapragmatic devices (or speech referring 
to speech) in discourse, used Vygotskyan developmental theory, which, 
roughly speaking, emphasizes the interdependence of language and 
thought in development. By contrast to Piagetian developmental theory 
that treats cognition and language as separate entities, with language 
being, to this view, the product of cognitive development, Vygotsky's 
approach considers, on one hand, language development and cognitive 
development in constant interaction and, on the other hand, the uses of 
language as necessary for the development of certain higher mental 
functions. Hickmann (1985) hypothesized that the ability to establish 
relationships among the utterances of ongoing discourse (and at the 
same time the ability to represent language in various ways through 
speech), would have implications for both the child's social and cognitive 
development. According to this line of research, and in M. Hickmann's 
own terms "the metapragmatic capabilities of language transform the 
child's developing ability to plan, organize, and interpret pragmatic uses 
of signs in interactive situations: they transform this ability to participate in 
gradually more complex interactive events with other agents, as well as 
his ability to reflect on, talk about and reason about the interactive events" 
(Hickmann, 1985, p. 254). M. Hickmann's analysis focussed, on one 
hand, on the intralinguistic uses of referring expressions (anaphoric uses) 
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which helps the children to 'create' referents linguistically, and 
subsequently maintain reference to these linguistic means, and on the 
other hand, on the pragmatic uses of speech (as, for instance, when a 
speaker uses speech in one situation in order to represent speech uttered 
in another situation). 
In her study, English-speaking children from 4 to 10 years of age 
as well as adults, were asked to narrate 'stories' in the following situation: 
- Film-narrative situations: a group of 10 children, in each of the 
age groups studied, was asked to narrate short film-strips to an 
interlocutor who had not seen them and who was subsequently asked to 
tell them back, but also to answer some questions about them. In the 
dialogue between two characters (puppets representing common 
animals), the 'participants' talked about two referents (or "the non-
participants" which were not present in the film). In other filmstrips, the 
two referents consisted of two animals (animate "non-participants"); in 
some other films, they were two objects (inanimate "non-participants"). In 
an example of a type of film type I, (inanimate "non-participants") a dog 
"interacts" with a frog: 
Frog: "Hi, it's my birthday today. Do you want to come to my 
birthday party?" 
Dog: "No, I can't go to your party. I'm very sad. I bought a candy 
bar and a flower for your birthday. The flower smelled good 
and the candy bar looked good. But now the candy bar is 
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sticky and the flower is dead. I don't know what happened" 
etc... 
Children in narrating these films, had to report in narrative form the 
sequence of speech events that took place in the dialogue. They had to 
rely on speech only, because, as it was specifically built in the design, 
they could not assume that their interlocutor was aware of the contents of 
the film, and also because there was nothing pertaining to the non-
linguistic context which could be related to the contents of the film. 
In the picture-narrative situation, the same children were asked to 
narrate two picture sequences to an interlocutor who this time was 
blindfold, and thus could not see the pictures. In this situation, though the 
non-linguistic context related to the contents of the narratives (pictures 
present throughout narration) was present, text-forming or cohesive 
devices were still necessary, so as to create referents linguistically since 
the interlocutor was blindfold. It was assumed that this task was easier 
than the first one for many reasons. The children did not have to 
remember the content as in the first task (filmstrips), since the sequence of 
pictures was present: this situation also allowed the children to use 
linguistic forms deictically rather than solely within the linguistic context; 
and the sequence of events within the picture sequences which are 
logically related did not, at first sight, involve speech events. 
Hickmann categorized referring expressions into "effective" 
"ineffective" and "mixed" forms, where the 'effective" forms consisted of 
means of introducing referents (e.g. indefinite articles), "ineffective 
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expressions which presuppose the referents on first mention (e.g. definite 
articles), and "mixed" forms, those which were neither effective nor 
ineffective (which include 'definite' article associated with 'topic' or 
existential clauses, insufficient definite descriptions, nouns without 
determiners). 
The results show, in the film-narrative situation, that the 4-year-olds 
produced a small proportion of effective referent-introducing forms, i.e. 
only 36% of the forms were effective, a relatively high proportion of these 
forms in the 7-year-olds, i.e. 56%, and about 89% in the 10-year-olds, 
which seems to indicate that only the 10-year-olds are using effective 
forms in order to create these forms systematically and consistently more 
frequently than in effective and mixed forms. 
What these results suggest is that children under 7 years have not 
yet mastered cohesive uses and have difficulties in interpreting referring 
expressions. Some inconsistencies in the 4-year-olds in the use of 
intralinguistic devices and metapragmatic frames were pointed out. 
Children of this age tended, in general, to focus their stories on 
participants rather than explicitly on their speech. In general, when 
reporting speech events that occurred in another speech situation, the 4-
year-olds did not clearly separate between the reported message and the 
narrative message in the preceding speech situation (i.e. reproducing 
simply the dialogue between the participants, in the first and second 
person, without very often any third person forms). 
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If the 4-year-olds have difficulties in using effective referent 
introducing forms (to introduce linguistically animate referents), to create 
a presupposition of the existence and specificity of these referents, the 
10-year-olds, however, tended to create these effective forms consistently 
when they mention participants. Overall, it appears that 4-year-old 
narratives, in Hickmann's study, did not depend strictly on children's own 
speech, but basically on either nonlinguistic context (deictic indexical 
relationships) or on adult's guidance in the form of questions. 
On the other hand, though 7-year-olds tended sometimes to begin 
their narrative by reporting the speech of the participant without 
mentioning the other participant, overall this age group, nevertheless, 
showed an emerging ability to use only linguistic means to organize their 
own discourse. 
To summarize the above findings, both Karmiloff-Smith (1979) and 
Hickmann (1985) pointed out a progression across age in the discourse 
functions that the same linguistic forms (e.g. definite articles, pronouns or 
demonstrative) may have 	 These two researchers showed that 
intralinguistic uses of such expressions in the creation of referents (i.e. 
anaphoric use and not just deictic use of referents) are relatively late 
development. 
In the same line of research but with a shift of emphasis on deixis 
as expressed in a number of different formal systems of grammar, i.e. 
through determiners, adverbs, pronouns, prepositions, lexical verbs and 
tenses, R. Wales (1986) stresses the importance of earlier deictic uses 
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For R. Wales (1986), deictic devices often enter crucially into 
children's conversational discourse, as has been already reported by 
Keenan and Schieffelin (1976). 
The proponents of the cognitive view of the development of deixis, 
maintain that it provides a linguistic mechanism for expressing the 
domain of joint speaker-hearer attention. Naming is a natural candidate 
for such a mechanism (c.f. works by Bruner (1975; 1983), and 
applications by Bridges (1978), Mc Shane (1980), Ninio (1980), Gopnik 
(1982) and Bruner (1983), and the general discussion of the first 
experiment of the present study. 
At this point, one can thus notice a kind of general trend from terms 
which are used correctly in their linguistically referential function (or 
deixis), to the gradual construction of a system of differential linguistic 
markers (full NPs, pronouns, etc.,) which are used in their linguistic 
referential function (or anaphora). 
Always in the same trend of research, some other workers 
(Chipman and deDardel (1974), extended the investigation of definite 
articles to pronouns, and from the principle of 'specific' and 'non-specific' 
(referent) to the corollary principle of 'all' vs. 'some'. That was also what 
Tanz (1977) did with children between 3 and 5 years. 
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2) Tanz' study of the definite pronoun 'it' 
Tanz (1977) replicated an experiment done by Chipman and 
deDardel (1974). These latter focussed on the possible interpretation of 
the definite pronoun 'it' in sentences in which 'it' referred to substances 
and collections. A typical sentence in Chipman and deDardel experiment 
reads like this: "there is a Play-Doh there. Give it to me". These 
researchers then recorded the children's answers to the above sentence. 
All the children in Chipman and deDardel (1974) understood that 'it' 
referred to the substance previously mentioned (i.e. interpreting 'it' 
anaphorically), the younger children, however, (3-year-olds) gave only a 
piece of the Play-Doh, rather than all of it, to the experimenter. Their 
conclusion is that children interpreted 'it' to mean 'one piece' of the 
substance previously mentioned, and that children did not understand 
that 'it' in "give it to me" contains implicitly the quantifier 'all', specifically 
when 'it' refers to substances and collections. 
For Tanz (1977), children in the Chipman and deDardel study 
(1974) might have interpreted the definite pronoun 'it' as the indefinite 
pronoun 'some', because they tended to give to the experimenter more 
than one piece of the substance or collection when requested. In Tanz' 
study, requests included N Phrases with definite article (e.g. "give me the 
Play-Doh") NP with indefinite pronoun 'some' (e.g. "give me some Play-
Doh"), and requests involving plural nouns and the definite pronoun 
'them', as in the following sentence: "there are flowers on "the table. 
Give them to me". Her results were somewhat different from those 
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obtained by Chipman and deDardel (1974). In Tanz' study, the youngest 
children almost always gave to the exerimenter all of the substance or 
collection requested, and children of the age-range studied by her usually 
responded appropriately to the requests using 'the' and 'some'. In 
general, it appears that in Tanz's study (1977) children observe the 
distinction between the definite and indefinite pronouns as it bears on 
quantity from the earliest age studied (3;5 - 5,0). The failure to realize that 
the definite anaphoric pronoun 'it' refers to all of its antecedents (e.g. 
"there is a cup of 5 marbles on the table. Give it to me"; there is a furniture 
on the table. Give it to me", the mass-noun "furniture" stands for 4 pieces 
of furniture) reaches about the same degree or is equal to the failure to 
realize that the definite NP refers to all of the matter in question. Thus, the 
problem of quantity extends to definite references in general, rather than 
being limited to the pronoun. On the other hand, suggestion is made that 
the plural definite pronoun 'them' is more problematic for the younger 
subjects than are plural definite NPs. Tanz concluded by saying that "the 
quantitative implications of plural definite referring expressions are easier 
for children to grasp in full noun phrases than in pronouns" (Tanz, 1977, 
p. 235). Thus, it appears that according to the results of some 
researchers (Tanz, 1977; Maratsos, 1976) children can differentiate 
definite from indefinite reference to some extent reasonably early, though 
it might take some time for that differentiation to become reliable for an 
adult listener; for some others (Karmiloff-Smith, 1977; 1979; Warden, 
1976; Hickmann, 1985, and the present study), cohesive uses and 
interpretations of referring expressions are a relatively late development, 
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and, on the other hand, early definite reference is exophoric rather than 
anaphoric. 
In the 1980's, some workers (Emslie and Stevenson, 1981; Power 
and Del Martello, 1986) brought some slight improvements to the 
procedures used by Maratsos (1976) and Warden (1976): quality of the 
pictures (bright coloured vs. black & white) in Warden (1976), 
reconsideration of the interactants, (the experimenter trying to interfere 
the less possible). 
Emslie and Stevenson's main expectations as to a correct usage of 
the indefinite and definite articles for first and second mention of a 
referent, are that pre-school children should go through three stages. 
These are, first, the nominative use of 'a', leading to an overuse of the 
indefinite article; second, an overuse of the definite article for first mention 
of a referent (Emslie & Stevenson did not specify the age at which 
children reach such an 'egocentric' stage); and finally a correct usage of 
both the articles in their anaphoric use (first and second mention of a 
referent). Their hypothesis is that a simple unambiguous task should 
eliminate the overuse of the definite article, if egocentric responses are 
due to tasks demands, and children should progress from an overuse of 
indefinite article 'a', directly to a correct (adult) use of referring 
expressions. They found no evidence for an egocentric stage in which 
definite expressions are used instead of identifying expressions, and their 
results, in general, indicate that the nominative use of the indefinite is 
mastered before its identifying use, and at 3 years of age children seem to 
have mastered the use of both identifying and definite expressions. They 
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slightly agree with Warden's data (1976) (nominative expressions 
acquired before identifying expressions), but are, in fact, more consistent 
with Maratsos' data (1976), as to the age level. These results also 
contrast with Karmiloff-Smith (1977; 1979) and M. Hickmann's data 
(1985), and the data of the present study. 
More recently and in the same vein as Emslie and Stevenson, 
Power and Dal Martello (1986) conducted experiments on Italian pre-
school children. They postulated a kind of pragmatic rule governing the 
choice between the definite and indefinite article which can be formulated 
as follows: when a speaker S mentions a referent (say, a rabbit) to a 
listener L, the listener's current state of knowledge must be taken into 
account by the speaker (S) in deciding whether to use the definite or 
indefinite article. In the case where L is already familiar with the referent 
(by experience or by report), S should use the definite referring 
expression (for instance the pronoun 'it'). But when L is not yet familiar 
with the referent, S should use indefinite article 'a'. Two types of errors, 
that a speaker might be prone to in using articles, were reported in Power 
and Dal Martello (1986): 
(1) the 'incoherent error' 
and 
(2) the 'egocentric error' 
In the first type (1), Speaker (S) might use the indefinite article in a context 
in which listener L was already familiar with the referent (which might give 
106 
L the false impression that a new individual was being introduced into the 
story). 
In the second type (2), S might use the definite article in a context 
in which L was not yet familiar with the referent. Besides Maratsos 
(1976), some other workers observed this type of error, which 
corresponds to an overuse of the definite article for information that is 
actually new to the listeners, in children between 3 and 5 years (c.f. 
Bresson, Bouvier, Dannequin, Depreux, Hardy and Platone, 1970; 
Bresson, 1974). Children in this age range wrongly assume that 
whatever is known to them is also known to their listener and, thus, can 
be presented as given. In Bresson et al. study (1970), children seem to 
experience the same difficulty as that described in Warden (1976), in their 
acquisition of the indefinite article. Children acquiring the French 
pronominal system experience a further difficulty than those acquiring the 
English pronominal system. The French language has several forms for 
the article: 'un' or 'une' for the singular, and 'les' for the plural. Six-year-
old children in Bresson et al study (1970) use the definite 'le 'la' les' 
instead of 'un' or 'une' (38% of the adult appropriate use of the definite 
articles), and did worse with the plural indefinite 'des': they used the 
definite article 'les' 76% of the time, instead of the indefinite article 'des'. 
Power and Dal Martello (1986) found that children in the age range 
3 to 5 years did a large number of 'egocentric errors' in their use of 
articles. But although Power & Dal Martello's findings are somehow 
consistent with Warden's data (1976), as to the 'egocentric error' in the 5-
year-old (38% in Warden, and 39% of error-rate in Power and Dal 
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Martello (1986), they, however, are more in agreement with EmsIle and 
Stevenson (1981) for the 4-year-olds, in one of their experiments (18% in 
Power and Dal Martello, and 15% of error rate in Emslie and Stevenson). 
It could be said that these differences with Warden's study (1976) in the 
results, are partly due to the circumstances of the experiments (difficulty of 
the stories in Warden's study, as was remarked earlier, and for the 5-year-
olds in Power and Dal Martello's data (1986), the backgrounds of the 
children, rural vs. urban). In Power and Dal Martello's study, the 
assumption is that there are less opportunities to listen to stories at home, 
and still less for rural children to tell stories themselves, than urban 
children do have. 
The early use of the definite article which is tied to situationally 
introduced referent, and thus not truly anaphoric (c.f. p.95) has also been 
extensively studied from a different perspective, within Bernstein's 
sociological theory of linguistic codes by Hawkins (1969; 1977). In the 
following section, Hawkins' study will be discussed in relation to 
anaphoric reference. 
3.3.4. A sociolinguistic view of anaphoric reference vs. 
exophoric reference 
Hawkins (1969) investigated the use of pronouns in a sample of 
312 British children from two geographically separated areas of London 
(180 working class, and henceforth WC, and 148 middle class, and 
henceforth MC). From this sample Hawkins selected 139 children from 
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WC and 124 children from MC, according to strict criteria of social 
classification and intelligent quotient, and the average age was five years. 
Two verbal tasks, in Hawkins (1969), were presented to the 
children: first, they were requested to tell a story from a series of four 
picture cards. In the first verbal task, the first picture showed some boys 
playing football; in the second the ball goes through the window of a 
house; in the third a woman is looking out of the window and making a 
threatening gesture, and in the fourth children are moving away. Hawkins 
provides two stories which he constructed on the basis of responses 
obtained. The middle-class version reads like this: 
three boys are playing football and one kicks the ball - and it goes 
through the window - the ball breaks the window - and the boys are 
looking at it - and a man comes out - and shouts at the boys -
because they've broken the window - and so they ran away - and 
then that lady looks out of her window, and tells the boys off. 
and the working class version: 
they're playing football - and he kicks it - and it goes through there -
it breaks the window and they're looking at it - and he comes out -
and shouts at them - because they've broken it - so they ran away -
and she looks out - and she tells the boys off. 
Hawkins' hypothesis was that middle class children use nouns, but 
working class children use pronouns more frequently. In order to quantify 
his results, Hawkins distinguished the following types of pronouns, basing 
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himself on Halliday's (1961) grammatical categorization and R. Hasan's 
study of narrative cohesion (1968). Narrative cohesion is usually 
achieved by the use of grammatical items which either refer backwards 
(to something already mentioned) or forward (to something about to be 
mentioned). Backward reference is anaphoric reference or, in other 
words, when a grammatical item is anaphorically given, the listener can 
identify the referent of this item just by going back to find out when that 
referent was lastly mentioned in his active memory for conversation (c.f. 
the recent detailed analyses of grammatical devices for sharing points by 
Brian Mc Whinney, from a psycholinguistic perspective, 1984). Forward 
reference is cataphoric reference. This means that an item which is 
cataphorically given can only be distinguished by reference to information 
in subsequent discourse. The following examples illustrate anaphoric 
and cataphoric pronouns: 
- The boy kicked the ball and it broke the window (anaphoric, when 
'it' refers backward to 'the ball') 
- It was the ball that broke the window (cataphoric, when 'it' refers 
backward to 'that broke the window') 
A third way of establishing givenness (i.e. presupposition), in the definite 
and indefinite pronouns category, is by exophoric reference, or reference 
'outward' to the context of situation (through situational reference). In this 
way, pronouns relate to the external context (concrete external objects or 
persons). In other words, the pronouns (or the grammatical items) refer 
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not to something already or about to be 'mentioned', but to something in 
the environment of the speaker. 
If, for example, one is standing on the edge of a football field and 
the players are clustered around the goal, one might say "they've scored!" 
and there would be no doubt who 'they' referred to. On the basis of this, 
Hawkins also included items in the quantification, these items permitting 
the choice between anaphoric and exophoric reference: 
1) 'this' that' occurring as head of the nominal group (e.g. 
anaphoric: 'go away, that's what she said'; exophoric: 'that's a 
little boy') 
2) 'this' that' occurring as 'modifier' (e.g. anaphoric (rare): 'the boy 
broke the window... so the lady told that boy off'; exophoric: 
'these boys were playing football' 
3) 'here' there' occurring as head of the group after a preposition. 
This referent is always exophoric, e.g. 'on here' up there' along 
there'. 
Hawkins' results were that there was no real difference between the 
classes (MC and WC) in the frequency of anaphoric pronouns, both in the 
picture narratives and in the description. In contrast, there were 
substantial differences in the use of exophoric pronouns (MC children 
used on average 2.84, MC 4.12; c.f. Hawkins, 1969, p. 132). However, 
these differences were not significant, most children of both classes were 
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using at least one exophoric pronoun. The other categories of exophoric 
pronouns, listed above, reached the significance level (P...05). 
Hawkins' conclusion is that working class children are using more 
pronouns of the exophoric kind, than the middle class children. In other 
words, WC children seem to be seriously limited in their possibilities of 
modification and qualification, since those children are using, instead of 
nouns, more frequently pronouns than middle class children. For 
Halliday and Hasan (1976), exophoric reference is a characteristic of 
children's speech, because this is what they call 'a neighbouring speech' 
or the language of children's peer group. And neighbouring speech is 
highly exophoric because children have a tendency to relate to things, 
and to relate to each other through things. Halliday and Hasan (1976), as 
well as Hawkins (1969) emphasized the 'restricted code' nature of 
exophoric reference, in the Bernsteinian sense, and for Halliday this 
'neighbouring language' is a positive feature, in that this highly coded 
non-redundant speech is a characteristic of both the neighbourhood and 
the small close-knit social groups. For Bernstein (1971) and for Halliday 
(1976), this speech becomes 'restricted' if it is transferred to contexts in 
which it is simply inappropriate. 
Thus, for Hawkins (1969) "the working class children...tend to use 
pronouns instead of nouns as 'heads', which reduces the possibilities of 
both modification and qualification, and they rely on the listener's 
awareness of the situation to achieve comprehension" (p. 135). Middle 
class children are being more specific and more elaborate "...they are 
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referring to the objects and the characters, by name, not just by the vague 
he, she, it, they". (p. 134) 
What is then the significance of Hawkins' investigation? This work 
clearly points to certain characteristics of working class children's 
pronominal usage, and these characteristics, according to Hawkins may 
well have important 'cognitive consequences' which, in other words, 
might lead WC children to communicative misunderstandings. The 
essential difference with the present investigation, is that the tendency to 
use the pronouns instead of nouns as heads of a sentence is not a 
characteristic of only the lower-classs children, but is found invariably at 
certain age (4-5 years) in all classes mixed together (c.f. Experiment. I), at 
least in the sample of pre-school urban Algerian children investigated for 
their use of referring expressions (common nouns, pronouns, and deictic 
uses). 
It is indeed difficult, if not improbable, to reach a significance level 
as to the difference, between the so-called WC and MC children, in the 
use of exophoric reference. 	 Exophoric reference was used 
overwhelmingly by children from 4 to 5 years in both experiments of the 
present follow-up study, as we remarked earlier in conjunction with the 
discussion of cognitive studies of referring expressions, but in all social 
classes without distinction. 
On the other hand, there are in Hawkins' study a certain number of 
problems in the experimental procedure, and some weaknesses in the 
analytical accuracy. First, there is indication of the significance level, but 
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there is no listing of the data so that the reader will have a general view of 
the scores for the individual variables, and there is no possibility to check 
the way in which the data have been manipulated (no mean duration of 
the utterances of both classes). This might indicate that if WC children 
use pronouns with greater frequency than MC children, this could be 
function of the longer mean duration of their utterances. Secondly, there 
is no clear indication about the cases in which nominal groups could be 
replaced by either anaphoric or exophoric pronouns, and this could have 
been a relevant information for readers who need to understand the 
choice of which type of reference in which nominal group, in that only the 
use of exophoric pronouns revealed classes differences. In her study of 
determiners and reference from a cognitive perspective, Karmiloff-Smith 
(1979) noted that, given the above situation in which either an anaphoric 
or an exophoric interpretation of the definite article is possible in French, 
pre-school children, no matter which social class they belong to, prefer 
the exophoric reference. 
Another problem, in Hawkins' study, pertains to the test situation: 
whether a test situation will justify the interpretation of a non-specified use 
of exophoric pronouns as poor communicative behaviour. Since the 
experimenter was present when the children constructed their stories 
(and thus did actually see the pictures), as was pointed out by M. Stubbs 
(1976) and P. Trudgill (1975) it is, in fact, possible that the working class 
version of the story is more appropriate in that specific context in which 
the children and the interviewer have the same information available to 
them. On the other hand, always assuming that the children and the 
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interviewer have the same opportunity to look at the picture, it is quite 
possible that the children coud describe details of the picture which the 
adult (the interviewer) was not able to recognize and identify. At all 
events, it is hard, as noted J.R. Edwards (1979), to accept that "the 
working-class version is any worse than the other, unless one assumes 
the correctness of middle-class style" (Edwards, 1979, p. 38). 
3.3.5. Questions related to the present study 
The preceding experimental studies of the development of 
referring expressions discussed here so far were the most closely related 
to the present research. These studies are perhaps the most consistent 
and equally significant attempts to study developmental trends in the use 
of definite reference, though the data on such trends remain conflicting. 
The present study is an attempt to investigate pre-school children's 
cohesive use of linguistic signs, through their use of deictic, intralinguistic 
(anaphoric) and ultimately cohesive (or 'text-forming" functions of speech, 
Halliday and Hasan, 1976) or metapragmatic use of referring expressions 
(in other words the use of speech in one situation to refer to speech 
uttered in another situation). The aim of the present study is to show that 
there is a kind of continuity/consistency in the anaphoric-cohesive use of 
referring expressions in 4 and 5 year old children. A definite referring 
expression, as it will be shown in the section on the units of analysis and 
in the subsequent chapters dealing with the experiments, used 
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consistently is continuous with an anaphoric use of a 3rd person. These 
two uses imply an understanding of the cohesive or text-forming function. 
The final aim in the present research is towards relating the 
hypotheses stated in the introduction to the psycholinguistic hypothesis 
(J. Lyons, 1975) that the use of linguistic signs to indicate interlinguistic 
relationships (that contribute to the cohesive function of speech) within 
the linguistic context is a further development of the early deictic use of 
referring expressions (the ones used to refer to non-linguistic entities of 
the immediate environment of the child). This is consonant with the 
developmental hypothesis (Brown, 1973; Warden, 1976; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1979; Tanz, 1980; Hickmann, 1985; Wales, 1986) which states that within 
the universe of child discourse, the forms used to refer to entities non 
present in the non-linguistic context of discourse, are a logical outgrowth 
of these early deictic uses of referring expression ('this', 'that"there', etc.). 
In trying to actually tackle the hypotheses of the present study and 
the problems involved within their statement, we will pose some research 
questions within the framework of the hypotheses. If there is a continuity 
between the earlier and possibly easier uses of the indefinite referring 
expressions, determined unambiguously as having only a nominative 
function (requiring only a grasp of class-membership), and later uses of 
the indefinite and definite reference determined as having an identifying 
function, (i.e. requiring a specification of the uniqueness of the referent), 
how can we account for such a continuity? 
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Is there enough proof of egocentric speech? Is the use of the 
definite reference consistent with the expectation of the 
audience/listener? 
All these questions and some other related ones will be dealt with 
in the course of the analysis of the present data and their discussion. In 
the meantime the question is: what are the referring expressions this 
research is designed to tackle? In what follows, the units of analysis 
(reference and referring expressions) will be introduced and defined in 
some detail, before the description and discussion of the experiments 
themselves. This will be followed by an overview of the grammar of 
definite referring expressions in Arabic. 
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Chapter 4 
Introduction to the Units of Analysis 
4.1. The act of reference: a developmental history 
When characterising as referential the behaviour of a one-year old, 
the 'concept of referring' is interpreted very broadly. The earliest and 
most central aspect of reference seems to be simply focusing one's own 
(and later another's) attention on some aspect of a situation. This broad 
referential function (as focussing attention or 'framing' some aspect of the 
world) may be similar to what A.R. Luria (1959) called a "directive 
function" of speech. Early reference in a child is presumably "intentional" 
only in the sense that the child is paying conscious attention to the 
referent, and the sign that carries the function is voluntary. It is only later 
in development that children become aware of the act of reference as 
having social effect (directing the attention of others) and later still, of 
conventional verbal means for carrying out various referring intentions. 
The pointing gesture is usually taken as referential because of its 
developmental history (growing out of the orienting or attentional 
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behaviour of the child) and because it is a deliberate gesture. Kates 
(1980) judiciously contrasts the grasping and pointing gestures as 
follows: in a grasping gesture, she says, " the eye serves as a tool 
guiding the hand", and the hand is used as tool "to reach some object" but 
"in a pointing gesture the hand is used as a tool serving the eye, as it 
focuses on some object". In both cases "the focus is not on the hand (the 
tool), but on the object of desire or attention that is the direct or indirect 
target of the gesture" (p.53). 
Ontogenetically, it seems that the pointing gesture serves as a 
function of drawing the child's own attention, first; in the next step the 
pointing plays a communicative function, the gesture, then, is used to 
focus the objects for someone else [c.f. for more detail works by Bruner 
(1975;1978) & colleagues in the mid-and late 70s, and Bates and her 
associates (1976;1977;1979 a & b) in the late seventies (c.f. also the 2nd 
chapter of the present study) 
4.2 Paradigmatic or referential function 
Researchers in child language consider such behaviours as'shift of 
gaze', 'gestural accompaniment', 'controlled intonation', 'persistence of 
behaviour', as indices of a communicative, referring intention, and 
therefore of genuine speech. 
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It is possible that children first use some verbal sign to refer to different 
things, with no underlying paradigm, and gradually learn to use different 
words to refer to different things. This line of thought was already framed 
in some earlier works on child language. M.M. Lewis (1936) 
distinguishes three functions of earliest child utterances: 
a) to accompany some action 
b) to declare something or, more accurately, to draw the attention 
of others to some object; 
c) to manipulate or draw attention to some object as a demand that 
some need in relation to that object be satisfied. 
There have been attempts, in the literature, to relate the second and third 
functions to, respectively, what E. Bates calls 'declaratives' (or declarative 
utterances) and what Piaget called 'imperatives' (or imperative 
utterances). Once children learn that words can be used to focus 
attention, whether one's own (the directive function of speech) or a 
listener's (the communicative function of declarative and imperative 
speech), they are able to discover the important fact that certain words 
draw attention to certain things. As this is usually put, children learn that 
things have names. Once children recognize this, they must discover 
what these names are. 
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In McNamara's study (1982), children naturally represent their 
environment as occupied by objects. When they first hear a word in the 
presence of a salient object, they automatically take a word as applying to 
the object as a whole. McNamara's theory - from a somewhat 
multidisciplinary point of view, psychological, linguistic and philosophical 
- of how a child learns names, is an alternative to Quine's (1960) 
viewpoint but without the behaviouristic overload: 
"Situations suggest to a child particular interpretations of what a 
name refers to. He tests out the names on well-disposed adults 
who, by some signs, say yes or no. But...how does the child know 
that the adult's assent relates to the name's being applied to an 
object as a whole and not some of its qualities, and for that matter 
how do adults know what the child meant by the word and that 
they are giving assent to the right thing?" (McNamara,1982,p. 
186) 
Of relevance, in this context, is Quine's answer to a closely related 
question: child and adult reach agreement because they are biased by 
nature to do so. Quine proposes that the child is endowed with " a 
prelinguistic quality space" (1960; p. 83) which is "innate" (1969, p. 123). 
This the child shares with adults, and it guides his hypothesis-forming 
about stimulus equivalence in the domain of qualities. 
In McNamara (1982), 'referring' is a 'primitive' of cognitive 
psychology and 'unlearned' or, in other words, an 'explanatory concept 
innately given' and it occurs to a human being in certain circumstances in 
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part because of what he observes, and in part because of the structure of 
his mind" (p. 173-4). Within the psychological act of referring, reference 
would be that relation between words and objects that is established by 
the act of referring. Following this line of thought (i.e. from McNamara's 
position), as a result of the child's experience with words, names acquire 
permanent reference, in that they have been used to refer in a long 
series of acts of referring. On the other hand, reference is some kind of 
aptness agreed upon conventionally, to perform particular acts of 
reference. We can say that children are guided to the set of names by 
clear cases of names, i.e. proper names. This set includes what 
McNamara (1982) calls "sortals" or 'primitives' which places an object in 
some natural kind, like 'dog', or some artificial kind like 'brush'. These 
'primitives' change from the predicate status to the subject status. If we 
assume that the child has the ability to grasp the semantic force of proper 
names, we can say, then, that he is able to learn that 'sortals' perform the 
function of proper names. The following pair "Minou is sick" and "the cat 
is sick" might well be part of the child's experience with words. The same 
thing can be said about names not in the referring position, i.e. names 
which only describe (attribute words, for instance). When they are clear 
cut, they guide the child to the set of descriptors in predicate position. 
Proper names appear to be prototypes of referring terms, they are 
never used to predicate. Even if they have an associate sense or 
whatever, their function can not be predicated. 
Common nouns, when used in referring positions, refer to a class 
of objects. Besides their referring function, common nouns also have a 
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descriptive one. As an illustration, when we say "All dogs are animals" 
and "Fido is a dog" we infer "Fido is an animal". Dog, in the first instance 
refers and describes, in the second, it only describes. 
Here are then introduced, developmentally, the terms of analysis 
and the actual psychological and linguistic task of delineating the act of 
referring and its function as this is laying firmer ground for the latter and 
more specific referring expressions within the context of actual discourse. 
4.3. Discourse reference 
4.3.1. Reference and referring expressions 
In semantics, when discussing lexical meaning, 'reference' 
denotes a function by which speakers, or writers, indicate through a 
linguistic expression the entities they are talking or writing about. 
According to J. Lyons (1981), reference is a relation that holds between 
linguistic expressions and what they stand for in the world or universe of 
discourse, and on particular occasions of its utterance. And always 
according to J. Lyons (1977) 
"whenever we talk of an expression in a given sentence as having 
reference, we are assuming that the sentence in question has 
been, or could be, uttered with a particular communicative force in 
some appropriate context of use" (1977, V.1 p .180. The 
emphasis is added). 
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There could not be better introduction to our terms of analysis. This 
sentence encapsulates all the known psycholinguistic constraints or 
conditions and possibilities that befall on a speaker of a language and 
shape the pragmatic or illocutionary force of his speech. It is only when 
these conditions ('appropriate conditions of use') and pragmatic 
intentions (or strategies of discourse) are fulfilled, or observed, that a 
reference, within the context of interactional discourse, is successful. 
Whether the expression which refers to and describes an entity, must be 
true - or correct - of the entity, is left to formal semantics. What is of 
interest to the discourse analyst is, whether the reference is successful in 
so far as it allows the hearer to identify, when receiving an actual 
linguistic message, and so a referring expression, the speaker's intended 
referent. Thus, the referential function of a referring expression depends 
on the speaker's intention on the particular occasion of use. 
As the practical discourse analyst is interested in the 'actual' use of 
linguistic expression in a definable context for a particular purpose (Yule 
& Brown, 1983), the 'potential' use of linguistic expression may lead to 
philosophical discussions (truth conditions, existence and uniqueness -
c.f. J. Lyons, 1977; 1981). And as the present work is concerned solely 
with the analysis of pre-school children's discourse, only a summary of 
these issues will be made. 
J. Lyons (1981 ;1977) in his treatment of reference in relation to 
speech acts, uses the term 'singular definite reference' to include 'definite 
expression' and 'referring expression'. A definite expression refers to 
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some definite entity and identifies it, in part, by means of the descriptive 
content of the expression. 'The man', 'John's father' are definite 
expressions. 'The man' could be factorised, semantically, into two 
components: 
1) descriptive ('man') 
2) referential (definite article 'the') 
'The' is non-descriptive, because it does not identify the entity that is 
being referred to by means of any of its context-independent properties. 
And 'man' is more or less descriptive of the referent according to the 
specificity or generality of its sense. 	 Definite descriptions involve 
existential presuppositions; if one deliberately violates an existential 
presupposition in using what purports to be a definite description one fails 
to express any proposition at all. Referring expressions of all kinds 
involve existential presuppositions. On the other hand, when one is 
referring to fictional or hypothetical entities, one is presupposing that 
these exist in a fictional or hypothetical world. 
To illustrate the semantic universal or the concept of 'existence', 
and the term existential presupposition, let us take the following example: 
"John wants to marry a girl with green eyes", when "a girl with green eyes" 
is used as a referring expression (technically a 'specific indefinite 
reference', but we will see this and other terms of discourse in more 
details in the coming pages), this presupposes or implies the existence of 
some individual who satisfies the description, in much the same way as 
would the definite noun-phrase (c.f. further developments) 'the girl with 
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green eyes' used as referring expression in the same context. If the 
individual noun-phrase 'a girl with green eyes' is constructed as non-
specific there is no presupposition, or implication, of existence at all (this 
is characteristic of descriptive noun-phrase, definite or indefinite) 
occurring with verbs denoting what Russell (1905) and Quine (1960) and 
others have called propositional attitudes, i.e. denoting belief, doubt, 
intentions, etc. 
The interpretation of the above example would be as follows: 
- (3x) (x is a girl with green eyes and John wants to marry x) 
- John wants (3x) (x be a girl with green eyes and John marry x) 
Let us avoid the controversy over "truth" and "existence" in philosophical 
discussions of reference, and move to the other term, 'uniqueness'. We 
can, instead, assume that condition of uniqueness goes along with, but 
not as a necessary condition of, the notion of successful reference. In 
saying for instance, 'the cat has not been in all day', we will be 
understood as referring to a definite individual and that the description we 
offer will be sufficiently specific, in the given context, to identify uniquely 
for the hearer the referent we have in mind. There is no need to go further 
into the discussion of these controversial notions of existence, truth 
condition and uniqueness, as this might lead us too far from the actual 
task of what is precisely the content of referring expressions, and their 
context of use, before moving to the actual use of referring expressions by 
pre-school children in a specific speech community. We can, in the 
meantime, assume that "the fundamental problem for the linguist [we can 
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also say for the developmental psycholinguist], as far as reference is 
concerned, is to describe the way in which we use language to draw 
attention to what we are talking about". (J. Lyons, 1977, V.1 p. 184). 
4.3.2. Specific and non specific use of referring expressions 
1. Indefinite noun-phrases 
To begin with, indefinite noun-phrases (or noun-phrases which are 
not definite) when used as complement to the verb 'to be' and when they 
appear in linguistic context as 'referentially opaque' are not used as 
referring expressions (e.g. "X is looking for a rubber". Rubber = any 
rubber, and thus non-specific. C.f. Lyons, 1977, pp.187ff for an extended 
discussion of the specific non-specific distinction). Constructions or 
contexts, according to Quine (1960) are opaque when they fail to 
preserve existentiality, i.e., truth-functionality. 
An indefinite noun-phrase can be either an indefinite pronoun or a 
noun-phrase introduced by the indefinite article (e.g. 'a man', and also 
phrases like 'such a man'). Indefinite noun-phrases (used with specific 
reference or not) when used can subsequently be referred to by means 
of a demonstrative or personal pronoun, or a definite noun-phrase. To 
be more precise, noun-phrases introduced by 'some' or 'any' may be 
employed specifically or non specifically. In some examples (for instance, 
when such indefinite expressions as 'something' or 'someone' are used) 
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paralinguistic clues (e.g. intonation) may actually help the listener to 
understand the speaker's intention to refer to a particular individual. 
- someone [I know who] won't do it. 
- someone [I don't know who] has left his bag here. 
Intonation is particularly important in very young children. Before two, the 
child uses intonation as a cohesive device before he acquires the pro-
forms (anaphoric reference, substitution) and the system of grammatical 
ellipsis. In Halliday's work (1975), Nigel, from the age of two, used what 
linguists call contrastive focus. To illustrate, let us take the following 
examples of conversation drawn from Halliday (1975): 
A - Put cereal down on table 
B - it is on table. 
Here, [is], in B's sentence, is a contrastive prominence. If A replies by 
giving new information and contrasting it with B's information, A has, 
presumably, realized the relation of coherence, making it by the cohesive 
device of intonation (e.g. "Nigel' table"). This is in fact, the beginning of 
the use of some pro-forms and elliptical patterns, but at this age (2 years) 
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the understanding of the rules of these grammatical patterns, or their 
linguistically defined rules, is still very incomplete. 
Somehow between 2 1/2 and 3 1/2 years, children begin 
systematically to delete information which is textually presupposed and to 
use pro-forms. The work of Thomas Thieman (1975), provides some 
evidence on the way nursery school children (between 44 and 66 
months) transform full forms to more compact or reduced forms, though 
many more direct examinations of coherent episodes of discourse are still 
needed to determine when and how children actually use these 
cohesive devices. 
2 - Proper names and definite noun-phrases 
A name, even a proper name, must depend for its referential 
assignment on an identification of a particular individual in a particular 
context. This assignment of reference depends on the type of predicate 
attached to the referring expression. 
Successful reference, in context, many depend crucially on 
selecting the most appropriate 'name' with which to identify an individual 
for a particular hearer or audience. 
A definite noun-phrase (c.f. Hawkins, 1978; and Van Der Auwera, 
1980) includes a referential and attributive use. The referential use 
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involves a specific individual (e.g. "the thief"). In the attributive use the 
intention is not necessarily referential (e.g. "the thief" = whoever did the 
theft). Donnellan's (1966) attributive uses of a definite noun phrase are 
generally treated as intended references. Though they may not pick out 
an individual in the world', they will pick out (or even establish) an 
individual in the hearer's representation of the discourse. 
The focus, in the present study, is on the singular definite referring 
expressions thus introduced. These comprise: 
1- Definite and indefinite noun-phrase (common nouns) 
and 
2- Pronouns 
Pronouns can be: 
-1) Noun-substitute 
-2) Deictic or indexical function 
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The sub-class of pronouns includes: 
1) 'I', 'you', 'we', etc., (personal pronouns). 
indexical 
function 
2) 'this', 'that' (demonstrative pronouns) 
And within the indexical function we can include - 'here', 'there' 
which are demonstrative adverbs (c.f. the following lines). 
Because of the impossibility, at this stage, of determining other 
forms of reference in the subject, let us concentrate, for now, on the deictic 
or indexical function. 
3 - Deixis 
According to J. Lyons (1981) Indexicality' and `deixis' can cover 
more than the 'personal' and 'demonstrative' pronouns. They might 
include demonstrative adverbs (`here' and 'there'), tense (past, present, 
future), and also such lexical differences which, in English, are 
exemplified by the verbs 'come' vs `go' and 'bring' vs 'take'. 
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There is still no systematic and theoretically well-motivated 
distinction between the terms 'indexicality' and 'deixis'. Both of these 
terms can be explained from an etymological point of view, on the basis of 
the notion of gestural reference. 
Deixis is to be defined, first and foremost, as a matter of spatio-
temporal location in the context of utterance. Thus, within the deictic 
context, every act of utterance - or locutionary act - occurs in a spatio-
temporal context whose centre can be referred to as here -and now. The 
demonstrative adverbs 'here' and 'now' (or their equivalent in some 
languages) must be related to the place and time of utterance: 'here' 
refers to where the speaker is and 'now' refers to the moment of utterance 
(or some period of time that contains the moment of utterance). The 
demonstrative adverbs 'there' and 'then' are complementary and are 
negatively defined with respect to the the preceding adverbs: 'there' 
means 'not here' and 'then 'not now'. 
When speaking of deictic context, one is usually drawing attention 
to some kind of speaker-based egocentricity (the 'I' referring normally to 
the person who is speaking). 
The personal pronoun 'I' and the demonstrative adverbs 'here' and 
'now' are referring expressions which single out and identify the logically 
separable components of the spatio-temporal centre point of the deictic 
context. Going a little further in our linguistic distinctions (c.f. J. Lyons, 
1981) we can say that there is a pure deixis- or the set of expressions 
whose meaning can be accounted for in terms of the notion of deixis, and 
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'impure deixis' - or the set of expressions whose meaning is partly deictic 
and partly non-deictic. The 'I' and 'You', within pure deixis, refer to the 
locutionary agent and the addressee without conveying any additional 
information about them. 'This' vs. 'that' and 'here' vs. 'there', when used 
in spatio-temporal reference and pure deixis, identify the referent (an 
entity or a place) in relation to the location of the locutionary act and its 
participants. 
Within impure deixis, 'he', 'she', 'it' encode the distinctions of 
meaning that are traditionally associated with the terms 'masculine' 
'feminine' and 'neuter'. These appear to be clearly non-deictic, because 
they are based upon properties of the referent which in fact have nothing 
to do with his/her or its spatio-temporal location, or role in the locutionary 
act. 
Further distinctions can be made of the notion of deixis. As a 
matter of fact 'primary deixis' is specifically distinguished from the more 
sophisticated and elaborated adult-like, 'secondary deixis'. We are more 
often concerned with primary deixis, when dealing with children's speech. 
Terms of gestural reference, within the framework of deictic context, can 
account for primary deixis. The English demonstratives - or their 
equivalents in some other languages - can be analysed in terms of the 
notion of spatio-temporal proximity to the deictic centre. 'This' and 'there' 
refer to entities and places located in the place where the speaker is. 
'This' and 'There' also refer to points or stretches of time located in the 
period of time that contains the moment of utterance. On the other hand 
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we can shift indefinitely far from the centre the boundaries of place and 
time.e.g.'here' can point to 	 'this' room 
or 
'this' galaxy 
'now' can point to 	 'this' moment 
or 
'this' year 
Reinterpreting or displacing the spatio-temporal dimensions of the 
primary deixis involves pointing to secondary deixis. Secondary deixis 
can be, in some cases, called metaphorical. This other dimension of 
deixis, very close to what linguists call subjective modality, introduces 
some other cases of demonstratives: 'this' vs. 'that', can be expressive, 
this expressivity being identified as that of emotional or attitudinal 
dissociation. To take an example, if someone is holding something in his 
hand, he will normally use 'this' rather than 'that' to refer to the thing or 
object in his hand (this is so by virtue of the spatio-temporal proximity of 
the object). Now, if he says "what's that?", then his use of 'that' will 
indicate for the participant(s) his dislike or aversion: this would mean to 
the participant(s) that this person is distancing herself or himself 
emotionally or attitudinally from what he/she is referring to. 
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In the following section, an overview of the grammar of definite and 
indefinite referring expressions in Arabic (the language spoken by the 
children of the present study) is given, before the introduction to 
methodology of the present research. 
4.4. Definite referring expressions in Arabic: an overview 
In the following pages, there will be an attempt to describe, briefly, 
the grammar of the definite and indefinite articles, and some other forms 
of determiners and reference in Arabic. 
4.4.1. Definite article 
The definite article Ji;  (?al; 'the' in English) in Arabic is invariable 
and is always prefixed. When attached to a word used in isolation, the 
initial glottol stop of this article will not be represented and the remaining 
'al' will be separated from the word it defines by a dash, e.g.: 
** al-kita:b (the book) 
* The transcription system in this work is intended to give the Arabic examples a reading 
form. This reading transcription is used instead of a strictly phonetic one. 
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When prefixed to a word beginning with one of the letters (c.f. table 4.1): 
tic] drssst din 
the 'I' of the definite article is assimilated to the sound it is annexed to, 
e.g.: 
al - + talj —> at-talj 	 (the snow) 
al - + tayr__, at-tayr 	 (the bird) 
al - + tamrinu —> at-tamrinu (the homework) 
When the definite article is in a junctural position it may be represented by 
'I' - or the sound it assimilates to only, as in the following example: 
quwatu i — e ira 	 (purchasing power) 
The attachment of the definite article to the word it defines is done purely 
on grammatical grounds. To do otherwise would involve a violation of the 
rules of Arabic syllabic structures. According to one of these rules, only 
the following types of syllabic structures in junctural position are allowed: 
CV, C.V and CVC. 
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4.4.2. Determination and interdetermination 
In Arabic, a noun or an expression is indeterminate or indefinite 
when it is used in isolation, for example: 
ghorfatun 	 = 	 a room. 
table 4-1  Arabic Consonants 
Nature Arabic 
letters 
Phonetic 
transcription) 
 
Point of articulation 
Bilabials 
-..._., 
__,,c; 
,_) 
b 
m 
w 
the lips 
Labio-dentals . 
J 
f the lower lip applied on the 
upper incisives of the lower 
and upper teethridges 
Interdentals 
-__:i' 
-3 
jj 
I 
d. 
d. 
the tip of the tongue placed 
between the incisives of the 
lower and upper teeth 
ridges 
Dentals 
___D 
_) 
1%,  j
) 
_L 
t 
d 
t 
n 
s 
z 
s 
upper incisives or their 
alveolaridge on which the 
tip of the tongue is applied 
The tip of the tongue is 
applied a little above the 
incisives 
Pre-palatals - 	 ,„,,-) 
•, 
2 
J 
d 
§ 
y 
r 
I 
ci 
Anterior palate 
Post-palatals 
__S k posterior palate 
Velars 
,_i)” 
..  
25 
q 
h 
g 
roof of the palate and 
posterior part of the tongue 
Pharyngeals __.. 
_....C- 
h 
c 
Walls of the pharynx 
Laryngeals _II 
s 
h 
1 
Larynx 
1  i.e = reading transcription used for the examples in Arabic, in the present work. 
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The lanwin"un' (in Arabic", or 5, ) or the doubling of the vowel 
`u' (9' in Arabic), which is suffixed to the word, represents the form 
grammatically equivalent to the indefinite article 'a' in English, in the 
absence of a separate recognizable form. 
When this word (e.g. ghorfatun) is determined, it is: 
1) accompanied by the article ?al (c.f. previous statement on the 
definite article): 
dalakati gl - ghorfata = she scrubbed the room 
2) annexed to a determinative object: 
ghorfatu at-tabhi = (the room of) the kitchen 
In this kind of relationship, the 1st term being determined by the 
2nd, it takes neither an article nor a lanwin', the 2nd term plays the role of 
the determinative object and takes the article only if the meaning requires 
it. The following examples might be taken as an illustration of the case: 
kacku cidin = a feast cake 
kacku ?al-cidi = the cake of the feast 
There are in Arabic multiple combinations of these terms. To take but a 
few examples, the 1st term may have the value of an adjective: 
6addatun dacifatu ?al-binyati 
= a grand-mother of a weak physical constitution. 
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And the 2nd or 3rd term may be a suffixed pronoun: 
Ummu faridun 	 = 	 the mother of Farid (Farid's mother) 
Umuhu 	 = 	 (literally: the mother of him) his mother. 
4.4.3. Demonstratives and pronouns 
A few words, here, are necessary about demonstratives and 
pronouns, to have a complete picture of the broader system of 
determination and reference in Arabic. 
Demonstrative pronouns in Arabic can be 'masculine' or 'feminine'. 
masculine 
proximity feeble distance extreme distance 
h a 	 a 
(this one) 
daika 
(that one) 
dalika 
(that one) 
feminine hadihi 
(this one) 
ti:ka 
(that one) 
tilka 
(that one) 
plural ) masc. 
) fem. 
haulai 
(these ones) 
awlaika 
(those ones) 
awlaika 
(those ones) 
Note: a long vowel is marked by two dots; a long consonant is marked by 
doubling the symbol. 
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The demonstrative adjectives are demonstrative pronouns 
followed by the article ?al, e.g.: 
dalika 	 al-quimtari 
(that schoolbag there) 
In the demonstrative the feeble distance (from the speaker) is 
marked by suffixing the 'k', the extreme distance (from the speaker) by 
infixing the 'I' between the demonstrative and the suffix. Sometimes, they 
have not the 1st syllable 'ha' which helps in drawing attention, and they 
become: dihi ; d a. 
The interrogative pronoun 'man' (k-..) ► ) is invariable. It is equivalent 
to "who?", "whose?", "whom?', in English. It is used only for persons, e.g.: 
man hada: 	 who (is) this one? 
The interrogative pronoun `ma:' (' 	 ) is equivalent to 'what', 'which' in 
English. It is used for things in general, e.g.: 
m a : f 
	
daka 
	
?al-ghorfatu 
what is it in that room? 
The personal pronouns which are isolated are always used as subjects, 
they are used in the singular and plural, e.g.: 
hua 6a: lisun 
	 = 	 he (is) sitting 
anti fi: ?al-fina:' 
	 = 	 you are in the courtyard. 
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Personal pronouns isolated or subjects: 
person 1st Person 2nd Person 3rd Person 
gender feminine masculine feminine masculine feminine masculine 
Singular 
ana 
(j) 
ana 
(j) 
anti 
(you) 
anta 
(you) 	 , 
hia 
(she) 
hua 
(he) 
Plural 
hahnu 
(me) 
nahnu 
(me) 
antuna 
(you) 
antum 
(you) 
huna 
(they) 
hum 
(they) 
In the case of the verbs used in isolation, as a general rule, the exclusion 
of inflection is indicated by a dash following the element which constitutes 
the base or root of the verbal unit, e.g.: 
Kasar 	 (to break) 
In case where the retention of these inflections is found necessary, the 
dash is still used to separate the two elements, e.g.: 
Kasar-tu 	 (I broke (something)) 
On the other hand, when used in a context, the verbal unit is fully 
represented and without the use of a dash, e.g.: 
?ana: kasartu 1-qualam 
(I broke the pen) 
O 
To end up this overview, a few examples about pre-school Algerian 
children's use of certain forms in Algerian colloquial Arabic (which has 
basically the same grammar as Modern Arabic, but with a few exceptions) 
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might be useful. In the personal pronoun category, there is often a 
redundancy of the 1st person in the young child: 
ana cndi 	 (Me I have) 
cridek 	 (you have) 
cridna 	 (we have). 
And in negation, we usually find the following forms from an early age: 
cndi 	 ma cridis- 
(I have) 
	
(I have not) 
cridek 	 ma crideks- 
(you have) (you have not). 
There is, in fact, in Arabic no verb which corresponds to the verb `to have' 
in English. It is approximately replaced by the preposition cndi (to) which 
is followed by personal pronouns which are used as suffixes: 
cndi ( I have) 
lana: (we have) 
The personal pronouns used as suffixes to a noun are equivalent to the 
possessives in English and in French: 
my, yours, his, etc. 
mon, ton, son, etc. 
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e.g. sahni = (the plate of me) my plate. 
In the interpretation and discussion of the experiments, the first few 
examples of children's sample speech are given both in the reading 
transcription of Arabic and the English equivalent. All the remaining other 
examples are given directly in the English translation, in order to ease the 
reading of the speech sample. 
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Chapter 5 
General Introduction to Methodology 
5.1. A theoretical stance 
5.1.1. Rationale: on studying language development in non-
western cultures 
Studying language development is one of the most challenging 
tasks for developmental psychologists. Certain methodological problems 
have been pointed out by some researchers in child language, but the 
most telling of these problems were in the area of cross-cultural research. 
Ervin-Tripp (1972) (and later on, Bowerman, 1981) discussed two types of 
methodological bias (linguistic and sociolinguistic), when the samples of 
children investigated are linguistically and/or culturally heterogeneous. 
The major methodological problems which arise are due to the fact 
that most of the investigators doing comparative studies, or studying non-
western children for themselves, do not belong to the cultures under 
study. An inadequate knowledge of the child's language and culture, and 
the use of an unfamiliar (for the child) standardized procedure (which 
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even for European children has some disadvantages) threaten the validity 
of the comparative research in question. In the same way, an investigator 
who uses a so-called 'standard' dialect, or in some cases, a 'standard' 
language in tasks which are intended to assess children's spontaneous 
speech, when in fact this 'standard' language is less familiar to some 
children than some other dialects, is possibly linguistically biasing his 
study. The other bias, socio-linguistically speaking, arises when an 
investigator transplants experimental techniques to test children's 
linguistic abilities to social groups for which these techniques were not at 
first intended (these being mostly developed in Western societies). If such 
biases can be avoided, then, the one expected outcome is that many 
investigators from Western societies will reappraise or reevaluate, in the 
light of cross-cultural practices, their theoretical and methodological 
arsenal. 
A first attempt to adjust standard experimental techniques to cross-
cultural settings, was done in the mid-sixties. A "Field Manual for cross-
cultual study of the acquisition of communicative competence" (Slobin, 
1967), which is the result of neighbouring disciplines like 
psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics, combining the investigation of 
grammatical development, language use in its social context, and a 
description of the belief systems surrounding language socialization, was 
developed. The idea was that Western researchers, choosing field sites 
where already anthropological stations were existing, will, in a space of a 
few months of study, have some knowledge of the language and culture 
under study. Most of the research following the methodological proposals 
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of the Field Manual omitted important dimensions of adult-child speech 
interaction (adult input mainly) (Blount, 1969; Kernan, 1969; Omar, 1973). 
It soon appeared that the research designs were inappropriate, since a 
certain number of variables - unexpected cultural variables which any 
viable research must be able to anticipate - were not controlled. While the 
goals of the Field Manual are worth pursuing, "a more holistic approach" 
as remarked one researcher (B. Schieffelin, 1979) "is needed to deal with 
various aspects of the development of communicative competence and 
language socialization in a unified manner. At the same time, such an 
approach must be flexible enough to handle diverse and unpredictable 
cultural situations" (B. Schieffelin, 1979, p. 76) 
In the late seventies Bambi Schieffelin conducted a research 
project on communicative competence in Kaluli children, using an 
ethnographic approach. This study was based on anthropological work 
done in Papua - New Guinea where the Kaluli people were living (the 
anthropological work being conducted by her husband, E.L. Schieffelin), 
a few years before her study began. Her work, usually considered as a 
positive account of the development of communicative competence in a 
non-literate and non-western society, takes into consideration not only the 
point of view of an outside observer, but also the point of view of the 
participants, "to interpret and understand the events observed by the 
investigator" (B. Schieffelin, 1979; p.77). The participants view being, in 
other words, the "emic" element of a cross-cultural strategy. 
Following a distinction in linguistics between phonemics, or the 
examination of the sounds used in a particular language, and phonetics, 
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or the generalisation from phonemic studies in individual languages to a 
universal science covering all languages, Pike (1966) has coined the 
terms 'emic' and `etic'. 'Emic' studies apply in only a particular society, 
while 'etic' studies are universal aspects (culture-free) of the world, or at 
least in more than one society (c.f. Berry, 1974; 1980; Narroll et al, 1980). 
As an example, if an ethnographer is using an 'emic' approach, he 
must seek to clarify and understand the conceptions and formulae (or 
constructions) used by the people under study to define what happens to 
them. 
Schieffelin's ethnographic approach involves not only a detailed 
account "of an event, series of events or even a whole way of life" from the 
point of view of a researcher who does not belong to the culture being 
investigated, but it also incorporates that 'emic' element which 
emphasizes the significance of the described events from the point of 
view of the participants. 
According to Schieffelin (1979), the research process, within an 
ethnographic approach, involves more than just collecting various types 
of data (i.e. representing spontaneous speech, observing child case study 
behaviour, interviews about the socialization practices). It involves, more 
importantly, the use of the above experimental techniques to "raise 
questions about, provide answers for, and contribute to the interpretation 
of the others (i.e. the people under study) throughout the whole course of 
study" (B. Schieffelin, 1979, p.77, the words between brackets are added). 
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To illustrate this, information about certain cultural traits and events 
(e.g. the traditional way in the preparation, the giving of and taking of food, 
in, for instance, Papua New Guinea, and food tabooed in infancy) may 
help disambiguate between what people say about bringing up children 
and what they are actually observed to do. 
B. Schieffelin's work is undoubtedly a remarkable contribution to 
methodology in the field of language development across cultures; it is 
nonetheless not without weaknesses. A stay of two years among Kaluli 
people, however they may help the understanding of the culture and 
language of these people of the Papuan Plateau, is, indeed, far from 
being sufficient to allow an investigtor, not belonging to the culture under 
study, to bring to the fore the full range of cultural and/or linguistic 
variables, or the potential behavioural differences. This is so even though 
her primary goal was not "to elicit speech from children for the purpose of 
linguistic analysis" since she "could not presume to know the culturally 
appropriate ways of speaking to and interacting with children" (p. 80), but, 
" to investigate the ways in which Kaluli people interact with and speak to 
their children" (B. Schieffelin, 1979, p. 80) 
It is precisely that 'abstraction from the components of 
communicative events' - to take one expression used by Hymes (1974) to 
identify aspects of the ethnography of speaking - which is so criticized in 
earlier approaches to patterns of speech activity using separate frames of 
references which the work of Schieffelin seems to consider. The 
investigation of communicative activities is a whole, if the goal is to 
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understand (taken in the scientific sense to mean to describe and explain) 
ways in which an ethnic group interacts with and speaks to its children. 
Therefore one must view these patterns of activities intermingled with the 
linguistic code in what Hymes (1974) describes as "the organisation of the 
elements and relations of the speech act and speech events, themselves 
part of a system of communicative acts and events characteristic of a 
group"1. 
The present study explores ways in which Algerian children talk 
about (or describe) objects and objects relations, events and activities, 
through language. It differs from Schieffelin's work in, essentially, two 
ways. The investigator can be presumed to know "the culturally 
appropriate ways of speaking to and interacting with (Algerian pre-school) 
children" (the words between brackets are added). Secondly, the 
investigator uses a different experimental setting where the situation and 
the tasks are manipulated in order to create the maximum of opportunity 
for the children to use certain forms, which yield more of a sentential 
(anaphoric) type of discourse, when talking about objects, events and 
relations that the tasks describe. (This will be made clear in the chapters 
on the experiments). 
1 For Conklin (1962) "an adequate ethnographic description of the culture (Goodenough, 
1957a) of a particular society presupposes a detailed analysis of the communicative 
system and of the culturally defined situations in which all relevant distinctions in that 
system occur" [Lexicographical treatment of folk taxonomies" in "Problems of 
Lexicography" F.W. Householder & S. Saporta (eds), pp. 119-141. Publication 21 of the 
Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics.] Via Hymes 
(1974) p. 17. 
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B. Schieffelin's work (1979) is essentially an ethnographic and 
anthropological description of the development of communicative 
competence. Children's talk within that approach, is seen as a social 
activity. The present study does not fulfill such purposes, but is is rather 
from a wider perspective of a developmental pragmatic approach, which 
also includes Schieffelin's work, and it combines different levels of 
analyses. These levels include the understanding and use of information 
not explicit in the literal meaning of a meaning (conversational 
implicature) and presuppositions, and, a little more in detail, the necessity 
for using information from the listener and the context for deciding among 
alternative forms of messages (e.g. definite and indefinite reference). 
5.1.2. Methodological dilemmas 
When assessing language and communication, it is not sufficient to 
control for such variables as age, sex, socio-economic status, (and 
sometimes such other child's attributes as intelligence and personality) 
which covary with the child's linguistic behaviour, to cite but the ones 
which, in practice, are the most commonly studied and possibly controlled 
in any within culture investigation. As it will be seen in the following 
paragraphs, it is not just a problem of building up a test which will look for 
differences in, say, the frequency of the use of turns at speaking, initiation 
of topics, or the number and quality of pragmatic functions or speech acts, 
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between children of the same sex and same age, and having the same 
socio-economic status. 
Even within a group of normal pre-school children from the same 
geographical area, matched for the above variables, and having 
approximately the same pre-school education (e.g. 4 and 5 year-olds 
attending the same nursery school for 1 and 2 years already), there are 
substantial differences in the way language is used for communication, 
the role language plays for each particular child - because of some 
complex phenomena the most prominent of which are the socio-
psychological and socio-cultural variables. 
The psychological and social dimensions of the expansion of 
communication open the perspective from which the pre-school child can 
be viewed as "an active and interactive member of a changing and 
expanding set of interpersonal contacts and relationships in which both 
interactions and communications become increasingly complex and 
varied" (C. Garvey, 1984, p.XV). 
With the cultural variable are associated a number of other 
variables which are inextricably mingled with that broad variable that 
makes it, in terms of experimental or statistical control, an overwhelmingly 
complex task for the researcher in child language. 
A substantial proportion of research in child language in the last 
two decades, and in the present one, in fact replicates experiments which 
have not been entirely conclusive. The main reason behind this is that 
most researchers subscribe to appealing theories of child language which 
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are not always supported by the evidence, and as a consequence, these 
researchers often sacrifice sound experimental methodologies which are 
not in line with the so-called theories. Examples in the literature are 
numerous (reports in the "Journal of Child Language" are revealing in this 
respect, c.f. L. Waterhouse, 1980). What Waterhouse (1980) calls 
'bankruptcy' of a theory may have been discovered by internal or external 
analysis, i.e. by discovering some logical inconsistencies, within the 
theory, or by finding no data to support the theory. 
To take but a few examples, some papers in child language 
development, discussing Clark's model of the acquisition of meaning 
(E.V. Clark, 1973) recognized only Clark's model for word meaning 
acquisition, while some others recognized a variety of such models. 
According to Clark's Semantic Feature hypothesis, children frequently 
begin by using actual words knowing only a partial set of semantic 
features. As an illustration, from the standpoint of the adult's word 
meanings, the word 'zebra' might include the following semantic features: 
[living], [animal], [wild], [four-legged], [mane] and [striped]. A pre-school 
child might begin, for example, with only two features of, let's say, 'cat', 
and thus take 'cat' to mean [living] and [four-legged]. In the event of 
seeing a tiger, the child might call it 'cat', since the semantic features 
which identify 'cat' for the pre-school child are shared by the tiger. This 
child might, as well call a 'zebra': "dog", since most semantic features that 
identify 'dog' are shared by the 'zebra'. 
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One possible explanation for the recognition of such a model 
(Clark, 1973) could be that the most salient parts of the model were 
understood, but the less salient parts were easily confused by most 
people. Interpretations of the theory appear to be, however, most 
probable on one point, which is the notion that the model predicts that the 
child's feature accretions should proceed developmentally from the more 
concrete to the more abstract. 
Another good example of misinterpretation in the literature on the 
subject are, in psycho-linguistics, Chomsky's models of grammar 
(1965;1964). With regard to the above remarks (theories not always 
supported by evidence), some researchers, attracted by the 
Transformational Model, disregarded the most critical aspects of the 
theory, and attempted to prove those parts of the theory which apparently 
fit their data, and so try to give to this theory of language acquisition an 
empirical fit. Chomsky's model was, in fact, never offered as the sort of 
empirical account, rival to the learning theory paradigm, of how the child 
acquires a language. Chomsky's model could be said to be a description 
of the problem of language acquisition, a sort of description which states 
that the acquisition of language by the child is a question of mastering the 
rules of a generative grammar. And the strong claims developed by 
Chomsky were somehow subject to empirical testing in the decade which 
followed the publication of the 'Aspects of the Theory of Syntax" (1965). 
Now, the set of beliefs about the nature of theories which sprang from the 
Chomskyan paradigm are decidedly metaphysical because, as Wanner 
and Gleitman (1982) argue cogently, they can not be confirmed or 
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disconfirmed by empirical means, but only that different metaphysical 
beliefs can be compared according to the degree of success of the 
scientific programmes they support. 
To sum up the speculations in child language research, one 
serious problem is the generalisation from the data of one subject, or 
even three subjects, to whole populations of children, this being followed, 
sometimes, by claims of universality - spelled out as universal principles 
of linguistic behaviour, extrapolation to a universal range of individual 
variation of a typical behaviour, or using interchangeably bicultural 
studies (based on samples of children from only two countries or two 
cultures) and cross-cultural studies (bearing on several different cultures) 
for some hypothetical cross-cultural universals pertaining to literacy, 
language use, child-rearing practices, etc. 
However, it can be argued that longitudinal studies which focus on 
a small sample, or even a single or two subjects, might have some 
advantage. A detailed analysis of a relatively small sample is often 
thought to be preferable to a more superficial analysis of a much larger 
sample where many interesting aspects of discourse might be easily 
overlooked (c.f. McTear, 1985). 
5.2. The data of the present study 
The present research is about the development of communication 
in Algerian pre-school urban children. The sample of pre-school children, 
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in this research, is expected to represent the major social strata of such 
large urban area such as Constantine. In the large Algerian urban areas 
(whether it be Constantine, Algiers or Oran), the most often used 
language (at home and outside home) is colloquial Algerian Arabic, 
which is an outgrowth of local dialects but having a large proportion of 
Arabic together with certain words from foreign codes such as French or 
Spanish. 
A majority of the population of Algerian children speaks this 
colloquial Algerian Arabic (I do not include Berber speaking children, 
since they represent another important cultural sub-group within the same 
broad culture, and these could be studied separately). 
Ninety six children with equal proportion of boys and girls 
representing the three main social classes [workers, owners - "petits 
proprietaires et commergants" - and learned people (teachers, 
intellectuals in general) etc.,] are studied cross-sectionally for their early 
speech, or, more precisely, on referring expressions and other aspects of 
discourse in the 1st experiment.. The age-range goes from 3 1/2 to 5 
years. More detail about the age sub-divisions within the sample will be 
given in the chapters dealing with the experiments. The same sample of 
children, with few exceptions, is used in the second experiment, some six 
months later. Thus, these two experiments present themselves as a kind 
of longitudinal study. Details about the method (i.e. procedure, materials, 
subjects, etc.,) are provided in the chapters concerning the separate 
experiments. 
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This study involved taperecording the spontaneous speech of all 
the children in the samples, in the specific setting of the "garderie 
d'enfants" (a kind of nursery school) which are the only places where it is 
materially and socially possible. 'Socially' because in the particular 
Algerian setting, the difficulty when it comes to arranging home visits with 
the parents, for the sake of taperecording speech situations and speech 
events (i.e. mother-child interaction, mother-child-sibling(s) interaction, 
and maternal interviews) is almost insurmountable. 
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Chapter 6 
Referring expressions in Algerian pre-school children 
Experiment I 
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Rationale 
The following description and analysis concerns the first of two 
experiments which constitute a two-part study of the development of 
referring expressions and other aspects of discourse in pre-school urban 
Algerian children. 
The aim of this study is to look at possible sources of variation, 
eliminating any which may be of no consequences, so as to show up 
major aspects of the speech forms used by the children. Potential 
sources of variation include differences between the sexes, age-group 
differences, social economic status differences or differences between 
school environments. These will either be tested for or taken into account 
as far as possible in the design. For example, the school populations 
covered the three main social strata and random selection of children was 
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made. Also, the schools themselves constituted the whole population of 
lardins d'enfants' in the city of Constantine. 
6.1.2. Subjects and materials 
The children investigated were selected from three 'jardins 
d'enfants' in Constantine which they had attended for at least one year. 
The first experiment was completed over a period of three months, from 
January 1985 to the end of March of the same year. A total of sixty 
children were selected randomly from a pool of ninety six who 
participated initially in the experiments. Selection took into account both 
age and sex. The overall age-range of the sample was from 3:3 to 5:0, 
with a mean age of 4:4. However a division into equal sized age-groups 
(3:7 - 4:3 and 4:4 - 5:0) was made to investigate any age differences. 
Also there were equal numbers of girls and boys so that any differences 
between the sexes could be assessed. 
The sixty children were tested in dyads, each child interacting with 
a partner of the same age. Dyads were chosen so that there were equal 
numbers of boy/boy, girl/girl and boy/girl pairings. 
The collection of data took place during the morning playtime 
between 10 and 11 o'clock. Before the actual experiment started, the 
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investigator spent about two weeks in warming-up sessions designed to 
introduce himself to the subjects and thus gain their confidence. The test 
sessions were conducted in a corner of a quiet room provided with chairs 
and tables, with pictures on the walls (either drawn by the pre-school 
teacher or taken from colour magazines for children, and representing 
various animals, and sometimes persons, engaged in typical activities), 
and toys of different sizes and colour in another corner of the room. The 
testing room was used at other times by the teachers and was, thus, 
familiar to the children. each dyad spent approximately 10 to 15 minutes 
in the testing room with the experimenter. 
The set of pictures presented to the subjects was hand-drawn by 
the pre-school teachers and all the pictures were selected from among a 
wide range which had been or were still being used in the pre-school 
classrooms. 
The main picture in the experiment was drawn on thick white 
paper, 40cm x 30cm and represented the following scence: 
- two girls (one in a yellow dress and one in a pink dress) were 
offering each other flowers coloured in yellow, red and blue and 
were standing near a blue river crossed by a bridge. All around 
there were flowers and tall grass on the ground, also some trees -
roughly represented in green - while in the sky a bird, coloured 
grey, was flying and another one was nesting on the ground. 
There was also the profile, clearly delineated, of mountains on the 
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horizon, a cloud above the mountains, a yellow sun, and two 
differently coloured butterflies. 
Four other pictures were also used in this experiment in addition to 
the large picture and were comparatively smaller (25cm x 20cm each). 
They represented various animals and objects already familiar to the 
children frequenting the 'jardins d'enfants'. The four pictures used were 
as follows: 
1- entitled "les canards" (the ducks) 
Ducks on a pond with one about to pick up a snail on a 
green leaf, while another one was shown as though looking 
at the snail about to be picked. The contents of the picture 
were coloured in green, brown and yellow. 
2- entitled "les poussins" (the chicks) 
Chicks were represented in various activities. Some were 
just breaking or had just broken their egg-shells, one was 
about to pick up a worm, another one was attracted by a 
snail, yet another one was running, and, in a corner, two 
chicks were resting against each other, eyes closed. 
3- A hen followed by her two chicks (drawn in red, grey, orange 
and yellow). 
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4- A representation of a house with two open windows, a tall 
green tree on either side and the ground covered with 
flowers. On a hill, a wide-spreading tree with a sun, 
coloured orange, above the tree. 
6.1.3. Procedure 
Two situations were given to the subjects, the structured-play 
condition and the free-play condition. In the structured-play condition the 
child participant either names or describes the picture he/she has in 
his/her hands to the other partner in the dyad. The other member of the 
dyad, who has an identical picture, names/describes in his or her turn the 
contents of the picture. 
Although the children did not know it, each had an identical picture. 
Instructions had also been given at the beginning of the session as part of 
the game, that they were not to look at each other's pictures. To make 
sure the injunctions were observed children sat on opposite sides of a 
table facing each other at a distance of approximately 50cm. 
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The instructions continued as follows: 
Experimenter: 	 Look at this picture (and name the child), isn't it 
nice? Can you tell (and name the other child) 
about your picture? 
After the child had made a response, the same instruction was then 
repeated to the other member of the dyad. It happened sometimes that, in 
the middle of the game, a subject after taking a turn wanted to speak 
again, although the verbal instruction was directed to the partner. The 
experimenter then intervened by saying "Let ....x (a child) speak, this is his 
turn, do you understand? When he finishes you can speak again, okay?" 
The question about the picture was designed to produce a 
dialogue between the children and was used as a repeated prompt after 
each turn at speaking, to elicit more speech from the children until one of 
the children was not able to describe the picture further. If a child, within a 
turn, happened to utter a word while pointing to a part of the picture, he 
was encouraged to produce a whole sentence while taking a turn. As the 
data show (see examples in the appendix), it was often the case that 
children omitted syntactic structures, essentially grammatical categories, 
and used only the word corresponding to the recognized object, or, 
sometimes the archetypal answer "I've got...". 
One main difference in procedure from other studies of referential 
communication is that no screen was used to separate the children. This 
162 
was decided upon, firstly, because the purpose of the study was not to 
compare and contrast critical attributes of the pictures themselves, such 
as in the studies of Whitehurst and his colleagues (1987), but to 
investigate the children's use of linguistic signs. Secondly, it was decided 
not to use a screen as a consequence of one of the hypotheses raised for 
this study. In the situation created for the subjects, in the first experiment, 
the play-space (close-range, far-range) is a critical factor; in other words, 
for more naturalness of the situation, the children must not see each other 
completely, and proxemic relations are important for a richer referential 
content of their messages. A study on which this view is based has been 
conducted by Bokus and Shugar (1984). Their hypothesis could be 
stated in this way: 
- In a dyadic, free-play situation, children are hypothesized to start 
interaction with a same age partner by constructing utterances 
following two different patterns depending on the proxemic 
relations of their fields of action: they produce short utterances 
lacking in referential content if the mutual distance is greater, and 
longer utterances with an expected richer referential content if the 
mutual distance is lesser. 
More will be said about this hypothesis, in conjunction with the 
discussion of our results. For now, it is sufficient to say that in our view the 
distance between the two partners of the dyad can be decisive, not only in 
matters of talkativeness but also in matters of mutual relations and 
reciprocal socialisation. In the structured play condition, the mutual 
distance is less than 50 cm, and in the free-play condition the distance is 
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still less (the table separating the children is smaller than the one used in 
the previous condition). 
In the free-play condition, there is less or no guidance, less or no 
elicitation. In this latter condition, the experimenter tries to interfere as 
little as possible with the choice of the child, except by asking, at the very 
beginning, the question which actually leaves the child free to decide on 
whatever he wants to talk about: "What do you like to talk about?" or 
"What do you like to play with?" 
Children either chose to tell a narrative (of events, toys, or persons 
they have chosen to talk about) or to tell about a picture picked up among 
the set of pictures described a few pages above, and designed for the 
purpose of a free-play situation. The experimenter was listening, and 
occasionally used the prompt "uh uh", or simply nodded. But when the 
child showed signs of wanting to go further in a narrative, for instance 
(some children, used the expression "now, I'm going to tell you 
	 " and 
repeated it many times, or just said "and 	  and"), the experimenter 
added the usual questions "yes, and what's next?" "and do you like it?" or 
"is it nice?", or a need for clarification "and what's its name?". 
The recording from each experimental session was analysed 
according to the following procedure. The experimenter placed into 
categories as shown in table 6-1: 
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1- speech directed to the child by the experimenter 
2- repetition: when there is a desire on the child's part to 
participate in the conversation, the repeated form or forms are 
counted. In general each time a participant takes a turn, the 
forms of interest, whether repeated or not, are counted. 
3- A form within the same sentence, if repeated, is counted only 
when it applies to a different new entity. 
Two other people aided the experimenter in the translation of 
speech from Algerian Colloquial Arabic to English. Examples of both the 
Algerian Colloquial Arabic and the English equivalent are given later. It 
should be noted that no written form of the Colloquial Arabic is used so 
that a phonetic transcription devised by the author is used. 
6.1.4. Results and discussion: preliminary considerations 
a) the scores 
The first reason why there are sometimes very high scores (c.f. 
table 6-1) in a condition for certain children, compared with the very low 
scores for certain others, is that some children spent more time than 
others with the pictures. The mean time spent with a dyad was normally 
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around 10 minutes. However there were dyads who spent up to 15 
minutes whereas some dyads spent only between 5 and 10 minutes, 
these later getting tired, bored, or perhaps becoming suddenly shy and 
non-responsive. 
On the other hand, those who had sometimes high scores in one 
condition have low scores in the other condition and vice versa e.g. some 
4-year-olds have high scores in the SP (structured-play) condition in one 
category and low scores in the same category but in the FP (Free-play) 
condition; some have high scores in the FP condition in a category, but 
low scores in the same category in the SP condition. Overall the majority 
of the scores in both categories (in the case of the Indefinite and Definite 
Noun Phases) are higher in the SP condition than in the FP condition. 
There are probably many reasons for this. One reason pertains to the 
nature of the situation itself. In the structured play situation, children are 
again and again encouraged to tell more about the picture they have in 
hand. By contrast, in the free-play situation, there is less or no guidance, 
less or no elicitation. Therefore, one consequence of this is that the 
amount of words produced in the structured play condition is substantially 
greater than the amount of words produced while being in the free play 
condition. 
b) Quantitatively, the children produced more referring 
experessions in the SP condition than in the FP condition in the Indefinite 
Noun Phrase Category (c.f. table 6-1), in what is designated in the 
literature on the acquisition of articles, the nominative function (Warden, 
1976; Maratsos, 1976; Emslie & Stevenson, 1981). The use of the 
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definite N Phrase was, quantitatively, much less in both age-groups and 
the difference between the two conditions did not show a difference 
across age groups (c.f. tables 6-1, 6-1a, 6-2) (note in table 6-1a, main 
effect A: age, B: linguistic forms). 
These findings support, partly, the above named researchers, 
whose hypothesis is that children around age four master first the 
nominative function of the indefinite article and only later master the 'a' in 
the use of identifying expression, and 'the' in the definite reference. From 
a cognitive point of view, the semantic distinction in the first use 
(nominative function) involves only a grasp of the class-membership (an 
individual class member), whereas that involved in identifying a definite 
reference requires from the child a specification of the uniqueness of the 
referent, i.e. the speaker/participant is referring to a particular example(s) 
of a class of things. Research in this area tends to show that the first use 
(naming) is cognitively simpler than the second (identification of a definite 
reference). 
6.2. Results and interpretation 
A linear regression and correlation analysis was carried out on the 
data scores between experimenter and dyads for each speech category. 
This analysis showed generally fairly high and significant correlations 
indicating a systematic linear relation between the scores. Values for r 
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Table 6-1 a 
Two-way Anova mixed design (1 between-subjects and 1 
within-subjects variable): cell means 
A (age) 
al 4; 4-5:0 	 a2 3;7-4:3 
Free-play 
bi 
B 
(linguistic 
forms) 
structured 
play 
b2 
a1 b1 
R = 6.90 
al b2 
X=5.07 
a2b1 a2b2 
SZ = 13.00 R = 11.93 
5Z . 5.98 
i= 12.46 
X=9.95 
	 )..-= 8.5 
(very significant 
level 2 treatment B) 
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and the strength of linear relationship, r2, are given in table 6-3. The 
index of multiple coefficient of correlation is: R=0.4906, for the pronouns, 
and R=0.493 for the common nouns, p< .05. 
Given the results of the correlational analysis, a one-way analysis 
of covariance was subsequently carried out, with the experimenter's 
score used as a covariate and subsequently to see whether there were 
differences in the scores of the subjects due to the 'sex' of the members of 
the dyads (i.e. the dyads being originally distributed equally, in the 
design, into Group 1: boys/boys, Group 2: girls/girls, and Group 3: 
girls/boys). The results, in table 6-4, showed that overall there are no 
significant F-values at the 5% probability level (with 2 and 24df the 5% 
significant value is F=3.40). In general experimenter effects go hand in 
hand with dyad responses, and the analysis shows no between-sex 
differences. 
Finally a series of factorial analyses of variance (three-way anova, 
with repeated measures on two factors) were performed on the individual 
scores for each type of production (see table 6-5. Factor A is the age-
groups, Factor B the linguistic forms and Factor C the experimental 
conditions (FP or SP)). 
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The justification of the use of parametric tests, such as Anova, is 
that, in the present data, it was possible: 
1- to use numeric scores, and there are more than two variables 
in the statistical design, with levels within each variable that 
produced interactions, which only a powerful parametric test 
can handle. 
2- people (children) have been assigned to groups randomly to 
keep the observations independent (subjects are assigned at 
random to experimental groups, and the experimental 
treatments are assigned at random to groups). And it is 
assumed that the population of children from which the 
sample is drawn, is normally distributed. 
Though this last assumption is difficult, thorny and controversial, some 
researchers consider the violation of this assumption a serious matter that 
leads to invalidity of parametric statistical tests. But because such tests as 
F and t-tests are robust (operating well even under assumptions violation, 
provided that they are not gross and multiple), violation of the assumption 
is not so serious (c.f. P. Gardner, 1975). It is assumed that variances are 
homogeneous from group to group within the bound of random variation 
(the age range in each sample group is about equal). On the other hand 
homogeneity of variance is not important as long as there are equal 
number of subjects in each experimental condition. The present study 
meets the basic criteria (enumerated above) for the use of parametric 
tests. 	 In such tests the original scores can be used directly or 
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Table 6-5a: pronouns 
B (pronouns: 1st & 2nd person) 
SP 
	
FP 
al b1 
X=5.55 
al b2 
X=2.91 
a2bi a2b2 
5Z = 9.00 R.-= 3.65 
X=4.23 
X=6.32 
7.27 	 = 3.28 
C (conditions) 
SP 
	
FP 
ai bi 
X = 5.33 
aib2 
X = 3.73 
a2b1 _a2b2 
X = 7.60 X = 5.05 
X=4.23 
X=6.32 
(3:7-4:3) 
al 
A (age) 
(4:4-5:0) 
a2 
(3:7-4:3) 
a1 
A (age) 
(4:4-5:0) 
a2 
X=6.46 6. X = 4.09 
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al bi 
X = 5.33 
_aid2 
X = 3.73 
_a2b1 _a2b2 
X = 7.60 X = 5.05 
(3:7-4:3) 
al 
A (age) 
(4:4-5:0) 
a2 
= 4.23 
5Z = 6.32 
Table 6-5a: pronouns 
B (pronouns: 1st & 2nd person) 
SP 
	 FP 
ai bi 
X=5.55 
al b2 
X=2.91 
a2bi 
R . 9.00 
a2b2 
X=3.65 
(3:7-4:3) 
ai 
A (age) 
(4:4-5:0) 
a2 
X=4.23 
X=6.32 
X=7.27 
	
X=3.28 
C (conditions) 
SP 
	 FP 
X=6.46 
	
X=4.09 
175 
Table 6-5b: 
Three-way anova with repeated measures on two factors: cell means 
B (linguistic forms) 
1 
	
2 
(conditions) 
SPA 
	
FP2 
	
SP1 
	
FP2  
(4:4-5:0) 
al bici 
X=8.033 
ai di c2 
X=3.067 
al b2ci 
X=2.633 2.6
ai b2c2 
R" = 3.20 
a2bici a2bic2 a2b2ci a2b22 
X= 13.667 7( = 4.33 5i• . 1.53 5Z = 5.76 
(3:7-4:3) 
A (age) 5Z = 4.23 
X=6.32 
X= 10.85 	 X=3.7 	 X=2.09 	 X = 4.48 
1 7i 
transformed. The second experiment will depend on the results of the 1st 
experiment, and its design will decide for the use of the appropriate tests. 
In the present experimental study, measurements are made for the 
purposes of making comparisons across children of aspects of their 
language in order to provide evidence for development. 
The results of the factorial Anova are very striking and are as 
expected, in the sense that the values are in the direction of the predicted 
means showing important effects of certan factors (categories) under 
specific levels of treatment or condition, as will be discussed. The results 
of the two-way anova mixed design (1 between subjects and 1 within 
subjects variable) (factor A = age; factor B = linguistic forms) showed a 
highly significant main effect B (linguistic forms) which represent the 
definite and indefinite Noun Phrase categories (F = 58.79; with 1 and 58 
df, the 1% significant value is F = 7.08). Because of this we can conclude 
that the means for B1 (X = 5.98) and B2 (X_ = 12.46) differ very 
significantly, i.e. the production of certain linguistic forms (indef. NP) is 
substantially greater under the SP condition than under the FP condition 
(c.f. table 6-1a). The main effect A (age) is non-significant across 
conditions and categories, which indicates that there is no significant 
difference between the two age-groups in the definite and indefinite N 
Phrase and under the two conditions. 
The results of the two-way anova also showed that there is a 
nonsignificant AxB interaction (F = 0.21, P = < .05). This indicates that the 
A effect (the difference between Al and A2) is independent of B, that is, 
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we have approximately the same difference between Al (age 1) and A2 
(age 2) regardless of the conditions (structured/free play) and linguistic 
forms (definite/indefinite NP). 
The results of the factorial analysis of variance performed on the 
individual scores for the pronouns showed a significant main effect A 
(age) (F = 7.99; with 1 and 58 df, the 1% significant value is F = 7.08) 
which represents the two age-groups. They also showed a highly 
significant main effect B (linguistic forms) (F = 55.39), and a significant 
main effect C (conditions) (F = 9.71). 
But, because of the significant A x B interaction (age x linguistic 
forms) (F = 6.41, the 5% significant value is F = 4.00) and also a 
significant A x B x C interaction (F = 9.99) (age x linguistic forms x 
conditions; c.f. figures 6-1 and 6-2), the difference between the two age-
groups is not independent of the levels of B (linguistic forms), and the 
difference between the linguistic forms (1st and 2nd person and 3rd 
person) is not independent of the levels of C (conditions: SP and FP). We 
can conclude that older children (4:4-5:0) produced more 1st and 2nd 
personal pronouns than younger children (3:7-4:3) under the SP (or 
structured play) conditions. But both age-groups produced more 1st and 
2nd p.pronouns under the SP condition than under the FP condition (c.f. 
tables 6-5a and 6-5b). On the other hand, it appears that older children 
produced more 3rd personal pronouns in the FP condition (X = 5.76) than 
in the SP condition (X = 1.53). This can be explained by the fact that 3rd 
p. pronouns are used anaphorically in contrast to 1st and 2nd p. 
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pronouns which function deictically (i.e. referring to aspects of the non-
linguistic context). 
In the free-play situation children are mostly telling narratives 
(about events, toys or persons) in which there is always an opportunity to 
use a third person being introduced or participating in their narratives. By 
contrast, in the SP condition these children usually name/describe the 
contents of the picture at hand by pointing, and have less opportunity to 
use linguistic forms which refer back (3rd p. pronoun) to what has been 
already introduced in the linguistic context. That explains why the mean 
for the 3rd person pronoun is substantially higher in the FP condition than 
in the SP condition. 
The results of the factorial analysis of variance concerning the 
indexical function showed a significant main effect B (linguistic forms) (F = 
20.91; with 1 and 58 df, the 1% significant value is 7.08), and a significant 
main effect C (conditions: SP and FP) (F = 18.64), but no significant main 
effect A (age) ()F = 0.02) (c.f. table 6-6b). It appears that children within 
the two-age groups produce more demonstrative pronouns (this and that) 
in the SP condition than in the FP condition, which indicates that children, 
when pointing to the contents of the picture at hand, use mostly the deictic 
pronouns: this and that. But when engaged into telling a story or a 
narrative, they use other linguistic forms. 
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Table 6-7a: Common nouns 
Three-way anova with repeated measures on two factors: cell means 
A (age) 
1 
	
2 
C (conditions) 
SP1 	 FP2 
	
SP1 
	
FP2  
a2bici 
3K = 2.500 
al bic2 
R. 2.567 
a2bici 
)7= 2.833 
a2b1c2 
5(= 4.067 
al b2ci 
X = 8.800 
al b2c2 
i= 3.133 
a2b2c1 
R . 10.033 
a2b2c2 
R. 3.000 
X=5.65 5.6 	 R. 2.85 	 X=6.43 6. 	 X = 3.53 
def. NP 
B 
(linguistic 
forms) 
indef. NP 
X = 2.99 
X = 6.24 
C.f. p. 291 
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The factorial analysis of variance concerning the common nouns 
(definite and indefinite NP) showed a highly significant B x C interaction 
(linguistic forms x conditions, SP and FP) (F = 11.75) (c.f. table 6-7a). 
This indicates that the difference between the linguistic forms (definite 
and indefinite NP) is not independent of the levels of C (conditions: SP 
and FP). Since there is no significant main effect A (age) and no 
significant A x C and A x B interactions, we can conclude that both age-
groups produced more indefinite NP under the structured play (SP) 
condition than under the free-play (FP) condition, and more indefinite NP 
than definite NP under the structured play condition. 
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Table 6-6a: pronouns 
Three-way anova with repeated measures on two factors: cell means 
B (linguistic forms: 1st & 2nd person & 3rd person) 
1 
	
2 
1st & 2nd person 	 3rd person 
C (conditions) 
1 SP 	 2 FP 
	
1 SP 
	
2 FP 
al bi ci 
X= 8.033 
ai bi c2 
X= 3.067 
al b2ci 
X= 2.633 
ai b2c2 
X= 3.20 
a2bici a2bic2 a2b2ci a2b22 
X = 13.667 5( = 4.33 X=1.53 )7 = 5.76 
7. 10.85 
	
X= 3.7 	 X= 2.09 	 X= 4.48 
(3:7-4:3) 
A (age) 
(4:4-5:0) 
X = 4.23 
X=6.32 
See p.295. 
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ai b 1 ci 
X=4.833 
al b2ci 
X=1.367 
a2bi ci 
X=4.733 
a2b2c1 
X=2.233 
al b 1 C2 
i= 2.133 
al b2c2 
X= 0.567 
a2b1c2 
5i= 1.200 
a2b2c2 
R . 0.500 
SP 
C 
(conditions) 
FP 
X = 3.29 
X=1.1 
Table 6-6b: Indexical function 
Three-way anova with repeated measures on two factors: cell means 
A (age) 
1 
3:7-4:3 
B (Linguistic forms) 
(here, 
hi 	
' 
	
hat 	 there) 
 
2 
4:4-5:0 
(those, 
this that) 
	
these 
i = 3.48 	 R = 0.96 	 R . 2.96 	 R . 1.36 
See p.299. 
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6.3. General discussion 
The two high means involving the structured condition in the 
indefinite NP category, in the two age-groups (3:7 - 4:3 = X 8.800; 4:4 - 5 
= X 10.033), correspond to what we can call a developmental function  
(the nominative function) as was suggested in the preliminary 
considerations. The deictic function of terms at a certain age (let's say at 
4 years) is an example of a developmental function. Deictic terms are 
acquired earlier than sentential expressions belonging to the extended 
discourse, and continue to function developmentally (e.g. the pronouns 
functioning deictically, or are deictically referential) for some time, before 
the effective use of cohesive devices (all aspects of anaphora, for 
instance the use of pronouns becoming discursively referential). 
In the age-group 3:7 - 4:3, the overwhelming presence of such a 
developmental function could somehow be justified if one refers to the 
developmental literature on the question (c.f. Warden, 1976; Maratsos, 
1976; Emslie & Stevenson, 1981); as they approach 5 years, it is usually 
expected to be less well accentuated, children of this age using already 
much more definite N. phrases. The present experiment is not as much 
designed to show more or less use of either categories (indefinite and 
definite reference, the presence or absence of the nominative function in 
the indefinite NP category) as to show that there is a kind of 
continuity/consistency in the anaphoric/cohesive use of referring 
expressions in 4 and 5-year-olds. A definite expression used consistently 
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is continuous with an anaphoric use of a 3rd person (the other referring 
expression included in the design, together with the 1st and 2nd personal 
pronouns, and the demonstrative pronouns and adverbs). Both uses 
imply an understanding of the cohesive or text-forming function. In one of 
the hypotheses of the present study, it was stated that the cohesive uses 
of referring expressions, (and their interpretation and recognition without 
difficulty by children), are relatively late developments (c.f. also works by 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1979, 1977; Warden, 1976; Hickmann, 1980, 1985). We 
stated before, i.e. in the previous chapter, that a definite reference, to be 
successful, must refer to a definite individual, and the the description we 
offer of that 'definite individual' will be sufficiently specific, in the given 
context, to identify uniquely for the hearer/participant (in the context of 
conversation) the referent we have in mind. This specification of the 
uniqueness of the referent is cognitively more demanding. Continuous 
with this cohesive use, 3rd person pronouns create referents 
linguistically, in such a way that the presuppositions about their existence 
and specificity then become available, and in the subsequent discourse 
with more use of presupposing coreferential 'definite forms', to maintain 
reference to these entities and thus provide continuity in the content of 
speech. We can say, then, that 3rd person pronouns contribute to the 
'text-forming' (Halliday & Hasan, 1976) function through cohesive 
intralinguistic relationships. "He" in, for instance, the sentence: 
'I saw a strange man in the street, [-±Q was throwing rocks at 
people'. 
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refers to a specific non-linguistic entity, but this entity is identifiable only 
through its indexical relation to previous (coreferential) noun phrase ('a 
strange man'). By contrast, first and second person pronouns refer to 
aspects of non-linguistic context. They are typically, 'exophoric' - to use 
another of Halliday and Hasan's terms (1976) - which seems to be more 
connected with the context of situation (except when they happen in 
quoted speech, there they become anaphoric). We will see later, in the 
discussion of the results of the second experiment, that the exophoric 
reference has been shown to be one characteristic of young children's 
speech (Hawkins, 1969). 
We have seen, in section 4 of chapter 4, that the indefinite article in 
Arabic is represented by the 'tanwin' (or the doubling of the vowel 'u') 
which is suffixed to the word, in the absence of a separate recognisable 
form. In Algerian Colloquial Arabic, when a child says: "hada tfal" = this 
one (is) a child, this is equivalent to the classical Arabic: 
hada tiflun = this one (is) a child. 
And "hada tfal" is different, on grammatical grounds, from "hada at-tfal" = 
this one (is) the child. The definite article '?al' which is assimilated to the 
sound it is annexed to (c.f. is, in many cases, represented in the 
same way as in the Arabic language: 
ha d a at-tiflu 	 this one (is) the child. 
The only difference is that there is no vowel 'u' suffixed to the word, 
in Algerian Colloquial Arabic. 
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But an indefinite expression and a definite expression are clearly 
marked in the language produced by native speakers of Algerian 
Colloquial Arabic. Here are few examples: 
Algerian Colloquial Arabic 	 Modern Arabic 
nouara = a flower 	 nouaratun = a flower 
an-nouara = the flower 	 an-nouaratu = the flower 
bahr = a sea 	 bahrun = a sea 
al-bahr = the sea 	 al-bahrun = the sea 
ouarda = a rose 	 ouardun = a rose 
al-ouarda = the rose 	 al-ouardu = the rose 
What is relevant to the discussion of the results of the 1st 
experiment is that in Algerian Colloquial Arabic, the indefinite NP 
category, (and in this experiment in the particular SP condition) is behind 
the presence of a developmental function (nominative function) in both 
age groups. It is striking that the predominant presence of such a function 
in the indefinite NP category reappears along with the use of the 1st and 
2nd personal pronoun category in both age groups, in the structured-play 
condition mainly (X = 8.033 for the 3:7 - 4:3, and 7. 13.667 for the 4:4 -
5:0 group of age, c.f. also figures 6-1, 6-2 and 6-3 for the interactions, this 
being explained by the combination of the task structure and the category 
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with whatever level). It appears that it is easier for the two groups to use 
personal pronouns which are essentially intralinguistic or cohesive (3rd 
person pronoun: 'he' she"it' and 'they'), when talking about or 
describing the contents of the picture in front of them. 'He' she"it' may 
be used deictically when they are not used anaphorically, or in other 
words, when the use of these pronouns is more context-specific, the 
referent being physically present. This is also an instance of what 
Halliday and Hasan (1976) call 'exophoric reference', wnere the 
pronouns refer to something in the environment of the speaker. In many 
cases, children in the sample, used these pronouns (he, she, it) as head: 
"he is angry 	 " or "it is going this way...." relying more on the listeners 
awareness of the situation. Adults have usually not much difficulty in 
recognizing and using an anophoric personal form, they can do so even 
with no clear reference available. The above results partially answer the 
question posed earlier of whether the earlier uses of referring 
expressions are easier than the later ones involving all aspects of 
anaphora. 
Overall these results are due, at first sight, to the nature of the 
situation, or rather the child's understanding of the situation: although 
both participants were encouraged at each turn to engage in a dialogue, 
what they seem to understand is that all what they are asked to do is to 
name the object or the contents of the picture, looking mostly at the 
experimenter and often ignoring the requirements of the dialogue with the 
samd age partner. Naming, in these kinds of situations, mostly involves 
question-answers, whereas real dialogue requires more social 
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awareness of the audience (the partner in this case) and an actual 
knowledge of its expectations. This is exactly the same requirement, from 
the children, of an appropriate use of the two articles discussed above ('a' 
and 'the'): the speaker/participant is assumed to use a cognitively more 
demanding capacity (than the one used for naming) to assess his 
audience's actual knowledge and probable expectations (this leads us to 
our second question in the framework of the present hypotheses: is there 
enough proof of egocentric speech? (c.f. p.100-101). 
We interpreted earlier the very high interaction in the common 
nouns category (definite and indefinite NP) as the combination of one 
particular condition (the SP condition) with whatever level of a factor 
(linguistic forms). This combination produces high effects in the indefinite 
NP category (level 2 of factor B, or linguistic forms). As discussed above, 
it seems that the presence/absence of the developmental function 
(nominative function) is behind these effects; a combination of one 
particular treatment (SP) or task structure, with one particular level 
(indefinite NP) coincides with its presence and so gives high results. It is 
easier for the children to only name the contents of the picture when the 
situation partly demands naming first - the idea of dialogue being not yet 
well assimilated. 
On the other hand, if one looks again to the means (c.f. table 6-1) in 
the 4:4 - 5:0 age-range in the definite and indefinite NP categories, we 
can notice that there is a difference between the means, within the free-
play situation, of the definite reference and indefinite reference (X = 4.06 
for the definite NP, and X = 2.6 for the indefinite NP). One possibility 
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could be that children approaching 5 years when talking about something 
they already know, or in the case of a picture-narrative something 
assumed to be known by both partners and by the experimenter, use 
more definite reference when referring to objects, persons and events, or, 
in the case of a picture/narrative, when referring to the contents of the 
picture. But when it comes to introducing what is known to them, but not 
known to the listener, they somehow fail to use the appropriate indefinite 
article ('a') in an identifying expression. Realizing that, demands a more 
acute cognitive and social awareness, or the realization of the audience's 
knowledge and probable expectations. This is explained by the low 
mean in the indefinite NP category, within the FP condition, when it is not 
just a case of pure naming (narratives about pet-toys and animals, 
mostly). In the following example, a child (4:4) started a story in this way: 
(examples are given in Arabic and the English equivalent) 
(child) B: 	 Linda matagdars tandar. Ana manes kima hia. hadi 
htu ma tagdarvs tandar. 
(child) B: 	 Linda cannot speak. Me I'm not like her. And this one 
his sister cannot speak. 
Experimenter (E): man hi Linda? 
Experimenter E: 	 Who is Linda? 
B: 	 baba vsrali kamiu ( 	 ?) u tomobil u hia dathum 
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B: 	 My father bought me a truck (----?) and a car and she  
takes them. 
E: 	 man hu li dahem? uhtuk? 
..., 
E: 	 Who takes them? Your sister? 
B: 	 ki tudhul, tadi li ju, tasraqhum 
B: 	 (continues his narrative without answering Es 
question) when she goes in, she takes toys, stole 
them. 
E: 	 uhtuk kbira ula sghira? qadg fi ucmurha? 
E: 	 (guessing) is your sister big or small? How old is 
she? 
B: 	 cmin 
B: 	 Two years. 
etc. 
In these examples, as in many others, the egocentric use of the 
definite reference at first mention of a referent, instead of the indefinite 
article in an identifying expression (designed to introduce a referent), is 
an indication that children of four - as far as this experiment is concerned -
have not mastered the associative anaphoric use of definite reference 
and identifying expression, this use implying that the speaker and hearer 
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are sharing some knowledge of the referent, following the previous 
mention of that referent. 
In the demonstrative categories, the only significant means are 
those corresponding to the use of the demonstrative pronouns (this, that), 
in the structured play situation. This again indicates that children, in both 
age-groups, when engaged in an otherwise naming function often use 
pure deixis (the ones usually designed as either 'proximal' demonstrative 
- e.g. 'this' - to introduce animate/human referents, or 'low' or 'non-
proximal' deixis - e.g. 'that' - to introduce non-human inanimate referents) 
often followed by the accompanying gesture. 
The second experiment of the present study was devised with two 
important problems in mind: one concerns the quality and contents of the 
pictures presented to the children, and one concerns the procedure. 
In the first experiment of this study, the pictures were hand-drawn, 
with bright colours, but there was little or no action (one standard picture 
shown to the children, most elements look static, with only two persons 
facing each other and standing up). This was the structure-play (SP) 
condition. In the free-play (FP) condition, each child of the dyad chose 
whatever he wanted to talk about (pictures, stories, etc.). The overall 
results showed that there was more talk in the SP condition than in the FP 
condition. The apparent reason behind this was that there was more 
guidance from the experimenter (using probes to elicit more speech in the 
SP than in the FP condition). The nature of the task and its understanding 
by the children (referent physically present and prompting spontaneous 
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acts of naming in the children) were, essentially, behind the 
overwhelming presence of the nominative function. 
In the second experiment, the children were shown printed 
pictures, with bright colours, but with more action than in the pictures 
shown in the first experiment (the materials were a series of six pictures 
making a coherent whole, i.e. same (referents) protagonists from the first 
to the last picture) and the concept of animacy was thus introduced, in the 
design, with however two basic differences: 
1) In the three-dimensional category of pictures, non-human 
(though personified) animate objects (a tank engine and a 
bus) are racing against each other. 
2) In the two-dimensional category of pictures, there were 
human animate beings (a day in the life of a girl). 
The emphasis, in the procedure, was more on the proxemic factor 
(the distance between the peer in a dyadic interactive situation), with a 
continual emphasis on dialogue (encouraging the children to talk to each 
other, to take a turn at speaking, rather than talking to the experimenter. 
These elements were introduced with the hypothesis that the 
children would be more sensitive to the proxemic factor, or situational 
opportunity, which could affect the children's performance level, and that 
the nature of the stimulus materials (pictures making up a unique story, a 
coherent whole) will perhaps yield more of a sentential type of discourse. 
195 
This second experiment attempts to bridge the gap between 
naturalistic studies (mostly longitudinal) and experimental studies (mostly 
cross-sectional) by including rationales of the two types of studies: 
1) Follow-up study (same children at two different times) 
2) Pictures and conditions (in doing this, some factors are taken 
into consideration: 
— nature of the task (cognitive demands) 
— quality of the picture (colour and print) 
— procedure (its inception) 
All this will be dealt with, in some detail, in the second experiment 
of the present study. 
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Chapter 7 
Referring expressions in Algerian pre-school 
children 
Experiment II 
7.1. Method 
7.1.1. Introduction 
The categories of discourse which are of interest, in this second 
experiment, are those which, strictly speaking, are used anaphorically. 
The personal pronouns (I, You) and the demonstrative adverbs (or 
locatives: here, there), which were under scrutiny in the first experiment, 
are dropped in the second experiment. These categories of discourse 
are hardly found because of the nature of the experiment, the purpose of 
which being the evaluation of the more intralinguistic uses of referring 
expressions. Unlike the first experiment which was designed to tackle 
both deictic and the intralinguistic uses of referring expressions by pre-
school children, the second was designed to measure the extent to which 
pre-schoolers engaged in some specific tasks (tasks which might prompt 
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the use of some aspects of discourse), use referring expressions in their 
anaphoric sense, and to track down these uses to their significance. 
In this second study, the pictures (three- and two-dimensional 
pictures) were chosen in such a way that the contents, or the protagonists 
of the story or situation or event, are the same from the first picture to the 
last (sixth picture, usually); one protagonist (a personified train, for 
instance) is introduced in some situation, and then it reappears in 
different situations. In discourse terms, a referent is introduced (indefinite 
noun or pronoun), then the same referent, together with other referents, 
reappears in different events or situations. The child is expected to use at 
first encounter with the protagonist (referent), an indefinite expression, 
then a definite one, when the same protagonist-referent reappears. In the 
present study the referring expressions of interest are more extended (1st, 
2nd and 3rd p. pronouns, indefinite and definite NP, and demonstratives) 
than the ones already investigated for European and American samples 
(c.f. works of Warden, 1976; Maratsos, 1976; Emslie and Stevenson, 
1981). On the other hand, the approach, which attempts to bridge the gap 
between naturalistic and experimental studies by including rationales of 
the two types of studies is, as was explained in the previous chapter, 
somewhat different. 
In the second study the materials were chosen to create the 
maximum of contrast between the contents of the pictures in the first part 
of the study, with one picture in the structured play with emphasis on 
naming/describing, and this second part (follow-up) with six pictures 
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having an emphasis on activities, emotions, but also including naming 
and describing. 
7.1.2. Subjects and Materials 
A total of seventy two children took part in this second experiment 
of whom fifty had also participated in the first. 
The age range goes from 4 1/2 years to 5 1/2 years, and the mean 
age is 4;11. As in the first experiment, the children participated during the 
morning playtime, between 10 and 11 o'clock. In this experiment, the 
investigator did not need to spend much time in warming-up sessions, 
since most children knew him already. The testings, as in the first 
experiment, were conducted in a corner of a quiet room in each of the 
three 'jardin d'enfants' which constituted the whole pre-school population 
of the city of Constantine. The testing room was provided with chairs and 
tables, with pictures on the walls, etc. (c.f. experiment I). The testing 
rooms in the three 'jardin d'enfants' were used at some other times by the 
teachers, and were, thus, familiar to the children. The subjects were 
tested in dyads, each child interacting with the same age partner. Each 
dyad spent, approximately, 15 minutes in the testing room with the 
experimenter. All the children have spent more than a year in the 
particular 'jardin d'enfants' where they were tested. 
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The six pictures selected from each of the two booklets chosen as 
stimulus-material (one three-dimensional and one two-dimensional) 
depict a series of activities in which the same protagonists are shown 
engaged in different actions from the first picture to the last. In the tri-
dimensional pictures category, a personified train and a bus are depicted 
racing against each other; and in the two-dimensional category, a day in 
the life of a small girl from the moment her mother goes to the office, and 
takes her to a person to look after her (a childminder), to the time when 
she comes to collect her daughter. Thus, the same protagonists 
appearing in each of the six pictures in each category is a good context in 
which to test the child's ability to use indefinite and definite NP 
appropriately (introducing a referent by an indefinite NP, and, 
subsequently, using a definite NP when the same referent reappears), 
and subsequently, the coherence and consistency in the use of personal 
pronouns. 
It may be assumed that normal pre-school urban Algerian children, 
who have been at least one year at a 'jardin d'enfants' (nursery school) 
would have no difficulty in recognizing drawings of persons, objects and 
animals in familiar environments, and engaging in some simple activities 
(playing with toys, reading and writing, eating, walking in a park, etc.). 
The pictures in the two- and three-dimensional categories were carefully 
chosen to correspond to what 4- and 5-year-olds would have already 
experienced in their nursery school activities, although these pictures 
were published in Great Britain. Therefore, the activities depicted in the 
pictures were assumed to be already familiar to urban Algerian children. 
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The basis for this judgement was from observations over the time of the 
first experiment, together with other visits to the three 'jardin d'enfants'. 
The kinds of pictures children were used to in the 'jardin d'enfants' 
were of the same qualities and quantities as the photographs and 
drawings which would be seen by a European child of the same age and 
experience. 
Beside the question of coherence and consistency in the use of 
reference, the emphasis in this experiment was not so much on the type 
of pictures -- which was the case the 1st experiment -- than on the quality 
of the pictures and the possible difference first, in the perception of a 
hand-drawn picture (first experiment) and printed picture (second 
experiment), and second, on the relative and hypothesized ease with 
which children might talk more about three dimensional pictures (objects 
pictured in relief so that children can feel their shapes) than about two-
dimensional pictures. 
7.1.3. Procedure 
In this experiment, the children were seated beside each other and 
sharing the same pictuers in the two booklets. The emphasis here is on 
the proxemic factor, as was discussed in the procedure and findings of 
the first experiment. It is assumed that for more naturalness of the 
situation, the children must see each other completely, and proxemic 
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relations would be more important for a richer referential content of their 
messages. The verbal instructions were as follows: 
a) For the three-dimensional pictures 
Experimenter: "look at these nice pictures in the book. Can you 
(and names the child) tell to (and names the other 
child) what is in the picture, and then (the other 
child) will tell you about it? Okay? 
The same instruction was repeated to the other member of the dyad. 
b) For the two-dimensional pictures: 
Experimenter: "look at these pictures, aren't they nice? Can you 
(and names the child) tell us about this picture?" 
The same question was then repeated to the other child. The 
experimenter used also probe questions to elicit the maximum of speech 
from the pair of children. 
e.g. Experimenter: "Uh uh; and do you like it? Can you say it 
again? Can you tell x about this?/etc" 
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7.2. Results and Interpretation 
Responses from the second experiment were categorised, firstly, 
with eight pairs of variables, experimenter and dyads, covering the use of 
common nouns and pronouns with the three-dimensional and two-
dimensional pictures. Sub-groupings for common nouns were the use of 
definite and indefinite articles in noun phrases and for pronouns, noun 
substitute personal pronouns and demonstrative pronouns. These results 
are shown in table 7-1. 
A second analysis is of the scores of the dyads across the four 
response types under the two conditions of two-dimensional and three-
dimensional pictures. 
A third analysis is to explore any changes in a sample of the fifty 
children measured on both occasions on the proportion of error scores 
which they made. 
7.2.1. 
The amount of talk used by the experimenter seems to be 
dependent on the children's talk according to the situation or condition 
and the category of discourse. If children find some relative difficulty in 
describing a picture (for example, the three-dimensional picture, table 7-
1) their total score is comparatively lower than the experimenter's 
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(indefinite NP category: variable 1 and 2) or approximately equal (in the 
third person singular and plural: variable 9 and 10). The reason why the 
experimenter has a higher or equal score is because he has to elicit, at 
each turn at speaking, children's speech by using not only probe 
questions but also whole descriptions of the contents of the series of 
pictures if children fail to identify and describe the contents. Children 
usually use the alternative strategy, which is to name the contents and 
only attempt short descriptions or characterisations which clearly do not 
belong to the sentential discourse type (i.e: agent introduced early in 
discourse). 
Here are some examples of non-sentential discourse in children. 
(Eliciting stimulus: picture of lorry and train racing each other). 
(child) 	 Ci "lorry" 
(experimenter) 	 E 	 "can you speak loudly?" 
C 	 "there is a lorry" 
E 	 "uh uh, and what else?" 
C 	 "it smiles (here child points to the train)" 
E 	 "yes, it smiles, you see? And it goes 'tuf tuf tuf', 
and smoke comes out from here. This is a 
train. So we have a train and a bus. What 
about the train?" 
another child (eliciting stimuli: a train and a bus are racing each other) 
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C2 "this one, her face" 
E 	 "yes, what about 'her' face?" 
C2 "she is looking" 
E 	 "yes, she is looking, but how is she? Happy or 
angry?" 
C2 "it laughs" 
E 	 "so, both of them are happy. Both are 
laughing, etc." 
In one situation (two-dimensional pictures) and with whatever 
category of discourse (definite NP and indefinite NP, 3rd p. and 
demonstratives), the children score much higher than the experimenter, 
up to 3 times (c.f. table 7-1, variable 7 and 8, 11 and 12, and, 15 and 16). 
The reason should be clear as the purpose of the experiment is to let 
children talk first and foremost, engage in a dialogue between each other 
about the picture, and to reduce to the minimum the experimenter's 
interference or participation in the dialogue between the members of the 
dyad, as much as it is allowed by the type of task and situation. 
Variables 2 and 6, in table 7-1, correspond to the experimenter's 
use of definite NP and indefinite NP in tri-D pictures, and variable 1 
corresponds to the children's use of definite NP in tri-D pictures. (tables 
7-1 and 7-2). 
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The question is: do they establish a common factor? And if there is 
such a factor, what kind of relationship does it establish? 
If we look more closely at the experimenter's scores across 
categories and conditions included within the above variables, we will 
find that the experimenter's score is higher than the dyads in definite NP 
category in tri-D pictures (882 vs. 703 for the dyads), lower in the 
indefinite NP category in tri-D pictures (243 vs. 492 for the children), and 
much lower in the indefinite NP category in two-D pictures (179 vs. 594 
for the children). This again corresponds, roughly speaking, to what we 
pointed out very generally, earlier on, to the degree of talkativeness of the 
experimenter in conjunction with the nature of the picture (tri-D or two-D 
pictures): more talk when the pictures are tri-dimensional, much less talk 
when they are two-dimensional. This, in other words, corresponds also to 
the degree of facility that the children find in talking (without much or less 
guidance) about pictures depicting typical activities of animate human 
beings, reducing considerably the experimenter's descriptions and 
interferences with children's utterances, leaving him with only few probes 
designed to elicit more speech from the successive dyads. (Here the 
interaction of the experimenter is an interaction rather than an 
interrogation, c.f. part of the procedure). Then, one possible interpretation 
of the grouping of the above variables is that, besides the fact that they all 
belong to the category of definite expressions, they establish the factor of 
consistency in the talk of the experimenter and the children in two 
different situations. 
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A second group (c.f. Appendix p304, g2), variables 15, 11, 13 and 
9 correspond to the children's use of pronouns (3rd p.) in whatever 
treatment and the use of demonstratives in whatever treatment. All of 
these discourse categories have one thing in common: they are pro-
nominals, or, in other words, they enter into the category of definite 
pronouns, which includes: he, she, it, they, that, this, these, his, hers and 
theirs. Now, after inspection of the whole speech sample, it appears that 
children's use of a 3rd person singular (it, him, her) is often after several 
uses of a demonstrative ('this one' used as a definite expression), and 
less often after a definite NP (eg. the train, or the bus). Here are some 
examples of such a typical use: 
-Tri-D pictures 	 Ci 	 " this one is not a house, it is a train" 
or 
(eliciting stimulus: C2 
a personified train). 
"this one, it laughs" etc. 
This use of pronouns also corresponds to a presuppositional usage, the 
children started to use pronouns before the use of referents. The use of a 
definite pronoun presupposes the existence of a particular, identifiable 
referent that meets all the number and gender requirements of the 
pronouns being used. 'She', for instance, presupposes the existence of a 
particular, identifiable female, etc. We have already seen, in the 
theoretical part of the thesis, that the referent for a pronoun may appear 
either as a previously introduced noun in the discourse (anaphoric 
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function) or as a physically present member of an appropriate class 
(exophoric function), though there are some cases in which the pronoun 
use is potentially ambiguous (eg. "X took Y home, so I could see her/him). 
If a definite NP is used, it is often used inconsistently, i.e.: not in the 
anaphoric use, but instead used at first mention of an element in the 
picture. A typical example of the inconsistencies in the use of the definite 
NP by most dyads: 
(Tri-D pictures: 	 Ci 	 "the lorry is happy" (1st mention of the 
stimulus: a lorry 	 referent). 
crossing a little bridge. 
Behind it a little mountain) 
and a little further another child: 
C2 	 "and the mountain" (1st mention of the 
referent). 
02 	 "`"at one the mountain (1st mention of 
the referent). 
Ci 	 "and this one, a lorry" (though being 
already introduced by a def. NP). 
And still a little further, the same child: 
C1 	 "yeah, the lorry!" 
On the other hand, if the scores of the children (c.f. table 7-1) are high in 
the use of definite NP in tri-D pictures compared to the use of indefinite 
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NP in the same category of pictures, it is mainly due to a deictic use 
(object seen, use of the demonstrative expression which is also a definite 
expression when preceding the referent, which in other words, is directly 
related to an exophoric reference). 
It was possible for most of the dyads to refer back, anaphorically, to 
an object or person named or introduced with a definite or indefinite 
expression, within the same sentence, or in the sentence coming 
immediately after the one introducing the referent. A few examples will 
serve as an illustration: 
(tri-D pictures 	 C3 	 "the train is laughing" 
eliciting stimuli, 	 E 	 "why is it laughing?" 
a train at a level 	 C3 	 "she is laughing at this one" 
crossing, and a 
bus being held at 
the gate) 
or 
C4 	 "this one is the train, it is laughing..." 
This is consistent in almost all the children of the sample, even if the 
definite NP is almost very rarely used in an identifying function, i.e. used 
at a second mention of the same referent, and this corresponds to the 
nominative use of definite NP. As discussed in the 1st experiment, this is 
a cognitively less demanding task than the identifying or anaphoric use of 
a definite NP. The picture is thus : children of 4 1/2 to 5+ years, in our 
212 
sample, use often the definite NP deictically (nominative use), but 
manage to refer to it, within the same sentence, anaphorically. 'The' is 
used before 'train' often at first encounter with the picture of the engine, 
but is referred to within the same sentence, or immediately after, 
anaphorically by 'it' or 'she' or 'her'. 
Continuing with the analysis of the dyad only groupings it can be 
seen that variable 3 (definite NP in two-D pictures) correlates highly with 
variable 11 (3rd person in two-D pictures) (r = .69, c.f. intercorrelation 
matrix, table 7-2 and G3a p3IV. One possible interpretation is that the 
extension of variable 3 to variable 11 shows that there is an underlying 
factor, which is actually the anaphoric or the cohesive factor. The use of 
the definite NP is consistent with the use of 3rd person. In sentential 
discourse they both establish and identify a cohesive factor, though in this 
case, the anaphoric use of the 3rd person is facilitated by the physical 
presence of the person or the object (actually seen in the picture), and not 
created by intralinguistic means in discourse, and therefore this use of a 
definite reference is a kind of exophoric use. One type of NP coherence 
which is of interest to us, is the use introduced early in the discourse 
(usually as agent). This type of coherence mostly receives the narrator's 
focus, and is relatively recurrent (the agent participates regularly in the 
events which compose the story being narrated, these events forming 
successive story clauses). The six pictures, in each of the two categories 
of pictures, presented to the children are about a girl, and two personified 
engines, who engage in various actions. Because this type of NP is taken 
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from picture to picture, it makes the series of pictures a coherent whole, a 
unique story (but c.f. the introduction to Experiment II, p.196). 
Two other variables, 15 and 9 can also be added to the group to 
give the highest value found for the B-coefficient (G3b, p305). 	 An 
objective procedure to ascertain the grouping of variables is Holzinger's 
B-coefficient method of factor analysis (Harman, 1976). It is useful in such 
a case as this as sample size is a critical matter as the method is based 
on the assumption that the variables of a group identifying a factor should 
have a higher intercorrelations than with other variables in the set. 
Holzinger's B-coefficient is defined as 100 times the ratio of the average 
of the intercorrelation of a subject or group of variables to their average 
correlation with all remaining variables (Harman, p.24). As a tentative 
standard of belonging together the B-coefficient of a group of variables 
should be at least 130 (ibid, p.27). 
If the use of definite NP is consistent with the use of the 3rd person 
(c.f. previous page) in sentential discourse, the anaphoric use of the 3rd 
person is facilitated by the physical presence of the object (we have seen 
that in the present study the children's use of a 3rd person singular - 'it', 
`him', 'her' - is quite often after several uses of a demonstrative, i.e. 'this 
one' used as a definite expression). This explains the groupings together 
of the variables 3, 11, 15 and 9 which represent respectively the definite 
NP, the 3rd person in two-D pictures, and the demonstrative pronouns 
(this and that) and 3rd person in two- and tri-D pictures respectively. 
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Other groupings which can be formed do not show particular dyad 
relationships but are either mixed dyad/experimenter (e.g. G4 & G5) or 
experimenter only (e.g. G8). 
7.2.2. Interpretation and discussion 
A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance on dyad responses 
across the response types (factor A) and over the two picture conditions 
(factor B) showed significant results on both factors, together with a 
significant interaction (A x B) (Tables 7-3, 7-4, Fig. 7-1). 
Let us first have a close look at the treatment means, within the 
body of the table 7-4, row by row and column by column. Because of the 
presence of a statistically significant interaction (F=6.98, with 3 and 147 df 
the 1% significant value is F = 3.91), the effects of one independent 
variable (factor B) on the production of discourse categories change 
when examining the results systematically for each level of the other 
independent variable (factor A). 
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Table 7-3 
Two-way within Anova with repeated measures on both 
factors 
Definite and Indefinite NP and 3rd person & demonstrative 
pronouns (tri- and two-dimensional pictures) 
The means are as follows: 
Treatment A (Types of Responses) 
Level 1 Mean = 14.02 (NP Def) 
Level 2 Mean = 10.93 (NP Ind) 
Level 3 Mean = 11.38 (3rd person) 
Level 4 Mean = 12.24 (demonstratives) 
Treatment B (Pictures) 
Level 1 Mean = 10.73 
	 (3-0) 
Level 2 Mean = 13.56 
	 (2-0) 
Analysis of Variance Table 
The signs '*', '$' and '£' indicate the three pairs of mean 
squares to be compared. 
Source 	 S S DF MS F 
A 	 558.61 
3 * 	 186.2 
3.87 
B 	 803.72 
1 $ 	 803.72 
15.89 
A x B 	 421.53 
3 £ 	 140.51 
6.85 
SUBS 	 7318 
49 
A x S 	 7079.77 
147 * 	 48.16 
B x S 	 2478.91 
49 $ 	 50.59 
AxBxS 	 3016.34 
147 £ 	 20.52 
TOTAL 21676.88 
399 
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Table 7-4 
Two-way anova with repeated measures on both factors. 
Cell means. 
A (response types) 
a1 	 a2 	 a3 	 a4 
def. NP) 	 (indef. NP) 	 (3rd p. 	 demonstratives 
Ex = 707 
14.14 
X ai bi 
Ex = 492 
9.84 
CC a2bi 
Ex = 454 
9.1 
5( a3b1 
Ex = 481 
9.62 
5< a4b1 
Ex = 695 Ex = 609 Ex = 684 Ex = 732 
13.9 12.02 13.68 14.64 
)Z al b2 Xa2b2 5( a3b2 3K a4b2 
tri-D 
P 
(picture 
conditions) 
two-D 
b2 
X = 10.73 
= 13.56 
X = 14.02 X=10.99 X=13.38 R = 12.24 
(very significant 
level 2 treat. B) 
(very significant 
treatment, level 1) 
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It appears that the definite NP (al) category under both treatments 
(tri-D and two-D pictures) has cell means which are very near each other: 
14.14 and 13.9, respectively; with the effect of 3-D much more prominent 
than 2-D. The picture is different when we examine the remaining 
discourse categories. The indefinite NP (a2) under the two treatments 
has two substantially different means: 9.84 (tri-D) and 12.02 (two-D). The 
3rd person pronoun and the demonstratives have much greater 
differences in their cells under the two treatments. The 3rd person 
pronoun (a3) has a mean of 9.1 under tri-D treatment, and 13.68  under a 
two-D treatment. The demonstrative pronouns (this, that) have a mean 
of9.62 under tri-D and 14.64 under two-D. Thus, the general picture is 
presented that: 
a) the four discourse categories under one specific treatment or 
condition (two-D pictures) have comparatively higher means, 
and 
b) these means are not far from each other. 
On the contrary, these same categories, under a tri-D condition, 
have much lower means than the ones under the other condition, with the 
exception of the definite NP which is as high in tri-D pictures (14.14, al bi) 
as in the two-D pictures (13.9, aibi). We will come back to this exception, 
when we will be interpreting the interaction later. 
One possible immediate interpretation is that it is perhaps easier 
for the children to talk about pictures which represent animate human 
beings which participate in an action or a dialogue (these were actually 
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the contents of the series of pictures in the two-D category), than talking 
about non-human animate objects (although personified) which are the 
contents of the tri-D pictures. When the pictures are two-dimensional, and 
the elements in the pictures are animate human beings, there is a clear 
tendency, in most dyads, to imagine whole dialogues between the 
protagonists, or whole situations in which such protagonists find 
themselves involved, in the series of pictures presented to them. 
Here are few typical examples of whole imagined dialogues: 
1st picture, two-D  
(c.f. appendix, p.34) 
Child2 
	
"the mother of the girl has sweets, her sister 
euh...this one her aunt is going to give her sweets, 
because her aunt has brought sweets, and told 
her: 'take' and then when this one got out with the 
girl, she [the other woman about to give sweets to 
a little black girl] gave her sweets, she told her 
'take all'... she told her 'I don't want" 
A little further, 3rd picture, same child 
"this is a school, the children have come to it, they 
draw and draw, and when she told him 'you draw' 
[interference of another child: 'No, no she is the 
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mistress] and she told them 'sit down' and then she 
told to this boy: 'come' to tell them: the one who 
wants to eat they give him this" [the girl was showing 
the scribbles that a little boy, in the picture, had done 
on his paper] 
Experimenter "uh huh" 
C2 	 "no, no, she said, write well, so that I'll stick them on 
the wall" 
In the two-dimensional pictures, the descriptions produced by the children 
are much longer than the ones used in the tri-dimensional pictures, but 
there are still inconsistencies in the use of the definite NP and though all 
the children use the 3rd person anaphorically after mention of a referent, 
this anaphoric use becomes inconsistent or ambiguous when there are 
many referents in the sentences they produce. Examples of such an 
egocentric use are numerous in the speech sample. To take but a few 
examples, one child talking about a two-D picture said: 
picture no. 3. two-D 
Ci 	 "this one is writing, until he finishes, she will give 
him..." 
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Another child said about a two-D picture: 
picture no. 4. two-D 
C2 	 "He has boots, his shoes and euh her daughter is 
giving her hand and she says to her 'give me...', that 
one has her hand in her pocket, and she is 
walking". 
Yet another child, also about a two-D picture: 
picture no. 5, two-D  
C3 	 "she sleeps, this one, and that one is putting her to 
sleep, she is afraid that someone takes her" 
Another example of apparent egocentric speech is the one produced by 
Sa, a girl of 4 1/2 years. What seems at first incoherent is apparently an 
extraneous story which she mixed in with the description of the picture 
(two-D) in hand: 
picture no. 2, two-D 
C4 	 "Now, this one is telling her : 'me I let down my hair', 
and then she said 'me I'm going to (...) she, is 
walking; now they do them like that, then that one is 
wearing A, she is wearing the blouse and the shoes, 
and then this one is turning to the other side, they 
have their hair cut..." 
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It appears, then, that in two-D pictures there is a tendency to 
describe and identify the persons and objects, but mainly animate 
persons. This is done, often, with an incoherent use of intralinguistic 
means (3rd person and possessives), the pronouns 'he', 'she', 'her' have 
no clear, unambiguous referents. On the other hand, most 3rd. person 
pronouns follow the use of an exophoric type of reference, i.e. when the 
referent is physically present - in this case, in the picture. We have seen 
in chapter 3, in conjunction with the discussion of the presentation of 
investigations of definite reference, deixis and pronoun, (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1977; Tanz, 1980; Charney, 1980; Chipman and deDardel, 1974, and 
Brown 1973, and others) that children's earliest uses of definite reference 
in general may seem anaphoric (reference backward) to an adult 
observer, but may actually be exophoric (reference outward), referring to 
something in the extralinguistic environment rather than to something that 
has already been introduced linguistically. 
In this experiment, the results of two-way Anova yielded a 
significant interaction (F=6.85, df 3, 147). In the first experiment, we 
interpreted the interaction (a combination of one particular treatment (SP 
condition) with one particular factor (ind. NP) as pointing out the presence 
of a developmental function (the nominative function). In the second 
experiment the def. NP category is confounding the effects of the two 
levels of treatment B (tri-D and two-D pictures). These treatments have 
almost equal effects on the definite NP, but very different effects on the 
other categories (indefinite NP, 3rd person pronouns and 
demonstratives). It seems that the apparently correct use of definite NP is 
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tied to situationally introduced referents and it is not, in fact, truly 
anaphoric. That might explain why preschool children often seem to be 
able to use correctly definite articles (and indefinite articles in two-D 
particularly) within a concrete situation, but overuse the definite article in 
referring to elements that are physically present. One might say that this 
use of definite articles to introduce a referent in a conversation may be 
exophoric in the sense that the children are trying to point to the referent 
itself - even though it is not physically present - and are, thus, ignoring its 
linguistic status. 
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7.3. Error Analysis 
7.3.1. Introduction 
a) 	 From a linguistic point of view, the object of error analysis is to 
describe the nature of the learner's interlanguage (Interlanguage' has an 
intermediate status between the codes of the mother tongue) (Li) and the 
target language (L2)). Error analysis is a comparative process. In the 
linguistic description of errors, we proceed by comparing synonymous 
utterances in the learner's dialect and the target language. Since it is 
often a question of a message expressed in two languages the task is that 
of a linguist who tries to describe an undescribed and unrecorded 
language (P. Corder, 1973). 
The key to error analysis is the systematic nature of language and 
consequently of error. The study of errors is, then, the study of the 
systematic breeching of the code: a learner makes systematic mistakes in 
a particular area for a limited time. The learner, eventually, gets the 
things right, but the transition from wrong to right is not a sudden one. 
This process will take time and the learner may pass through intermediate 
stages, each of them having its own system. The most noticeable stage is 
when the learner sometimes puts a thing right and sometimes wrong 
(inconsistency). 
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b) 	 A full description of the error in a learner's sentence involves 
explaining it in terms of the linguistic processes or rules which are being 
followed by the speaker. We infer these from the evidence of the 
learner's utterance and from others from the same learner, in which 
articles are or are not present (e.g. as in, for instance, speakers of 
Algerian Colloquial Arabic), whether correctly so or not. We need data 
about the omission of an article in order to build up some evidence for 
systems and rules which are abstractions from such linguistic data in the 
target language. 
A description of errors can be made according to degrees of depth, 
generality and abstraction. One kind of description is to classify the 
differences between the learner's interlanguage's utterance and the 
reconstructed utterance in the target language into four categories: (c.f. P. 
Corder, 1973, ch.11). 
— 'omission' of some required element 
— 'addition' of some unnecessary or incorrect element 
— 'selection' of an incorrect element 
and — `misordering' of elements. 
All these items are described at different linguistic levels, the 
phonological/orthographical, the grammatical and the lexical. 
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Here are a few examples of interlanguage's utterances and the 
reconstructed utterances in the target languages. 
English 
1) L1 original sentence 'He told me: there is a grocer shop' 
L2 reconstructed version 'He told me: there is the grocer shop' 
French 
2) L1 original sentence 'je vas a l'ecole tojours' 
L2 reconstructed version 'je vais toujours a l'ecole' 
Arabic 
3) L1 original sentence 'Ana cndi nouara' (in English = Me 
I have flower) 
L2 reconstructed version 'cridi nouaratun' (in English = I have a 
flower) 
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7.3.2. The analysis of children's errors in the present data 
The situation of a learner of a language has been compared to that 
of an infant who is in the process of acquiring his mother tongue (P. 
Corder, 1973). Thus, the language learner's utterances are in all 
circumstances not those of an adult speaker, in the same way the young 
children's utterances are accepted as different but not 'erroneous'. Both 
of these kind of utterances (the learner's and the child's) are considered 
as though they belong to a different language. 
Research which focusses on children whose second language is 
not the language of their larger social environment attempts to show that 
interference (between first and second language) tends to result from the 
'imbalance in exposure and use" (c.f. B. McLaughlin, 1988, for a detailed 
review of second language acquisition). This seems to be the case of 
Algerian school children who learn Arabic language exclusively in school 
(Algerian Colloquial Arabic being used at home and outside home, c.f. ch 
4, section 4). Pre-school children, in the present study have been 
superficially exposed for a period of a few months, and thus interference 
is much less perceptible than it could be in schooled children beyond the 
age of 6 years. This 'imbalance of exposure' would also account for 
interference, in various amounts, observed by educators and school 
psychologists (Rivers, 1964; Stern, 1970; Vey, 1946). 
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For Ervin-Tripp, (1974), situational specificity (whether the 
language is learned in isolation or in concrete situations) is an important 
factor in minimising interferences between languages; when children 
attempt to communicate at a more complex level they tend to fall back on 
their first language structures. Classroom communication might be at a 
more complex level than communication at home or on the playground, 
and that might explain why interference is more likely to be found in the 
classroom setting. 
A number of studies on this issue of interference between 
languages, and whose conclusions are based on evidence from error 
analysis, have been criticized on many grounds. Schachter and Celce-
Murcia (1977) pointed out the difficulty of knowing exactly what type of 
error a second language learner is making and why the learner makes it. 
Intralingual and interlingual factors (the developmental mistakes of the 
monolingual speaker and the mistakes which reflect the influence of the 
learner's first language on the second language, respectively) might 
confuse the type of error which is being investigated. 
A contemporary researcher on second language acquisition 
(McLaughlin, 1988) pointed out the possibility of directing one's research 
to the strategies used by individuals in acquiring a second language, and 
put less stress on the arguments over the presence/absence of 
interference from the learner's first language. But this needs more 
information about the errors made by second language learners, the 
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extent to which these errors reflect the learning situation and finally the 
structured similarities between languages. 
For the purpose of the present developmental study, the focus is 
not on hypothetical interference of children's first language (Algerian 
Colloquial Arabic on Arabic language learnt at school; Arabic language of 
which more than 50% of the vocabulary is found in Algerian Colloquial 
Arabic), but on the developmental errors which are reflected in the 
speech of the 4 and 5 years old. 
A developmental error is an error in the language use of a first and 
second language learner which is the result of a normal pattern of 
development, and which is common among language learners. To take 
an example, pre-school children might learn the rule for regular past 
tense formation and then apply it to all verbs (for instance, verbs like 
*'comed' *'goed' and *'breaked' instead of 'come', 'went' and 'broke'). 
Later on such errors disappear as the learner's language ability 
increases. In the present research, the overuse of the definite article, for 
example, enters into these kind of overgeneralisations. These 
overgeneralisations are a natural or developmental stage in language 
learning. 
On the other hand, the present study being an experimental 
investigation of pre-school children's use of referring expressions, the 
analysis of errors is done in terms of the error scores across the four 
selected categories of discourse (definite and indefinite NP, 3rd person 
and demonstratives) over the two experiments. 
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A sample of 16 children were taken randomly from the 50 in the 
study. Their 'error scores' on each of the two experiments were 
calculated in four discourse categories. These error scores were 
transformed from proportional measures (errors/total responses) to 
counteract any problem with variances, employing Arc Sine equivalents 
(Winer, 1971, pp.397-400), and then used in a two-way analysis of 
variance. 
7.3.3. Results and interpretation 
The results of the two-way anova with replications on equal groups 
within two factors (factor A = linguistic forms, factor B = conditions, SP & 
FP) showed a significant main effect A (linguistic forms) (F = 12.94, with 3 
and 120 df, the 1% significant value is = 3.95) which represents the 
indefinite NP in the SP condition (c.f. figure 7-2). This means that far 
more errors are made in the indefinite NP category than in the remaining 
other categories (definite NP, 3rd person and demonstratives). We saw, 
in the discussion of the results of the 1st experiment, that the 
overwhelming presence of a developmental function (the nominative 
funtion) is behind the use of the indefinite article in the SP condition (c.f. 
Experiment I). The indefinite article having, in this case, a naming 
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function rather than an identifying function which involves taking into 
account the listener knowledge to introduce a referent. A typical deictic 
use of children approaching 5 years, in Experiment I, was of the form: 
"this one a-x--" 
It is easier for the children to name the contents of the picture in front of 
them when the situation partly demands naming first — the idea of the 
dialogue (which requires a more social awareness of the audience and 
an actual knoweldge of its expectation) being not yet well assimilated. 
This explains why children make more errors when they use more of a 
definite reference (indefinite NP, in this case), because an appropriate 
use of the indefinite article (and the definite article) assumes the child to 
use a cognitively more demanding capacity than the one used for naming 
(where only a knowledge of class-membership is assumed) to assess his 
audience's actual knowledge and probable expectations. 
The results also showed a significant interaction (F = 15.40, with 3 
and 120 df, the 1% significant value is = 3.95) (c.f. figure 7-3). Because of 
this, the difference in errors between the linguistic forms (definite and 
indefinite NP, 3rd person and demonstratives) is not independent of the 
levels of B (conditions: SP and FP): it appears that more errors are made 
in the indefinite NP under the SP conditions. And more errors are made 
in the 3rd person under the FP condition. We can conclude that in the SP 
condition children are urged to name/describe the contents of the pictures 
(c.f. part on the procedure, Experiment I), and the one expected result is 
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that they use more of the definite reference (in this case, the indefinite 
NP), but this use is mostly deictic (pointing to and naming the object) and 
not truly anaphoric (introducing and referring back to what has been 
already introduced). This use being inconsistent, it explains the high 
proportion of errors in the indefinite NP category. In the free-play (FP) 
condition there is always an opportunity, for the children, to use a third 
person which is introduced or participating in children's narratives. But 
the use of 3rd person, in this sample, is essentially deictic (context-
specific, the referent being physically present) and not intralinguistic or 
cohesive (creating referents linguistically and maintaining, by means of 
coreferential definite forms, reference to entities, events and objects 
introduced earlier in the discourse). 3rd person use in the rising fives is 
often incoherent (not often continuous with a definite expression, c.f. 
discussion of Experiment I), and this explains why the more the children 
have an opportunity to use a 3rd person, as in the FP condition, the 
higher the proportion of errors. 
The results of the second experiment are consistent with those of 
the first experiment. 5 year old children, in this sample, overuse the 
indefinite article (when the use of the definite article is more appropriate, 
the referent being already introduced) and do the same with the definite 
article (a definite article being used instead of an indefinite article when 
they need to introduce a new referent). These errors are consistent with 
what Power and Dal Martello (1986) call the 'incoherent error' and the 
`egocentric error'. The first type of error (Incoherent error') corresponds 
to the use of an indefinite article in a context in which a listener is already 
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familiar with the referent (and thus giving the listener the false impression 
that a new individual, or object, was being introduced into the story or 
narrative). In the second type of error ('egocentric error'), the speaker 
might use the definite article in a context in which the listener was not yet 
familiar with the referent. 
We have seen in the discussion of the results of the second 
experiment that children produce longer descriptions in the two-
dimensional pictures condition than in the tri-dimensional pictures 
condition, in spite of the inconsistencies in the use of the definite NP and 
ambiguous use of 3rd person in the presence of many referents 
(egocentric use). The interaction in the 2nd experiment (F = 4.83, with 3 
and 120 df, the 1% value is F = 3.95) (c.f. figure 7-4) shows that there is a 
high proportion of errors in the indefinite NP and the demonstratives in 
the two-D pictures (the production of more linguistic forms depending on 
level 1 of factor B, which corresponds to two-D pictures). The more the 
children produce of these linguistic forms (indefinite NP and 
demonstrative in this case), the more they are prone to error in the use of 
such forms. 
There is a relationship which is established between the indefinite 
NP and the demonstratives, shown in the graphic representation of the 
interaction in the error scores (c.f. figure 7-4). This could be explained by 
the fact that when naming/describing an object (in the picture) 5-year-old 
children, in this sample, use such typical sentences as: 
"That's a _x_" or "this one a –x—" 
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with a demonstrative in an agentive position and the indefinite article in its 
nominative function. 
7.3.4. Discussion 
Experimental studies of children acquiring French (Bresson et al, 
1970; Bresson, 1974) and other Romance languages (c.f. review by 
Clark, 1985) show that 4- and 5-year-olds also have some difficulty 
learning to use the definite and indefinite articles. Like children acquiring 
other languages (Warden, 1976, with English children; Mills, 1985, with 
German Children; and Algerian children in the present study), they tend to 
overuse the definite article. 
The general consensus, from these studies, is that these errors 
seem to result from children's relative lack of skill in keeping track of what 
they and their addressee mutually know about any particular topic. 
For example, in the Bresson et al study (1970) all the 4- and 5-
year-olds, like in the present study, used the indefinite article 
appropriately in naming things, e.g. 'c'est un mouton' (It's a sheep) (which 
we found, in the present study, as corresponding to a 'developmental 
function', c.f. Experiment I). But when the indefinite article is needed in 
order to refer to one or more of a set of like objects, children used 
consistently the definite article instead. 
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In one experiment, in the Bressen et al study (1970), the 
investigator removed some sheep from a number of others, and asks "qui 
est parti?" (who went away?). Four-year-olds would reply * 'Les moutons 
sont partis, les moutons sont restes' (the sheep went away, other sheep 
stayed) instead of 'des moutons sont partis, des moutons sont restes' (a 
more sophisticated answer would have been : 'quelques moutons sont 
partis, d'autres sont restes') (some sheep went away, some sheep 
stayed). 
Four-year-olds in Bresson et al's study (1970) used the indefinite 
article 'un' (a) and 'des' (some) 50% of the time in such contexts, and five-
year-olds did worse, using the indefinite only 31% of the time. These 
findings are also compatible with Warden's results of experiments with 
English children (1976), which were discussed earlier, in chapter 3. In 
the context of these typical errors children produce in the course of 
acquiring their mother tongues, Warden's conclusion about the uses of 
the indefinite article is worth reconsidering. 
In Warden's study, it is only after 9 that children showed full 
mastery of the indefinite article for nonspecific references, like those 
needed in answering the questions "qui est parti?", in Bresson et al 
(1970). The general conclusion from Warden's study (1976) and from the 
present one (c.f. Experiment I, p189 and p221, Experiment II) concerning 
definite referring expressions, is that the overuse of the definite article 
appears to be the result of children's failures to appreciate that their 
addressees do not necessarily know what they, as speakers, know. 
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In the same context of studies Karmiloff-Smith (1977; 1978; 1979) 
investigated French-speaking children's use of articles (c.f. section 2 of 
chapter 3 of the present study), from the point of view of their 
plurifunctionality: articles have mutliple meanings that vary with context, 
and it seems that because of that children take time to acquire them. 
Karmiloff-Smith attempted to show that, basically, children's initial usage 
of articles and other forms of determiners depended heavily on the 
identification of a single meaning or function for each term. If their initial 
uses of articles 'le' and `un' (`the' and 'a') with `meme' and `autre' (`some' 
and 'other') did not reveal obvious errors, later on, however, when they 
began to switch from the interpretations of 'same kind' to 'same one', they 
frequently created new (often ungrammatical), forms to carry the 
additional meanings they were trying to express. 
In the present study, four- to four-and-half-years-olds in the first 
experiment produced more indefinite NP than any other category of 
discourse included in the design (definite NP, 1st and 2nd person, 3rd 
person and demonstratives), in the structured play condition. We 
interpreted this as being mostly deictic and not truly anaphoric. This 
inconsistent use explains the high proportion of errors in this category. 
In the second experiment, six months later, the same children 
(approaching five or already five years old) produced more definite NP, in 
one condition, i.e. two-dimensional pictures. This is due partly to the 
nature of the stimulus (brightly coloured pictures representing animate 
human beings paticipating in actions or in a dialogue), and partly due to 
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their age, though this is confounded by the conditions to which the 
children were submitted, as it was seen in the discussion of the 
experiments. 
The consequence of this is that children used longer descriptions 
with a frequent use of definite reference (in this case, definite NP). We 
interpreted the apparently correct use of definite NP that it is tied to 
situationally introduced referents and that it is not truly anaphoric. That 
explains, partly, why pre-school children often seem to use correctly 
definite articles in a concrete situation, but overuse the definite article in 
referring to features that are physically present. This corresponds to a 
kind of 'egocentric error' where the children are actually using the definite 
article in a context where they need to use an indefinite article. 
In the general discussion of the hypotheses and the findings of the 
present study, an attempt will be made to relate the present research with 
some recurring idea in the developmental literature. Namely, that the 
learning of the rules of language use to decide which forms to use in 
which context, together with the ability to take into account the listener 
when formulating a message are two major requirements for the 
development of language. 
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Chapter 8 
Putting it all together: referring expressions in 
Algerian urban pre-school children 
8.1. Discussion of the hypotheses: situational opportunity 
and animacy of topical referents 
An attempt at a comparison between the results of the 1st 
experiment and those of the 2nd experiment, in terms of the amount of 
speech all through the four categories of discourse (def. NP; Ind. NP; 3rd 
person and demonstratives) produced by the children, will reveal 
interesting differences as to the scores (c.f. table 8-1). The two tests were 
administered at two different periods, separated by an interval of about 6 
months. In the construction of the test-situation, it was hypothesized that 
children would produce more speech and longer utterances, if the 
situation created for the two members of the dyad was such that there was 
a close-range of the play-space between the subjects, i.e., the mutual 
distance were as short as possible. In other words, the proxemic factor -
the distance between the peer in a dyadic interactive situation - is a 
condition which is going to influence the pattern of production and 
construction of utterances, a pattern which allows for an expected richer 
referential content. One study in this direction (Bokus and Shugar, 1984) 
suggested that children are highly sensitive to the proxemic factor in that it 
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determined their perception of the relations between play spaces 
allocated to self and to the dyadic partner. But more will be said about 
this later on. 
In the first experiment, the mutual distance was less than 50 cm, in 
the structured play situation, and still less in the free-play situation. In the 
second experiment, the children were seated beside each other and were 
sharing the same pictures of a small booklet, and these pictures were of a 
better quality than the ones used in the first experiment. The quality of the 
picture was the second factor involved in the experimental task. 
Thus, in the first experiment the pictures were hand-drawn with 
bright colours, but less action (in the standard picture shown to the dyads 
most elements look static, with only two persons facing each other and 
standing up. This was the structured play condition (S.P). In the free-play 
condition (F.P), each member of the dyad chooses freely pictures, stories, 
etc., to talk about). In the 2nd experiment, there were printed pictures, 
with bright colours, and more action. A series of six pictures making up a 
coherent whole - the same protagonists appeared from the 1st picture to 
the last, and engaged in different actions. The pictures in the 2nd 
experiment were of two kinds: tri-dimensional and two-dimensional 
pictures. These function as two different conditions, or treatments in the 
statistical design, instead of the S.P (structured play) and F.P (free-play) 
conditions of the 1st experiment. Since the children in the 1st experiment 
talked more in the SP condition, as it is shown by the results of the 1st 
experiment (c.f. table 6-1 and 6-2) than in the FP condition, mainly 
because of a sustained guidance and elicitation of speech by the 
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Table 8 - 1 
Experiment 1: scores of children in both age ranges (3;8 - 4;4) 
and 4;4 - 5;0) subjects = 60 
Common Nouns Pronouns Demonstratives 
Def. NP Ind. NP 
._ 
3rd person demonstrative 
pronouns 
S P + 159 X = 2.6 554 	 X = 4.2 125 5( = 2.08 283 	 X = 4.7 
F P+ 1 9 9 174 269 1 0 1 
= 5.8 = 12.1 X = 6.5 X = 6.4 
(N = 60) (N = 60) (N = 60) (N = 60) 
(N = 60) 
X = 18.5 
X = 12.3 
Experiment 2: scores of children between 4;4 and 5;4 years. 
subjects = 50 
Common Nouns Pronouns Demonstratives 
Def. NP 
_ 
Ind. NP 3rd person 
.... 
demonstrative 
pronouns 
3-DP+ 703 X = 14.06 492 	 X = 9.8 510 X = 10.02 500 	 X = 10 
2- D P+ 695  594 684 732 
X = 27.9 X = 27.7 = 23.8 = 24.6 
(N = 50) (N = 50) (N = 50) (N = 50) 
+SP = Structured Play 
FP = Free Play 
3-DP = Tri-Dimensional pictures 
2-DP = Two-dimensional pictures 
(N = 50) 
X = 44.1 
X = 54.1 
experimenter, it was decided to keep the SP condition as a framework 
within which the two treatments (two-D and tri-D pictures) are used. The 
focus in these two series of pictures is on animacy, which is another factor 
built in the hypotheses of the present study. But again a distinction is 
taken into consideration, which is animacy in participant non-human, 
mechanical objects though personified (thereby making their perception 
near that of human beings: a train and a bus in the tri-D pictures), and 
animacy in participant human beings. 
Thus one of the hypotheses could have also been stated like this: 
given the situational opportunity and the nature of the task, it is possible to 
trigger the cohesive (or metapragmatic) use of speech in pre-school 
children. 
Let us explain this in more detail. An intralinguistic use (linguistic 
sign to linguistic sign, or an indexical relationship strictly within the 
context of an utterance) and ultimately a metapragmatic use (speech 
referring to speech, or the use of speech in one situation to refer to 
speech uttered in another situation) could be made possible, i.e. could be 
shown to be realizable, by the nature of the situation and the task: a short 
distance between the same age partners, a guidance in the form of 
probes by the experimenter and focussing on animacy 
(animate/inanimate) and participation in speech events (participant/non-
participant). In other words, the situation (short distance between 
members of the dyad) and the contents of the pictures-task (human 
beings engaged in action and dialogue) could ultimately trigger the 
cohesive (or metapragmatic) use of speech which is hypothesized as 
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being continuous with the early deictic uses of referring expressions (this, 
that, there, etc.,), as was stated in the introduction of the present study. 
The use of linguistic signs to indicate intralinguistic relationships - that 
contribute to the cohesive or "text-forming" function - within the linguistic 
context is hypothesized, in the developmental literature, as a further 
development of the early deictic use of referring expressions (or the ones 
used to refer to non-linguistic entities of the immediate environment). But 
to what extent do situational opportunity and all the other factors just 
named play a role in the overall cohesive properties of children's 
narrative discourse? 
At an inspection of the results of the second experiment we pointed 
out, in the previous chapter, high means of the four discourse categories 
in one condition (two-D pictures). The interpretation was that children find 
it relatively easy to talk about pictures representing animate human 
beings participating in an action or a dialogue. And the tendency in the 
children is to imagine whole dialogues in these circumstances: i.e. human 
beings depicted as being engaged in action or dialogue. The fourth 
picture, within the two-D category, representing a woman with three small 
children taking their lunch (the woman was represented with her face 
turned towards a small boy, and as if she was talking to that boy) was 
apparently the one which drew most attention from the dyads. They were 
more talkative about it, and some engaged into a dialogue or imagined a 
dialogue between the mother and the small boy. On the other hand, 
children, in the 2nd experiment, produced longer descriptions in two-D 
than in tri-D pictures, in spite of some inconsistencies in the use of definite 
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NP, and ambiguous anaphoric use of 3rd person, in the presence of 
many referents; this was again an example of egocentric use. 
In general, there is a tendency, in the children, to describe and 
identify persons and objects which are animate, but essentially animate 
persons in two-D category. This was done often with incoherent 
intralinguistic means (3rd p. and possessives), and the 3rd p. used mostly 
after an exophoric type of reference, a characteristic which has been 
pointed out in the general discussion of other studies of referring 
expressions in the previous chapters. The apparently correct use of the 
def. NP is tied to situationally introduced referent and not truly anaphoric. 
This explains, partly, why pre-school children seem often to use correctly 
definite articles (indef. articles in tri-D particularly) in a concrete situation, 
but overuse the def. article in referring to features that are physically 
present (c.f. Karmiloff-Smith, 1977; 1979). 
The situational opportunity somewhat triggering a richer referential 
content, and the factor of animacy and participation in speech events as 
being a potential influence on children's production of speech (longer 
utterances), and cohesive uses, have also been recognized by such 
developmentalists as Bokus and Shugar (1984; 1986) and Hickman 
(1985). 
The hypothesis, in the Bokus and Shugar study (1984) is that 
children of the same age and involved in a free-play situation start 
interaction by constructing utterances, according to two different patterns 
depending on the proxemic relations of their action fields: they produce 
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short utterances lacking in referential content when the mutual distance is 
greater, and longer utterances with richer referential content, when the 
mutual distance is lesser. 
The play-space (close-range, far-range) was thus a critical factor, 
the child, apparently, is using "different kinds of utterances depending on 
whether his play space is adjacent or overlapping with that of the partner 
or whether it is farther removed..." (Bokus & Shugar, 1984, p. 332); the 
child's expectancies, about how the other partner will respond to given 
types of utterances, being taken as reliable, in spite of the fact that 
children start interaction sequences in conditions of unfamiliarity with 
each other and with the play setting (unaffected by habitual experiences 
linked to partner and place). 
The conclusion from their findings is that in child-adult interaction, 
children learn from adults practical procedures and norms of socio-
cultural life, whereas in child-child interaction "children build their own 
mutual relations socializing each other and themselves" (Bokus & 
Shugar, 1984, p. 333) 
In a recent developmental study (1986), Bokus and Shugar 
recognized one factor pertaining to the situational condition which was 
affecting the performance level. This factor was understood in terms of 
perception of situational opportunity in the narrator, in one case allowing 
for fuller access to sources of material for linguistic manipulation, both 
external and internal, and in the other restricting the access. Evidence for 
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this interpretation was found in an analysis of reference situations serving 
as topic sources for constructing narratives. 
The findings of this empirically based study of the consequences of 
differential conditions in which pre-school children present their 
knowledge in the form of picture-based narratives to an equally engaged 
adult listener, lead them to believe that what is at issue is the 
psychological function of a sense of freedom of choice. This function 
seems to enter strongly into the performance of a communicative task 
such as the one they studied, and in the given conditions can determine 
the quality and successfulness of the child's performance. 
This seems to be in accordance with Vygotsky's developmental 
theory that adult-child interaction is the basis for development of higher 
mental functions in the individual. An understanding of the developing 
rate, scope and use of knowledge accretion about objects, events, 
situations and relationships is crucial for an understanding of the 
development of young children's language skill. 
In some earlier studies (Bates, 1975; Cazden, 1970; and Shatz, 
1974), the situation is indeed a controlling variable in other ways for 
determining the amount, the topic, and the forms of messages in 
discourse. In some others (Cooperman, 1970 (in Cazden, 1970); 
Freedle, Lewis and Winer, 1974) children have also been observed to 
talk more often and to use longer utterances when they initiated the topic 
of conversation. In this context, Bates (1975) and Shatz (1974) observed, 
in children from 2 to 4 years, differences in the initiation of topics in 
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situations that differ according to the activity, the participants and the 
extent to which the children can control the events that are happening. 
In Hickmann (1985), the data indicates that both animacy 
(animate/inanimate) and participation in speech events (participants/non-
participants) played a role in the overall cohesive properties of children's 
narrative discourse. In her study (c.f. chapter III, section 2, of the present 
study), children, in general, organized their narratives around highly 
presupposed and "topical" animate referents (4-year-olds used highly 
presupposed and deictic forms such as "it", "this", "here", "there", in such 
utterances where the indefinite article was used to indicate class 
membership of a referent denoted deictically, e.g. "it's a dog", "here's a 
dog"). But 4 to 7 year-olds have a tendency to presuppose all animate 
referents from the first mention on, instead of using intralinguistic means 
to first create them in discourse. In other words, pre-school children, 
according to Hickmann (1985), have difficulties 'introducing' linguistically 
'all' animate referents (participants or non-participants in a speech event) 
with effective forms that create a presupposition of the existence and 
specificity of such referents. 
It was pointed out earlier that children, in the present study, tended 
to describe and identify persons and objects which are animate, but with 
often incoherent intralinguistic means (3rd p. s. and possessives), that 
their descriptions are longer in spite of some inconsistencies in the use of 
def. NP, that the anaphoric use of the 3rd p. was often ambiguous, when 
the child is faced with many referents. Pre-school children in the present 
study, and in Hickmann (1985), generally, when they objectify speech 
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events that occurred in another speech situation, tended not to distinguish 
between the reported message and the narrative message in the 
immediate speech situation, as in the following examples (from the 
present study, experiment II). 
(Picture No. 3, tri-D pictures) 
B = "they are waiting for the train, and that one is thinking about 
these ones so that "I take them', they say to him, and then he 
is doing his mouth like that" 
and in Hickmann (1985) 
Type I stories (4-year olds) 
C = "the donkey is angry...because "I put my toys in the 
box...Now I bring that to school..." 
E = "uh huh" 
C = 	 "I think you're trying to 'trick' me...I'm not...' "You are - you h - 
you...took it. I am very angry at you". No...You don't 
understand me!" 
E = "uh huh" 
C = 	 "Well I...I'm your friend. Let's go and play." "OK." etc. 
In these two examples, the two children pass indifferently from narrative 
speech to reported speech in the first and second persons ["and that one 
is thinking about these one so that "I take them..." (Exp. II, present study) 
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- "The donkey is angry...because "I put my toys in the box..." etc. 
(Hickmann, 1985)] 
They afterwards simply carry on, reproducing the dialogue in the 1st and 
2nd p, without any 3rd p. frames. 
Thus, it appears that in the present study situational opportunity and 
animacy played an effective role in influencing the pattern of production 
and construction of utterances (richer referential content). However, in 
spite of their relative easiness to talk (to describe and identify) more 
about pictures representing animate referents (mostly animate human 
beings participating in an action or a dialogue), pre-school children, in the 
present study, have difficulties in using intralinguistic means (third person 
forms) and metapragmatic frames (reporting dialogic events that occurred 
in another situation). 
To organize their own discourse, young children should rely strictly 
on linguistic means. This organizing capacity involves the use of 
intralinguistic means to 'create' referents linguistically and to maintain, in 
subsequent discourse, reference to them, and, on the other hand, the use 
of metapragmatic framing devices to objectify speech events and 
transform them into cohesive texts. This was consonant with the findings 
of Hickmann (1985) and Karmiloff-Smith (1977;1979). 
If we can say something about the overall quality of the pictures, it 
appears that children, in the present study, found it relatively easy to talk 
more and use longer utterances when the stimulus presented to them is 
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in the form of brightly coloured printed pictures. When the pictures are 
hand-drawn even though brightly coloured, children in the first 
experiment of the present study, tend to produce short utterances, mostly 
of the nominative type (e.g. "I've got...(a noun), or: "that's...(a noun)), with 
few intralinguistic means. 
b) Some hypotheses about the understanding of pictorial 
representations. 
We have already discussed the factor of animacy as being one of the 
essential reasons behind a comparatively richer referential content in the 
second experiment than in the first experiment, but this is not the only 
reason. This might have to do with the children's ability to watch and 
understand pictures. Cazden (1972) has discussed the importance of 
children's understanding of pictorial representation and acceptance of 
pictorial conventions. The acceptance of pictorial conventions can 
influence the ways in which children respond to task stimuli. Thus, it 
would appear that children's interpretations of social conventions as 
represented in pictures can influence their responses to pictures when, 
for example, they interpret the shading conventions of graphics either as 
light shadows or as dirt or depiction of 'dirty' (Rosenthal, in Cazden, 1972, 
p. 266). 
Some investigators (Deregowsky, 1976; 1968 a & b; Hagen, 1974) 
attempted to show that the inability to rightly interpret pictures by non-
western (rural African) subjects [being shown the Hudson pictures (1967) 
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involving an African hunter (with spear about to be thrown), an elephant, 
an antelope, and a tree, all represented in line drawings; the aim of this 
study was to see how people interpret depth shown in pictures], does not 
imply that these subjects are not capable of viewing pictures as 
representations of three-dimensional space. Other workers (Jahoda and 
McGurk, 1974a; 1974b) studied children from diverse cultural and 
geographical areas (Chinese, African and European children from 4 to 10 
years). They asked these children to make three-dimensional models of 
pictured situations. Children's accuracy in model-building increased with 
age and showed only significant between-culture differences. It appears 
that, even four-year-olds are capable of estimating - fairly reasonably - the 
real size and spatial relations of depicted objects, though the presence of 
more pictorial cues will result in a better size estimation, whereas a better 
estimation of spatial relations by pre-schoolers is possible on the basis of 
a limited number of pictorial cues. It could be said that 'cues' are simply 
the way in which depth is represented by the perceptual system. 
In Constantine - the setting of the present study - as in Algiers or any 
other non-European or non-American urban area, children of pre-school 
and school age are provided with stimulation very much akin to what 
European children might experience in an urban environment. Being 
urban and frequenting the 'jardin d'enfants' for at least one year, the 
sample of children of the present study have, on the whole, no difficulty in 
detecting, recognizing and identifying most elements in the experimental 
pictures. 
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In Deregowsky (1968a) a distinction is made of the above skills 
needed for the perception, understanding and interpretation of visual 
representations. 'Detection' is the realization that one is not looking at 
meaningless blotches of paper, but that these, in fact, represent 
something meaningful. Pictorial 'recognition' means a person can match 
a picture of an object with the object, and with 'identification', the viewer 
goes further; he can name the object pictured by the artist and the 
photographer. 
Deregowsky (1968b) showed to a small sample of schoolchildren 
and a few adults in Zambia, models and photographs of familiar animals 
(zebra, elephant) and unfamiliar animals (camel, polar bear). The 
subjects had no trouble in detecting pictures and photographs, but they 
experienced more difficulty in recognizing unfamiliar animals, especially 
in matching the photograph image with the solid object. As to the 
identification of pictorial items, Wober (1975) suggested that, instead of 
asking children questions which may make them socially uncomfortable, 
and consequently may result in answers which may not be entirely 
related to how they actually see the pictures shown by the experimenter, 
the best way is to devise ingenious experiments, directly related to the 
subjects' interests. For Wober (1975) the misinterpretation of pictures 
occurs especially with less educated observers, and with those pictures 
which involve in general unfamiliar pictorial conventions (such as the 
horizon line). On the other hand, pictorial cues, according to Van Geert 
(1983) are part of a system of coherent but impoverished pictorial cues of 
space which belong to contradictory system of cues, present in the 
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pictures, between three-dimensional space (to which pictorial cues refer) 
and two-dimensional space (binocular, kinesthetic and motion cues). 
And to know how children learn to cope with such a contradiction, a 
researcher "must not only take into account the child's growing mastery of 
the 'optical ecology', but also the pedagogical efforts of a culture in which 
'looking at pictures' is a very important aspect of everyday life" (Van 
Geert, 1983, p. 91-92). 
The pre-school children in the present study have spent at least one 
year in the 'jardin d'enfants' (nursery school), and were consequently 
used to 'looking at pictures', if they were not already used to viewing 
pictures at home. However, some difficulties in the recognition of pictorial 
conventions pertaining more to the mastery of the 'optical ecology' in 
children, were observed in some subjects. 
A 5-year-old girl interpreted a contour of a line of trees supposed to 
be a wood and coloured in green, in the sixth picture of the two-
dimensional category, as a 'mountain'. She continued her interpretation 
of the picture (after the experimenter had given her the right interpretation 
of the green contour as being tree shown in perspective) like this: 
A = 	 "mountain, always the paper..."[?] [was she trying to say that 
in the paper mountains are always drawn like that?] 
F (another 5-year-old girl) = "but they are not like this, euh..." 
E = 	 "What's that they have not, F...?" 
F = 	 "this" [pointing to the ground, in the picture] 
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A = 	 "the ground, the grass" 
E . 	 "the grass [the green colour of the grass was of a different 
hue than the green of the contour of trees]." 
If the colour is the source of the misinterpretation of a line of trees, in 
another picture of the two-dimensional category, the misinterpretation 
was due, apparently, to a not yet familiar pictorial convention to 5-year-
olds: the representation of a person 'behind' an object. In the picture, a 
woman was shown pushing a pram in which there was a small child. 
Represented, front view, the woman's feet were not seen in the picture. A 
5-year-old boy, Y, said about this picture that the woman is "above him, 
and she is sitting". For Y, the woman was "above him" as if she was 
standing up on the back of the pram. A conventional interpretation of this 
representation would have been done according to the other 'cues 
concurring to the overall interpretation of the situation: two other girls 
were accompanying the woman and were depicted stretching on their 
feet, on a green ground. The interpretation is therefore that they are all 
walking in a park. 
Such 'errors' in the recognition of a composite of cues representing 
movement or depth in the artist's view, are partly due to the attention the 
child gives to constructing a dramatic (effective) account of what the 
picture shows him. 
In Hudson' (1967) and Mundy-Castle (1966)' studies of visual 
representation, subjects (primary school children in Africa) have named a 
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line which was intended to be the outline of a hill, as a snake, and a road 
drawn as receding into the distance, has been called 'poles', or a ladder, 
or an elephant trap. And in the present study, again the same types of 
'errors' in interpretation were done by some 5-year-olds. Thus, L, a 5-
year-old boy, said about a barrier - in the 3-D category of pictures - which 
separated the railway tracks from a road, the tracks cutting through that 
road, that it was a 'bridge'. L, as some other 5-year-olds in the sample, 
could have taken the road for a stream. The same child had difficulties in 
interpreting the conventions of showing perspective and distance in the 
pictures, and in talking about a lorry set against a green roadside, said 
that "the big lorry" was in "a garden". 
In the picture, the perspective drawing sets the lorry, which is on a 
bridge at the left of the picture, against the green roadside with some 
bushes and small trees in view behind the lorry. With the same types of 
pictures, using depth perception, horizon line, as with Hudson's test 
(1967), some workers (Kilbride, Robins and Freeman, 1968) showed that 
perspective cue is significantly correlated with educational experience. In 
such tests, subjects are usually asked to interpret pictorial depth between 
separate objects. All the above named researchers noted that the correct 
identification of tri-dimensional objects, represented in pictures two-
dimensionally, and the inference of the distances between objects (and 
the relative size of far and near objects) is a matter of specifically directed 
education. On the other hand, for some psychologists (Hagen, 1976; 
Van Geert, 1983), it is not until 12 years that children fully acquire the 
picture concept, though it is now commonly recognized that children, as 
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early as 3 years of age, manifest an ability to watch and understand 
pictures. But the recognition and identification of depicted objects in 
natural circumstances (such as watching picture books), for young 
children, is not like the recognition of otherwise very impoverished and 
abstracted pictures of objects of the three-dimensional space, as those 
represented in some experimental tasks. The first task (i.e. looking at 
picture books, and recognition and identification of objects in picture 
books) is comparatively easier than the second (e.g. estimation of 
distance and size of, say, geometrical forms), because of less ambiguity 
of the perceptual information in the first task. 
The conclusion of a theoretical study of the development of picture 
perception (P. Van Geert, 1983), is that researchers in this particular field 
should take into consideration the functionality of the picture, which turns 
around the picture as a composite of actions expressing the purpose and 
meaning of picture making and use. If such a functional value has been 
hidden or is not known, then the results of experimental studies will not 
tell much about perception. 
In the next section, there will be an attempt to summarize the findings 
of the present study, and in the conclusion an appreciation of the 
meaning of the present approach and findings, finally ending up by 
asking some questions on the future of developmental research on 
aspects of language use in young children. 
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8.2. Summary and conclusion 
Overall, the results of the present study, together with examples from 
experimental data, indicate that the function of the definite article may 
initially be predominantly exophoric or deictic, in as much as this function 
signals a particular object or the actions of one salient object singled out 
from a group of others in the extralinguistic context. The results of the first 
experiment showed that personal pronouns ('I', 'You') are typically 
'exophoric', since they refer to aspects of the non-linguistic context, and 
by contrast 3rd person pronouns ('he', 'she', 'it', 'they') are essentially 
intralinguistic or cohesive. Similarly, in the second experiment, the 
results concerning the definite NP do agree with Karmiloff-Smith's 
findings about the deictic function of the definite article (which sometimes 
is used correctly, when the object is alone, and at some other time it is 
used incorrectly in the instance of a non-specific reference). This, in fact, 
is quite different from an anaphoric or extralinguistic function: it grew out 
from the present data that the apparently correct use of the definite NP is 
tied to situationally introduced referent, and that it is not, in fact, truly 
anaphoric. 
On the other hand, according to the results of some researchers 
(Tanz, 1977; Maratsos, 1976), children can differentiate definite from 
indefinite reference to some extent reasonably early, though it might take 
some time for that differentiation to become reliable for an adult listener. 
For some other researchers (Karmiloff-Smith, 1977; 1979; Warden, 1976; 
Hickmann, 1985; and the present study), cohesive uses and interpretation 
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of referring expressions are a relatively late development, and early 
definite reference (i.e. early use of the definite article) is exophoric rather 
than anaphoric. To illustrate this, in the interpretation of the results of the 
second experiment of the present study, a tendency was found in the 5-
year-olds to describe and identify mainly animate human beings 
(depicted in the pictures), and this was done with an incoherent use of 
intralinguistic means (i.e., 3rd person pronouns and possessives). On the 
other hand 3rd person use was essentially exophoric (referent physically 
present, i.e. in the pictures they have in front of them). The general 
discussion of the second experiment emphasized the fact that children's 
earliest uses of definite reference in general may seem anaphoric, or 
reference backward, to an adult observer, while this use may actually be 
exophoric, i.e., reference outward, or essentially referring to something in 
the extralinguistic environment rather than to something that has been 
introduced linguistically. In this respect, the findings of the present study 
are supporting Karmiloff-Smith's (1979) and Warden's (1976) results 
concerning the 5-year-olds. The results of the present investigation also 
support partially Hawkins' (1969) results as to the use of exophoric 
reference for the 4- and 5-year-olds, but disagree with Hawkins' findings 
that the tendency to use pronouns instead of nouns as heads of a 
sentence is a characteristic of only the lower-class children, since in the 
present study this was found invariably at the age of 4 to 5 years in all 
social classes without distinction. 
It was pointed out in the interpretation and in a subsequent 
discussion of the result of the first experiment that the articles 'a' in the 
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case of an identifying expression and 'the' in the definite reference, 
involve a task which is cognitively more demanding than the one implied 
in naming (nominative function). Naming, it was argued, involves only a 
grasp of the class membership - an individual class member. Cognitively 
speaking, the semantic distinction involved in identifying a definite 
reference requires from the child a specification of the uniqueness of the 
referent, i.e. the speaker/participant is referring to a particular example(s) 
of a class of things. Research in this area (Emslie and Stevenson, 1981; 
Warden, 1976) tends to show that the first use, i.e. naming, is cognitively 
simpler than the second use, which corresponds to the identification of a 
definite reference. 
One important hypothesis in the present study was that the cohesive 
uses of referring expressions, and their interpretation and recognition 
without difficulty by children, are relatively late developments. The results 
showed that neither the 4-year-olds nor the 5-year-olds in this follow-up 
study, showed an appropriate use of the definite and indefinite articles. 
These results seem to be partly due to the children's understanding of the 
situation in which they find themselves involved (i.e. picture identification 
and description to the same age partner). Children of the age-range 4-5 
years seem to be more sensitive, in such a situation, to the naming 
function, which mostly involves questions-answers, and these results are 
also partly due to the difficulty in engaging in real dialogue. 
Children seem to ignore the requirements of the dialogue with the 
same age partner. Real dialogue requires more social awareness of the 
audience (the partner in this case), and an actual knowledge of its 
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expectations. This is, in fact, the same requirement, from the children, of 
an appropriate use of the two articles 'a' and 'the'. For that matter, the 
speaker-participant is assumed to use a cognitively more demanding 
capacity than the one for naming, to assess his audience's actual 
knowledge and probable expectations. And this reflexion is directly 
related to another question in the formulation of the problem as to the 
conventions of discourse: is there enough proof of egocentric speech in 
pre-school children? Studies by Brown (1973), Maratsos (1976), Warden 
(1976) found that children, when they come to introduce a referent known 
to themselves but unknown to the listener, use the definite article. It was 
argued, in these studies, that pre-school children, in general, fail to take 
into account the listener's knowledge. We stated, throughout the present 
study, that the first mention of a new referent in a discourse is 
conventionally accomplished by the use of the indefinite article. 
Subsequent mention of that referent can then be made by the use of the 
definite article, since the referent is known to both speaker and listener. 
This initial inappropriate use of the indefinite article was judged by most 
researchers in the area of definite reference, as leading to a failure in 
communication as the listener does not fully understand the intended 
referent. 
For Warden (1976), the acquisition of the function of articles is a slow 
process, with the final function, i.e. the use of the indefinite article to 
introduce a new function, appearing around the age of nine years. In 
Warden's study, if the 5-year-olds can be non-egocentric in their use of 
referring expressions (e.g. when using demonstratives), they are still 
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grappling with the implications of non-egocentricity for the use of the 
articles. And this difficulty was attributed to the dual function of the 
indefinite (it either indicates an indefinite referent or a specific but 
previously unidentified referent. In the former function, a speaker need 
only consult his own knowledge of a referent, in the second, he must take 
account of his listener's knowledge). And it was suggested in Warden 
(1976) that pre-school children may be forced to rely on the definite article 
until they have mastered the identifying function of the indefinite article. 
The mastery of this function will depend on an awareness of children's 
audiences' point of view. 
The view adopted in the present research, and which was expanded 
in the theoretical chapters, introduces 'communicative competence' from 
the perspective of language use. Such a perspective combines different 
levels of analysis. This includes: 
1) the acts (communicative) performed with words, 
2) the functions that speech acts and speech events serve to 
meet the need of indidivuals, 
3) the understanding and use of information not explicit in the 
literal meaning of a meaning (conversational implicative) and 
presupposition 
and, in a little more detail, 
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4) the necessity for using information from the listener and the 
context for deciding among alternative forms of messages 
(e.g. definite and indefinite reference). 
An attempt was thus made to explore, from the above perspective, 
ways in which Algerian children talk about (or describe) objects and 
objects relations, events, and activities, through language. This is the first 
attempt to describe some aspects of discourse in Algerian pre-school 
children, which is made by an investigator who can be presumed to know 
the culturally appropriate ways of speaking to and interacting with 
Algerian children, since he is a member of the speech community to 
which the children belong. 
In the experimental procedure of the present research, the situation 
and the tasks were manipulated in order to create the maximum of 
opportunity for the children to use certain forms which yield more of a 
sentential (anaphoric) type of discourse, when talking about the objects, 
events and relations that the tasks describe. 
One important hypothesis in the present research is that, given the 
situational opportunity (children sitting beside each other) and the nature 
of the task (quality of the pictures, plus a series of pictures making a 
coherent whole, and involving human beings participating in action or 
dialogue), it is possible to trigger the cohesive use of speech in pre-
school children. 
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Conditions were built up in the design of experiments (structured 
play/free play in the 1st experiment, and tri-dimensional pictures/two-
dimensional pictures in the 2nd experiment), in order to create the 
maximum of contrast between the nature of stimuli (nature of the pictures 
and their contents) and the type of discourse categories used (definite vs 
indefinite NP; 1st and 2nd person vs 3rd person; and the demonstrative 
uses). 
The immediate result was that children, in this sample, find it 
relatively easy to talk about pictures representing animate human beings 
mostly engaged in actions or in a dialogue. 
The results of the first experiment showed a predominant presence 
of a developmental function (the nominative use of the definite reference, 
in this case: the indefinite NP) and a consistency in the appearance of 
such function across categories (the deictic uses) developmentally 
associated with this function. This developmental function is, in our view, 
a normal pattern of development, and perhaps the most consistent pattern 
of development which is reflected in the 4-year-olds in their attempt to 
recognize the basic functions of the articles. This may be a first step 
towards the recognition, later on, of the multiple functions or meanings of 
the articles (c.f. Karmiloff-Smith, 1979). 
The results of the 2nd experiment showed that children use longer 
descriptions in two-D pictures than in tri-D pictures, but with some 
inconsistencies in the use of the definite NP, and an ambiguous 
anaphoric use of 3rd person in the presence of many referents. 
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The findings in the present study show that, in general, there is a 
tendency, in the pre-school children, to describe and identify persons and 
objects in more detail when presented with pictures showing essentially 
animate objects, e.g. persons engaged in actions in the two-D pictures. 
This was done often with incoherent intralinguistic means (3rd person 
and possessives), and the 3rd person was mostly after an exophoric type 
of reference (referring to aspects of the non-linguistic context). 
Thus, it appears that 4- and 5-year-olds, in the present study, find 
some difficulties in using intralinguistic means (i.e. the use of the third 
person forms in order to create referents in discourse), and difficulties in 
reporting dialogic events that occurred in another situation — or, in other 
words, difficulties in using metapragmatic devices. 
The present findings are consonant with a current hypothesis in the 
developmental literature, and which goes back to the work of Brown 
(1973). This hypothesis states that single forms or words used to talk 
about events and participants are learned first, while alternative forms 
(shifting reference) appear later in children's speech because their use, 
and the rules which underlie them, involve judgement about the situation, 
the social status of the listener and the needs of the listener. 
The closely related hypothesis is that forms or words are intially 
unifunctional before they become plurifunctional (c.f. Karmiloff-Smith, 
1979). And that, in a sense, would help us to understand why deictic use 
appears before the anaphoric one (c.f. Lyons, 1975, 1977). 
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We have attempted to show, in this section, how the present 
research and findings are related to previous works in this area of 
developmental research, and, at the same time, how it has extended it, in 
that it is unique in dealing with a particular language, and culture, which 
have not been studied before in the developing child. 
To conclude the present research, we can again point out a criticism 
levelled at aspects of some other works (Maratsos, 1976; Hawkins, 1969), 
which is that the production of referring expressions, in Warden (1976) 
and in the above-named studies, is influenced by context both verbal and 
non-verbal. The physical presence of both referents and audience may 
have encouraged the use of definite references, particularly by young 
children. 
The other remark which could be made is that these researchers 
tend to draw on adult-based conceptual frameworks, i.e. models drawn 
from the work of grammarians, linguists and/or psychologists, and 
subsequently children's performances are compared to the adult model. 
As one recent researcher in the area (Garton, 1983) remarked, to analyze 
"data from children in terms of the correct or incorrect use of the simple 
contrast ['the' and 'a'] could lead to the misrepresentation and an 
underestimation of the child's semantic and pragmatic knowledge" 
(Garton, 1983, pp. 523-524). 
To resume the arguments presented above, the problem which has 
been tackled so far (is there enough proof of egocentric speech?) is 
decidedly a function of the approach one adopts, whether to regard the 
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indefinite and definite articles in terms of contrastive systems (e.g. Brown, 
1973; Warden , 1976), or within a broader system of determination (e.g. 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1977; 1979; Garton, 1983). Thus, drawing on the 
previous works on the anaphoric use of definite and indefinite reference, 
and on the basis of the results of the present study, it is current to think 
that children's difficulties in using definite and indefinite reference can be 
explained by the complex linguistic analyses required for the appropriate 
uses - e.g. the anaphoric reference - of the articles and pronouns, rather 
than to think in terms of 'inability' or 'failure' to take into account the 
listener's viewpoint or knowledge. In other words, the question is exactly 
how young children know that the listener's knowledge differed from their 
own and whether one can say that they could or could not reliably use 
definite and indefinite articles to reflect their appreciation of the difference. 
This, perhaps, would require from the researcher in child language to 
regard the child as an active hypothesis-testing learner of language, 
which would provide him/her with the possibility of shedding some light 
on the ways in which children acquire their language by studying the 
systematicity and regularities the child is imposing on his/her use of 
articles. Such a possibility would perhaps help us to understand, how we 
should be conducting research into other aspects of language 
development. 
The present investigation of referring expressions was started by the 
formulation of some questions, within the framework of the hypotheses on 
which this research is based, and there was an attempt to find some 
possible answers to those questions, but in the face of the available 
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evidence about pre-school children's use of referring expressions, and, in 
general, about some characteristics of children's language use, this study 
is more likely to end up by posing some questions which are still in need 
of more probable answers. 
First, is it appropriate to hypothesize (this was actually done by De 
Hart and Maratsos, talking about presuppositional usages, 1984) that the 
child simply registers a great amount of information about conversational 
situations, regardless of salience (i.e. saliency of the forms used and 
aspects of the situation)? 
If a developmental relationship could be established between deictic 
and anaphoric person pronouns (as was discussed so far in the present 
study), what kind of specific test should one construct, and how could one 
account for that kind of relationship? On the other hand, if the available 
data on aspects of language use (presuppositional terms for instance) 
present scant evidence developmentally, is it because we are still in need 
of looking at the real roots of the acquisition process? 
Many more questions, equally important, on aspects of language 
use in young children, and in relation to this research and to the 
development of communication in general, remain to be asked and 
appropriately formulated, and these will need, in turn, some effective 
answers. 
What was found in the present study of referring expressions in pre-
school children is one result, among the hundreds of findings turning 
around specific but very old questions, which, I hope, would add to the 
268 
numerous and rapidly growing building pieces of the edifice of child 
language. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
This appendix contains: 
1) raw scores used for the different statistical tests carried out on 
the data. The calculations of the correlations and intercorrelations and 
the analysis of covariance being too numerous, only the series of Analysis 
of Variance, performed on the scores in the two experiments, are 
included. 
2) The calculation of the B's-coefficient for the different 
groupings of variables. 
3) The pictures used in the two experiments of the present 
study. 
Appendix 2 
Total speech sample collected for the purpose of the present research. 
This is contained in two IBM compatible disks. 
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n•••• n•••, 
7 
DESIGN 7 - TWO WAY MIXED DESIGN - 161W. 
Oataset: Linguistic Forms 
DATA 
B (REPEATED MEASURES) 
1 
1 
I 
14 
17.=. 
• 
:5 
16 
17 
7 13 
1S E 1:2) 
19 1 16 
21 
2A 
25 4 14 
25 
23 --.  ,.,.  ... . _., 
2g 18 1: 
70 11 :6 
1 
4 
74 
3 
7S 
1 iS 
4 7 
45 
287 
52 
53 
54 
SE 
SzF, 
57 
SE 
• 	 59 
50 
2 
2 
	
18 
	
12 
	
5 
	
14 
16 
18 
	
10 
	 14 
1 
F 
=INALYS:::: OF VAIANCE lABLE 
fF,CURCE 
     
MS 
       
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
	 39 
Mali-, Effect 
Error for A 	 1875.E 	 JO 
WITHIN SUCJECT:"; 
Main Lffect, 6 	 261.01 
]nte;.action A X 	 4.4; 
Error for E; 
Total 
  
44;48.93 
	
119 
    
MEANS 
Level a 1 	 Mean 	 '3.950 
Level a 2 Mean 
S (REPEATED MEASURES') 
LPvei b 1 	 Mean = 	 5.983 
Level b 2 Mean 	 12.467 
CELL MEANS 
	
a 1 b 1 = 	 5.90 
	
a f b 1 = 	 5.07 
IbL 
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a 2 b 2 = 	 11.93 
Date: 04-06-1990 
Time: 13:57:31 
A 
DESIGN 11A - THREE WAY ANOVA - MIXED: 16 2W 
Dataset: Common Nouns 
DATA 
A 
1 
E,  
• 
1 
5 
e-. 
0 
3 
31 
35 
:9 
2 
..._ . 4._ 
14  
16 4E, 
17 2 47 
IC; 4E 
19 2 49 
1•n•  
20 SC 
21 
- 
_ 51 
--, 
.- 8 52 2 
23 5 57 
 
24 0 54 1 
25 0 55 
,., 25 2 56 
 
27 2 _ 57 10 
-,- 
_o 
1 
SS J: 
7,9 
_ 
59 4 
:0 60 
 
1 
C.; Z2 21 
34 
5 0 35 
6 
3 3'3 
:9 
10 1 
;1 3 41 
12 2 42 
47 
; 4 
290 
291 
15 	 3 45 
16 	 4 46 
17 	 0 47 
16 	 0 48 
19 	 16 49 
20 	 3 50 
21 	 6 51 
22 	 0 52 
23 	 S 53  
	
1:4 	 .:.--I 	 54 	 -4 
	
25 	 7.; 	 7,5  
	
26 	 5 56  
	
27 	 0 57 	 15 
C. 	 2 55 	 12 
	
29 	 0 59 	 14 
	
30 	 1 50  
••• 
••••••••••n•••••••• • 
1 71 
•••• ••••• •••• ••••• 	 ••••• 	 ••n••••• 	  
2 
2 — 32 11 
3 73 4 
5 C :5 — 
:,: 7E, ,•,, 
•••• •••• 
	
• '. . st 	 - .- 
_ 	 - id. • 
• • , 	 - ".. 
,- 	 fi? : = .. A: 
„...1.-.;-,t, • .1 
.,- 
-
,---e 	 ‘: 	 ' 
 
, 
3 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
••••• 
4 
2. 
• • 
. . 
••• •`,/ 
7,,::- 
C 
.-".. 
.._, ...., 
6 3 : 3 11 
— 10 7 15 
, 
,..-. '3 39 20 
10 6 40 14 
12 • • — 42 10 
14 12 44  
15 15 45 10 
16 7 46 9 
17 9 47  
18 "' 48  
19 6 49 14 
20 -, 50 10 
21 7. 1 4 
22 , 
0 53 
— 54 
2.5 
26' 
57 
23 13 53 
10 59 14 
14 GO 
1 
WI 
1 E; 4 ... 	 : 46  
1 6 C 43 
13 .E: 43 
20 5 ;.--'C, 
21 6 51 
--,- 
—.4 4 52  
,,... 
24 0 54 
d—, ....., 1 55 
25 2 5.6 
 
.7.'E, 
 
2,,,-, _ Sc' 
- 	 30 ,-, .., 60 
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MEANS 
FACTOR A 
Level 1 	 Mean = 
Level 2 	 Mean = 
 
 
4.250 
4.963 
FACT, OP 6 (REPEATED MEAsuRcC) 
Level I 	 Mean = 	 2_9'32 
Level 2 	 Mean = 	 6.242 
FACTOR C ( REPEATED mEASURES1 
Level 	 Mean = 	 6.042 
Level 2 	 Mean = 
	
).192 
MEANS FOic, INTERACTTONE: 
7WO-WAY 
Ac: 
a 1 b a 	 Mean = 
a. 1 b 2 	 Mean = 	 967 
J-,2b1 	 Mean 
a 	 7 	 mean 	 r.S17  
AC: 
alcl 	 Mean = 
	
S.650 
C 	 me-an . 	 L_SE,;) 
a 2 c 1 	 Mean = 	 6.433 
a 2 c 2 	 Mean = 
SC: 
b 1..-: I 	 Mean = 	 2.aS7 
t 1 c. : 	 ri&an - 	 -.Z.. 
b 2 c I 	 Mean = 	 9.417 
b 2 c .:. 	 mean = 
	
:.067 
-HREE-WAY 
ABC: 
.ait1z 	 lean = 	 2.00 
a 1 b 1 	 2 Mean = 	 2.567 
a 1 b 2 	 mean = 
a 1 b 	 - Mean = 
a 2 b 	 Mean .  
a 2 b 1 c 2 mean = 	 4.067 
cx 2b2zi Mean = 	 10.033 
	
2 b 2 c 2 Mean = 	 1.000 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE 
SOURCE so 	 OF MS 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
Main Effect A 
Error for P 
910.73 
	
32.27 	 1 	 32.27 
	
373.47 	 sa 	 15.1 
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WITHIN SUBJECTS 3880.00 180 
Main Effect 6 633.75 1 633.75 55.09 
Interaction A x B 2.02 1 2.02 0.18 
Error for 	 B 667.23 58 11.50 
Main Effect C 487.35 1 487.35 29.90 
Interaction A x C 0.15 1 0.15 0.01 
Error for 	 C 045.0 16.30 
Interaction 6 x C 735.00 1 735.00 110.75 
Interaction ABC 4.07 1 24.07 3.63 
Error 	 for BC 334.93 50 6.64 
Total 4790.73 239 
Cate: 04-06-1990 
Time: 14:23:1,=, 
DESIGN 11A - THREE WAY ANOVA - MIXED: 1B 2W 
Dataset: Pronouns 
DATA 
A 
1 	 2 
C 
S 	 S 
B 
1 
1 
1 5 31 13 
2 5 32 16 
3 9 33 18 
4 r 34 17 
5 31 35 18 
6 15 36 15 
7 9 37 
S 10 38 5 
9 0 39 10 
10 0 40 11 
11 12 41 14 
12 21 42 13 
13 12 43 17 
14 10 44 16 
15 12 45 IG 
16 3 46 10 
17 1 47 10 
18 1 45 4 
19 0 49 5 
20 11 50 23 
21 12 51 27 
22 2 52 12 
23 2 53 16 
24 0 54 0 
25 0 55 1 
26 18 56 27 
27 17 57 28 
2S 4 55 15 
29 1 59 17 
30 5 60 2 
2 
1 1 31 1 
2 0 32 
3 0 33 9 
4 0 34 7 
5 0 33 
6 0 36 
7 1 37 5 
7 38 3 
9 1 39 3 
10 3 40 5 
11 0 41 0 
12 0 42 0 
13 4 43 0 
14 3 44 
.11 
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. . -i, 
	
:.- 	 - ‘ '. 
	
::,'. 	 I 
15 7 45 0 
16 0 46 . 0 
17 3 47 0 
18 1 48 0 
19 8 49 0 
20 4 50 1 
21 0 51 1 
22 0 52 2 
23 3 53 6 
24 2 54 6 
25 4 55 15 
26 15 56 6 
27 3 57 6 
2S 10 58 7 
29 4 59 5 
30 5 60 29 
2 
1 
1 0 31 0 
2 0 32 0 
3 0 33 1 
4 1 34 2 
5 11 3:d 1 
6 5 36 1 
7 5 37 0 
3 35 0 
9 0 39 1 
10 0 40 0 
11 1 41 0 
12 0 42 0 
13 1 43 0 
14 2 44 1 
15 7 45 3 
16 2 46 0 
17 0 47 0 
18 6 48 8 
19 1 49 4 
20 2 50 1 
21 2 51 2 
22 0 52 0 
23 6 53 2 
24 6 54 2 
25 3 35 1 
26 0 56 
27 1 57 4 
28 5 5S 0 
29 0 59 1 
30 7 60 9 
2 
1 2 31 1 
2 4 32 1 
3 0 33 S 
4 0 34 11 
5 0 35 0 
6 0 36 , 
— 
, 37 5 
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S 10 33 5 
9 5 39 2 
10 1 40 12 
11 0 41 0 
12 0 42 4 
13 2 43 0 
14 2 44 6 
15 7 45 7 
16 0 46 0 
17 1 47 1 
13 5 45 0 
19 1 49 0 
20 3 50 4 
21 0 51 1 
22 0 52 15 
23 7 53 10 
24 2 54 15 
25 14 55 13 
26 12 56 15 
27 3 .:7 15 
25 2 55 5 
29 5 59 3 
30 6 60 9 
MEANS 
FACTOR A 
Level 	 Mean = 
	
4.233 
Level 	 Mean = 	 6.325 
FACTOR B (REPEATED MEASURES) 
Level 1 	 Mean = 	 7.275 
Level 2 	 Mean = 	 3.253 
FACTOR C (REPEATED MEASURES) 
Level 1 	 Mean = 
	
6.467 
Level 2 	 Mean = 	 4.092 
MEANS FOR INTERACTIONS 
TWO-WAY 
AB: 
.... 
	 albl 	 Mean = 
	
5.550 
a 1 b 2 	 lean = 	 2.917 
a 2 b 1 	 Mean = 
	
9.000 
a 2 b 2 	 Mean = 	 3.650 
AC: 
alcl 	 Mean = 
	
5.333 
a 1 c 2 	 Mean = 
	
3.133 
a 2 c I 	 Mean = 	 7.600 
a 2 c 2 	 Mean = 
	
5.050 
BC: 
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blcl 	 Mean = 
b I c 2 	 Mean 
b 2 c I 	 Mean = 
b 2 c 2 	 Mean 
10.850 
3.700 
2.083 
4.483 
THREE-WAY 
ABC: 
alblc' 
a 1 b 1 c 2 
alb2c1 
alb2c2 
a 2b1c1 
a 2b1c2 
a 2b2c1 
a 2b2c2 
Mean = S.033 
lean = 3.067 
lean = 2.633 
Mean = 3.200 
Mean = 13.667 
Mean = 4.333 
Mean = 1.533 
Mean = 5.767 
ANALYSIS OF 
SS 
2167.05 
VARIANCE TABLE 
DF 
59 
MS 
262.50 262.50 7.99 
1904.54 55 32.84 
7445.26 130 
956.00 1 956.00 55.39 
110.70 1 110.70 6.41 
1001.04 5S 17.2C 
335.44 1 338.44 9.71 
1.84 1 1.84 0.05 
2021.48 5S 34.85 
1365.04 1 1368.04 56.45 
242.00 1 242.00 9.99 
1405.71 55 24.24 
9612.30 239 
SOURCE 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
Main Effect A 
Error for A 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
Main Effect B 
Interaction A x B 
Error for B 
Main Effect C 
Interaction A x C 
Error for C 
Interaction B x C 
Interaction ABC 
Error for BC 
Total 
Date: 04-06-1990 
Time: 14:53:04 
DESIGN 11A - THREE WAY ANOVA - MIXED: 1B 2W 
Dataset: Indexical Functions 
DATA 
A 
1 
	
2 
S 	 S 
B 
1 
1 
1 	 0 	 31 	 3 
2 	 1 	 32 	 0 
3 	 2 33 
4 	 0 34 	 1 
5 	 16 	 35 	 4 
6 	 S 
	 36 	 2 
7 	 37 	 1 
5 35 	 2 
9 	 0 39 
10 	 0 	 40 	 2 
11 	 1 	 41 
12 	 0 42 
	 1 
13 	 1 	 43 
14 	 2 44 	 1 
3 	 9 	 45 	 4 
16 	 7 46 
	 0 
17 	 4 47 
	 2 
IS 	 9 	 48 	 20 
19 	 11 49 	 35 
20 	 3 50 
21 	 31 	 9 
22 	 2 52 	 0 
23 	 7 53 	 1 
24 	 9 54 	 3 
25 
	 3 
	 55 	 4 
26 	 6 56 	 4 
27 	 2 57 	 4 
2S 	 0 39 	 9 
29 	 10 39 
	 3 
30 	 17 60 	 0 
2 
	
1 	 2 31 	 0 
	
2 	 S 32 	 0 
	
3 	 0 33 	 0 
	
4 	 0 34 	 0 
	
5 	 0 35 
	 0 
	
6 	 0 36 
	
2 
	
7 	 0 37 	 0 
	
5 	 2 3S 	 0 
	
9 	 5 39 
	
0 
	
10 	 3 40 	 1 
	
11 	 0 	 41 	 0 
	
12 	 0 42 
	
1 
	
13 	 0 	 43 
	
0 
0 	 44. 	 1 
1.1 
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15 1 45 4 
16 7 46 0 
17 0 47 4 
18 2 48 0 
19 0 49 0 
20 2 50 0 
21 0 51 3 
22 0 52 0 
23 0 53 0 
24 2 54 4 
25 C 55 3 
26 12 56 5 
27 0 57 0 
28 17 55 1 
29 0 39 2 
30 1 60 5 
1 
1 0 31 0 
2 1 32 0 
3 0 33 15 
4 ' 34 5 
5 0 35 5 
6 0 36 1 
7 5 37 0 
S 0 35 0 
9 0 39 1 
10 0 40 1 
11 0 41 0 
12 _ 42 1 
13 0 43 2 
14 0 44 1 
15 2 45 2 
16 0 46 3 
17 0 47 3 
18 6 45 1 
19 5 49 1 
20 1 50 5 
21 1 51 3 
22 3 52 0 
23 0 33 0 
24 2 , 54 0 
25 1 55 0 
26 0 56 6 
27 3 57 4 
28 5 55 3 
29 3 59 1 
30 4 60 0 
2 
1 6 31 0 
2 0 32 0 
3 0 33 2 
4 0 34 0 
5 0 35 0 
6 3 36 0 
7 37 0 
300 
8 0 38 0 
9 0 39 0 
10 0 40 4 
11 0 41 0 
12 2 42 0 
13 0 43 0 
14 0 44 0 
15 0 45 0 
16 0 46 0 
17 0 47 1 
15 0 45 0 
19 0 49 0 
20 3 50 0 
21 0 51 0 
22 0 52 0 
23 0 53 0 
24 0 54 2 
25 0 55 1 
26 0 56 1 
27 2 :77 2 
28 1 35 0 
29 1 59 0 
30 2 60 2 
MEANS 
FACTOR A 
Level 	 Mean = 	 2.225 
Level 	 Mean = 	 2.167 
FACTOR B (REPEATED MEASURES) 
Level 1 	 Mean = 	 3.225 
Level 2 	 Mean = 	 1.167 
FACTOR C (REPEATED MEASURES) 
Level 1 	 Mean = 	 3.292 
Level 2 	 Mean = 
	 1.100 
MEANS FOR INTERACTIONS 
TWO-WAY 
AB: 
albl 	 lean = 
a 1 b 2 	 Mean = 
a 2 b I 	 Mean = 
a 2 b 2 	 Mean = 
AC: 
alcl 	 Mean = 
a 1 c 2 	 Mean = 
a 2 c 1 	 Mean = 
a 2 c 2 	 Mean = 
BC: 
3.483 
0.967 
2.967 
1.367 
3.100 
1.350 
3.483 
0.850 
301 
blcl 
b 1 c 2 
b 2 c 1 
b 2 c 2 
Mean = 
Mean = 
Mean = 
Mean = 
. 4.783 
1.667 
1.800 
0.533 
, 
THREE-WAY 
ABC: 
alblcl 
alb1c2 
alb2c1 
alb2c2 
a 2b1c1 
a 2b1c2 
a 2b2c1 
a 2 b 2 c 2 
Mean = 4.533 
Mean = 2.133 
Mean = 1.367 
Mean = 0.567 
Mean = 4.733 
Mean = 1.200 
Mean = 2.233 
Mean = 0.500 
ANALYSIS OF 
SS 
VARIANCE TABLE 
DF 
737.55 59 
0.20 1 
737.34 55 
3000.25 150 
254.20 1 
12.60 1 
704.94 55 
256.20 1 
11.70 1 
996.84 58 
51.34 1 
0.04 1 
780.38 55 
3737.50 239 
SOURCE 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
Main Effect A 
Error for A 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
Main Effect B 
Interaction A x B 
Error for B 
Main Effect C 
Interaction A x C 
Error for C 
Interaction B x C 
• Interaction ABC 
Error for BC 
Total 
ns 
  
0.2 
12.7, 
254.20 
12.60 
12.15 
235.20 
11.70 
15.46 
51.34 
0.04 
13.45 
0.02 
20.91 
1.04 
15.64 
0.76 
3.52 
0.00 
 
   
Date: 04-06-1990 
Time: 14:37:44 
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TWO WAY ANOVA 
REPEATED MEASURES ON BOTH FACTORS 
DATA 
A 
1 4 
B 
1 
S 
	
1 	 12 	 5 	 11 
	
15 	 12 
	
10 	 12 	 17 
	
4 	 "--+, 
	
-- 	 7 	 28 	 14 
	
14 	 14 	 5 	 S 
	
6 	 20 	 19 	 6 	 5 
	
7 	 7 , 	 13 	 7 	 6 
	
e 	 11 	 11 	 4 	 12 
	
9 	 8 	 ,J 	 7 	 7 
	
10 	 22 --	 11 	 17 	 7 
	
11 	 7 	 9 	 , 
	
- 	 0 
	
12 	 37 	 10 	 11 	 12 
	
13 	 7 	 7 	 6 	 6 
	
14 	 6 	 7 	 9 	 -1- .... 
	
15 	 7 	 17 	 4 	 22 ..... 
	
16 	 14 	 7 	 5 	 .::. ,-,m- ,J 
	
17 	 -I," 
	
...:. 	 7 	 13  
	
18 	 13 	 7 	 15 	 18 
	
19 	 11 	 9 	 5 	 0 
	
5 	 5 	 1 
	
21 	 lo 	 15 	 14 	 8 
	
22 	 7 	 4 	 4 	 0 
	
,-1-7 	 -,, 	 4 	 11 	 16 
	
.,..... 	 ... 
	
24 	 16 	 6 	 12 	 13 
	
,-,..- 	 11 	 16 	 17 	 6 ....., 
	
26 	 18 	 8 	 18 	 8 
	
27 	 7 	 11 	 4 	 7 
	
28 	 10 	 5 	 5 	 11 
	
29 	 16 	 7 	 13 	 15 
	
30 	 6 	 10 	 4 	 9 
	
31 	 16 	 9 	 4 	 ,J 
	
-7,-, 	 12 	 8 	 7 	 11 „... 
	
74 	 6 	 7' 	 7 	 10 
	
75 	 16 	 19 	 = 
	
,J 	 5 
	
76 	 11 
	 1 	 , 	 10 
	
77 	 - 
	
5 	 17 	 6 
	
78 	 10 	 6 	
43 	
14 
	
79 	 13 	 26 	 1 ., 	 21 
	
40 	 24 	 19 	 16 	 5 
	45 	
_ 	
27 	 12 
	
46 	 4 	 13 
	
47 	 36 	 9 
	
48 	 39 	 12 
	
49 	 4 	 8 
	
50 	 13 	 9 
S 
	
1 	 7 	 6 	 4 	
,.- 
.g. ..J 
- 
	
^, 
	
l0 	 16 	 6 	 19 
	
3 	 1B 	 8 	 - - , ... 	 24 
	
4 	 13 	 6 	 28 	 21 
	
5 ,..)	 1 1 	 20 	 8 	 7 
	
6 	 11 	 27 	 17 	 13 
	
7 	 13 	 21 	 19 	 27  -7 , 
	
8 	 9 	 11 	 9 	 20 
	
9 	 7 	 3 	 7 	 6 
	
10 	 17 	 10 	 17 	 18 
	
11 	 1 	 10 	 8 	 8 
	
12 	 26 	 17 	 13 	 12 
	
1 3 	 , - 
	
- ; 	 2 	 22 --t 
	
-	 2 1 
	
14 	 13 	 :." 	 11 	 11 
	
15 	 13 	 10 	 9 	 11 
	
16 	 18 	 11 	 24 	 29 
17 
	
11 	 77 	 13 
	
18 	 30 	 12 	 31 	 27 
	
19 	 19 	 13 	 12 	 11 
	
20 	 16 	 12 	 5 	 10 
	
21 	 11 	 8 	 11 	 10 
,,, 
	
4.44:4 	 B 	 12 	 7 	 15 
	
,..., -7 	 1 8 	 9 	 1 8 	 -7,-7 
	
.4.-4: 	 4:4, 
	
24 	 15 	 12 	 10 	 11 
	
25 .‘. -40 	 1 6 	 14 	 17 	 11 
	
26 	 31 	 15 	 26 	 27 
	
27 	 4 	 6 	 10 	 9 ..-.. , 
	
2B 	 Q 	 6 	 11 	 14 
	
29 	 4 	 1 	 4 	 1 
	
30 	 2 ..,_ 	 6 	 1 	 3 
	
31 	 16 	 6 	 17 	 15 
	
32 
	
7-~ 	 14 	 13 	 ,, 4,4.4:4 
	
33 	 0 	 7 	 3 ,	 -7 , 
	
34 	 3 	 3 ...	 1 3 	 7 
	
35 	 20 	 17 	 14 	 20 
	
36 	 15 	 15 	 12 	 19 
	
37 	 - ,-.- 
	
, 	 11 	 ....... 	 16 
	
38 	 1 3 	 12 	 11 	 10 
	
39 	 9 	 Z2 7,_	 6 	 15 
	
40 	 10 	 24 	 14 	 6 
	
41 	 12 	 19 	 7 	
,,, 4:44._ 
	
42 	 14 	 8 	 6 	
,,, 
........... 
	
43 	 14 	 25 
	
9 	 15 
	
44 	 18 	 18 	 12 	 15 
	
45 
	
33 	 20 	 .... --,,,.... 	 15 
	
46 	 16 	 10 	 8 	 7 
	
47 
	
1B 	 19 	 16 	 13 
	
48 	 , -!.. 
	
...,, 
	
16 	 19 	 17 
	
49 	 4 	 6, 	 4 	 .., -) 
	
50 	 S 	 7, 	 11 	 -, ..._. 
304 
19 
11 
18 
4 
_ 
9 
4 
20 
21 
10 
THE MEANS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
nAJA-) 	
,) 	 s 
The means are as follows: 
Treatment A 
Level 1 Mean = 14.02 
Level 2 Mean = 10.93 
Level 3 Mean = 11.38 
Level 4 Mean = 12.24 
Treatment B 
Level 1 Mean = 10.73 
Level 2 Mean = 13.56 
F Table 
The signs 1*', 1$' and 1£1 indicate the three pairs of mean 
squares to be compared. 
F Source 	 S S 
A 	 558.61 
B 803.72 
A x B 	 421.53 
SUBS 7318 
A x S 	 7079.77 
B x S 	 2478.91 
AxBxS 3016.34 
	
DF 	 MS 
	
3 	 * 186.2 
	
1 
	 $ 803.72 
	
3 	 £ 140.51 
49 
	
147 	
• 	
48.16 
	
49 	 $ 	 50.59 
	
147 
	 £ 	 20.52 
3.87 
15.89 
6.85 
TOTAL 21676.88 
399 
FACTOR ANALYSIS: Holzinger's B Coefficient 
Calculations of B Coefficient. 
Formula: BCi = 200 (n-v)S/(v-1)T 
G1 
Variables 
a) (7,8) 
b) (7,8,2) 
c) (7,8,2,1) 
B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.6514) / (2 - 1) (6.1554) 
= 296.31 
296 
B = 200 (16 - 3) (1.7489) / (3 - 1) (7.227) 
= 314.15 
= 314 
B = 200 (16 - 4) (3.1785) / (4 - 1) (7.4915) 
= 339.42 
= 339 
d) (7,8,2,1,6) 
	
	 B = 200 (16 - 5) (4.6686) / (5 - 1) (7.9166) 
324.34 
= 324 
G2 
Variables 
a) (15,11) 
	
	
B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.4904) / (2 - 1) (4.2854) 
= 320.41 
= 320 
b) (15, 11, 13) 
	
	
B = 200 (16 - 3) (1.3245) / (3 - 1) (5.1477) 
= 334.48 
= 334 
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c) (15,11,13,9) 	 B = 200 (16 - 4) (2.5426) / (4 - 1) (5.5371) 
= 367.35 
= 367 
G3 
Variables 
a) (3,11) 
b) (3,11,15) 
c) (3,11,15,9) 
B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.6935) / (2 - 1) (4.3705) 
444.23 
= 444 
B = 200 (16 - 3) (1.642) / (3 - 1) (4.3073) 
= 495.57 
= 496 
B = 200 (16 - 4) (2.9317) / (4 - 1) (4.5535) 
= 515.06 
= 515 
G4 
Variables 
a) (7,5) 
b) (7,5,2) 
B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.6433) / (2 - 1) (4.0509) 
= 444.65 
= 445 
B = 200 (16 - 3) (1.6967) / (3 - 1) (5.2207) 
422.49 
= 422 
B = 200 (16 - 4) (3.1537) / (4 - 1) (5.5658) 
= 453.29 
= 453 
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G5 
Variables 
a) (1,7) 
b) (1,7,2) 
B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.5861) / (2 - 1) (6.1406) 
= 267.25 
= 267 
B = 200 (16 - 3) (1.634) / (3 - 1) (7.3214) 
= 290.13 
= 290 
B = 200 (16 - 4) (2.8521) / (4 - 1) (8.2915) 
= 275.18 
= 275 
G6 
Variables 
a) (6,2) 
b) (6,2,1) 
B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.5159) / (2 - 1) (5.6511) 
= 255.61 
= 256 
B = 200 (16 - 3) (1.3641) / (3 - 1) (7.0684) 
= 250.88 
= 251 
c) (6,2,1,8) 	 B = 200 (16 - 4) (2.5292) / (4 - 1) (7.9963) 
= 253.03 
= 253 
308 
G7 
Variables 
a) (1,2) 
b) (1,2,8) 
c) (1 ,2,8,4) 
d) (1,2,8,4,6) 
B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.4811) / (2 - 1) (5.4281) 
= 248.16 
= 248 
B = 200 (16 - 3) (1.3742) / (3 - 1) (6.901) 
= 258.86 
= 259 
B = 200 (16 - 4) (2.3986) / (4 - 1) (7.546) 
= 284.08 
= 284 
B = 200 (16 - 5) (3.6922) / (5 - 1) (7.5737) 
= 268.12 
= 268 
G8 
Variables 
a) (10,14) B = 200 (16 - 2) (0.3773) / (2 - 1) (3.2476) 
= 325.90 
= 326 
b) (10,14,16) 	 B = 200 (16 - 3) (0.8142) / (3 - 1) (3.3048) 
= 320.27 
= 320 
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Experiment is Anova Two-way (2B) 
Error Scores (Scores: arc sine transformations for proportion) 
def. NP 
	
2nd NP 
	
3rd o. 	 demonstratives 
Si 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
.6094 
.54 
.6094 
.33 
.64 
.44 
.54 
.45 
.57 
S1 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
1.37 
1.09 
1.37 
1.34 
1.09 
.95 
1.30 
1.32 
1.93 
S1 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
Sg 
.26 
.29 
.26 
.57 
.49 
.38 
.38 
.58 
.97 
S1 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
58 
Sg 
.42 
.29 
.42 
.67 
.64 
.44 
.85 
.57 
.32 
S10 .64 S10 1.95 Si 0 .49 S10 .82 
Si i .59 S11 1.51 S11 .41 Sii .85 
Si2 .77 Si2 .71 Si2 .33 Si2 .45 
S13 .59 S13 1.14 S13 .70 Si 3 .79 
S14 .28 Si 4 .88 514 .28 Si 4 .28 
Si 5 .57 Si 5 1.57 S15 .57 Si 5 .57 
S16 .29 
 Sib 2.02 S16 .49  S16 .49 
Si .42 Si .87 Si .87 Si .42 
S2 .54 S2 .54 S2 1.59 S2 .29 
S3 .42 S3 .87 S3 .87 S3 .42 
S4 .24 S4 .45 S4 .90 S4 .67 
S5 .37 S5 1.02 S5 .64 S5 .49 
S6 .53 S6 .70 S6 .53 S6 1.36 
S7 .97 S7 1.97 S7 .54 S7 .25 
S8 .70 S8 .70 S8 .92 S8 .58 
Sg .45 S9 .45 S9 .97 S9 .73 
Sio 1.64 Sio .57 S10 .95 Sio .41 
S11 .59 S11 .59 S11 .26 S11 .26 
S12 1.02 S12 .57 S12 1.04 Si 2 .53 
S13 .73 Si 3 .49 S13 .70 S13 .26 
S14 1.22 S14 .28 Si 4 1.22 Si 4 1.22 
Si 5 .57 Si 5 .57 Si 5 .57 Si5 .26 
.49  S16 , 
	
Sib .49 Si 6 .29  S16 .29 
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Experiment II: Anova Two-way (2B) 
Error Scores (Scores: arc sine transformations for proportion) 
2nd NP 
	
3rd o. 	 demonstratives 
Si 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
.45 
.92 
.45 
.44 
.60 
.87 
.82 
.70 
.57 
Si 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
.67 
.90 
.67 
.87 
.60 
.76 
.60 
.53 
.70 
Si 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
59 
.49 
.49 
.49 
.49 
.73 
.79 
.40 
.53 
.40 
sif 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
.45 
.45 
.45 
.64 
.45 
.45 
.57 
.08 
.73 
Sio .82 Sio .57 Sio .37 S10 .26 
S11 .85 S11 .49 S11 .70 S11 .73 
S12 .85 S12 .60 Si 2 .76 S12 .31 
513 .70 Si 3 .57 S13 .53 S13 .60 
514 .64 514 .70 514 .70 514 .85 
Si5 .76 Si 5 .40 Si 5 .73 Si 5 .76 
Si 6 1.04 Si 6 . .53 Si 6 .57 	 , 516 .53 
Si .67 Si .87 Si .85 S1 1.02 
S2 .67 S2 1.09 S2 .85 S2 .87 
S3 .67 S3 .87 S3 .85 S3 1.02 
S4 .76 S4 1.04 S4 .64 S4 .60 
S5 .73 S5 .79 S5 .73 S5 .70 
S6 .76 S6 .73 S6 .79 S6 .64 
S7 .76 S7 1.04 S7 .60 S7 .79 
S8 .76 S8 .95 S8 .70 S8 1.07 
S9 .64 S9 .70 Sg .64 Sg 1.00 
Sio 1.11 Sio .95 S10 .57 Sio .87 
S11 .79 S11 .70 Si i .64 S11 .67 
S12 .76 S12 .67 512 .76 S12 .79 
S13 .53 S13 .79 Si 3 .76 Si 3 1.00 
514 .45 514 .45 Si 4 1.00 S14 .70 
S15 .57 Si 5 .53 S15 .40 Si 5 1.15 
/ 	 S16 .90 
 S16 .70 
 S16 .60 Si6 .60 
tri-D = tri-dimensional pictures 
two-D = two-dimensional pictures 
Tri-D 
Two-D 
311 
:ataset: error analysis 
A 
.45 .67  .43 .45 
.92 .3 .49 .45 
.45 .6" .49 .45 
.44 .87 .49 .64 
.6 .6 .73 .45 
.37 .76 .7 9 .45 
.32 .6 .4 .57 
.7 .i3 .53 .38 
.7 - .4 .73 
.57 .5 .37 .26 
.82 .43 .7 .73 
.35 .6 .76 .31 
.7 .57 .53 .6 
.64 .7 .7 .85 
.76 .49 .73 .76 
1.04 .53 .57 .53 
2 
.67 .3-  .35 .32 
.67 1.C9 .85 .57 
.67 .37 .35 .32 
.76 .34 .64 .6 
.73 .73 .73 .7 
.76 .73 .79 .64 
.76 1.04 .6 .79 
.76 .35 .7 1.07 
.64 .7 .64 1 
1.11 .95 .57 .87 
.79 .7 .64 .67 
.76 .67 .76 .79 
.53 .79 .76 1 
.45 .45 1 .7 
.57 .53 .4 x.15 
.9 .7 .6 .6 
B 
-17nAf\3 -- •.,),4-1 CAA,c-kfkl-
Arqt‘ 
The Means of LEVELS for A and B are as follows: 
Variable A: 
Level ' 
Level : : 
Level 3 : 
Level '4 : 
Variaple B: 
Level 
Level 
Mean = .71 
Mean = .72 
Mean = .64 
Mean = .68 
Mean = .61 
Mean = .77 
The Means of Cells, 	 pAqB, 	 are: 
Cell: 
	 p 	 1 	 q 	 1 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .71 
Cell: 	 p 	 1 	 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean = .72 
Cell: 	 p 2 q 
	 1 	 : 	 Mean = .64 
Cell: 	 p 	 2 	 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean = .8 
Cell: 	 p 	 3 	 q 	 1 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .57 
Cell: 	 p 	 3 	 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .71 
Cell: 	 p 	 4 	 q 	 1 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .52 
Cell: 	 p 	 4 	 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .34 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE 
SOURCE SS 	 DF MS 
Main Effect A 0.13 3 0.04 1.58 
Main Effect B 0.81 1 0.81 30.07 
Interaction A X B 0.39 3 0.13 4.83 
Error 	 (Within Cells) 3.25 120 0.03 
Total 4.59 127 
Date: 10-02-1990 
Time: 11:43:02 
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A 
.45 .67  .45 .45 
.32 .9 .49 .45 
.45 .57 .49 .45 
.44 .87 .49 .64 
.6 .6 .73 .45 
.87 .76 .79 .45 
.82 .6 .4 .57 
.7 .53 .53 .08 
.7 .' .4 .73 
.F.:7 .57 .37 .26 
.32  
.35 .6 .76 .31 
.7 .57 .53 .6 
.64 .7 .' .85 
.76 .49 .73 .76 
1.04 .53 .57 .53 
2 
.67 .37 .35 1.02 
.57 1.09 .35 .87 
.67 .37 .35  32 
.76 1.04 .64 .6 
.73 .79 .73 .7 
.76 .73 .73 .64 
.76 1.04 .6 .79 
.76 .95 .7 1.07 
.64 .7 .64 1 
1.11 .95 .57 .87 
.79 .7 .64 .67 
.76 .67 .76 .79 
.53 .79 .76 1 
.45 .45 1 .7 
.57 .53 .4 1.15 
.9 .7 .6 .6 
B 
•• 
v.111,1k 
Dataset: error analysis 
The Means of LEVELS for A and B are as follows: 
Variable A: 
Level 1 : 	 Mean = .71 
Level 	 2 : 	 Mean = 	 .72 
Level 	 3 : 	 Mean = 	 .64 
Level 	 4 : 	 Mean = 	 .68 
Variable B: 
Level 1 : 	 Mean = .61 
Level 2 : 	 Mean = 	 77 
The Means of Cells, bAqB, are: 
Cell: 	 p 	 1 	 a 	 1 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .71 
Cell: 	 p 	 1 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean = .72 
Cell: 	 p 	 2 q 	 1 	 : 	 Mean = .64 
Cell: 	 p 	 2 	 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean = .8 
Cell: 	 p 	 3 	 q 	 1 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .57 
:ell: 	 p 	 3 	 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .71 
Cell: 	 p 	 4 	 q 	 1 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .52 
Cell: 	 p 	 4 	 q 	 2 	 : 	 Mean 	 = .34 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE 
SOURCE SS 	 DF MS 
Main Effect A 3.13 3 0..04 1.58 
Main Effect B 0.81 1 0.81 30.07 
Interaction A X B 0.39 3 0.13 4.83 
Error 	 (Within Cells) 3.25 120 0.03 
Total 4.59 127 
Date: 10-02-1990 
Time: 11:43:02 
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